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It should be reasonable to think of the Timaeus as an exposition on physics or, what I 
consider to be synonymous, cosmology.  Such a view, in fact, is a constant in commentary on the 
dialogue.  What is less prevalent, I find, is prolonged attention to why cosmology is at issue in 
the first place, and in this dissertation, at the most general level, I am filling in for this lack of 
attention. The Timaeus is not solely a physical treatise.  Rather, it is part of a larger multifaceted 
narrative.  As we learn at the outset of the dialogue, the previous day Timaeus and his cohort, 
which includes most notably, Critias, ask Socrates to offer his views on the nature of the ideal 
city.  Socrates accepts but asks the group to reciprocate with a story about his city at war.  They 
agree and the following day return to tell the story.  When digging deeper, we see that Socrates is 
asking more specifically for an encomium to his city that highlights not only its actions in war 
but also its warriors’ education as philosophers.  Critias, who spearheads the response, 
recognizes these details though instead of offering a story entirely his own, he draws on Solon’s 
account of the culture of ancient Athens and its battle with Atlantis.  This account includes not 
only the martial component of the encomium but also specifics about the Athenian warriors’ 
education which, as it turns out, is centered on the study of the kosmos.  In the end, Critias and 
Timaeus split the task of presenting Solon’s account.  Critias will relay the story about the 
Athenian warriors’ victory but only after Timaeus, who shows cognizance of both Socrates’ 
interest in philosophy and the ancient Athenians study of the kosmos, presents an account of the 
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cosmological education of philosophers.  Thus, my most comprehensive contention is that the 
physical views expressed in the Timaeus are first and foremost the substance of an educational 
program that acts as the gateway to philosophy and consequently to superior philosopher-
warriors, and I spend the majority of the dissertation unpacking this claim.  
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 In what follows, I offer, first, a general overview of my project; second, a synopsis of the 
four chapters that compose this dissertation; and third, a description of my methodology. 
General Overview 
The Timaeus is not an independent work.  Rather, it is the premier dialogue in an 
unfinished trilogy that also includes, the Critias, of which we have only a fragment, and the 
Hermocrates, which is forecast in the Critias but was presumably never written.1  Building on 
these considerations, in my investigation of the Timaeus, I start from the assumption that the 
physical views presented by the main character, Timaeus, can only be adequately understood if 
this larger context or story is taken into account.  
The larger story is one that, in a literal sense, surrounds Timaeus’ physics.  Prior to the 
physics, we get a rich prologue that can be divided into three parts.  In the first part, Socrates 
reminds his interlocutors—Timaeus, Critias, and Hermocrates—of the speech he had given them 
the previous day, a speech about the best city and its citizens.  After going over the high points of 
his speech, which concerned the education and upbringing of philosopher-warriors, Socrates then 
reminds Timaeus and company of the request he made of them.  The request was that they repay 
his account of the ideal city with a story of its philosopher-warriors engaged in battle.             
In the second part of the prologue, we get a trial run or mini-version of the story that 
Timaeus and company hope will fulfill Socrates’ request.  The story is told by Critias though it is 
not Critias’ own creation.  Rather, he borrows the tale from Solon.  On the whole, the tale is a 
discussion of the history of ancient Greece.  It includes the bad times, cataclysmic events like 
floods and conflagrations that destroy Greece’s cities and people, and the good times, the fine 
                                                 
1 See Cornford (1937): 7-8. 
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laws and heroic military victory of the first Athenians over the aggressive military forces of 
Atlantis.   
In the final part of the prologue, Critias proposes that Timaeus and himself work together 
to tell the latter more positive part of the history as a way of fulfilling Socrates’ request.  
Socrates accepts this as fulfillment, and the plan for the two speeches is further described and 
solidified.  Timaeus will speak on the generation of the universe and mankind, and Critias will 
follow him with a story about the ancient Athenians and their battle with Atlantis.  Thus, in the 
end, Timaeus’ physics is surrounded on the one side by the prologue, and on the other by Critias’ 
story about the war with Atlantis, a story which is (or at least was meant to be) the content of the 
dialogue, Critias.  
Now, I think, what should be striking here is the apparent disconnect between Socrates’ 
request for a story about a war and Timaeus’ story about the universe.  On the face of it, the one 
simply does not seem to be relevant to the other.  Yet when Critias proposes the plan for the 
speeches, Socrates is not at all surprised to hear that he will be getting a speech about physics or 
cosmology.  In fact, he seems quite happy about it.  So the solution to this initial problem seems 
to be a project that involves taking a closer look at Socrates’ request, and ultimately this 
dissertation is just that.   
First and foremost, I aim to show that Socrates actually secures what he wants, and 
showing this involves two things.  On the one hand, of course, I will need to determine what 
Socrates’ is asking of Timaeus and company.  On the other, I will also need to establish that 
Timaeus and Critias, in particular, really give him what he wants.   
In sum, I claim that Socrates is seeking out an encomium to his ideal city, an encomium 
that undoubtedly includes a story about a war but one that also includes reference to the warriors’ 
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education in philosophy.  I further assert that Critias takes on the task of telling the story about 
the war, and Timaeus provides the tale of philosophical training via cosmology.   
Accordingly in Chapter 1, I begin by establishing the substance of Socrates’ request and 
how Timaeus and Critias act to fulfill it.  I then move in Chapter 2 to show that Timaeus is 
indeed taking up the educational portion of the task, and I lay out in broad strokes what I take his 
educational program to be.  In Chapters 3 and 4, I complete the project by sharpening the focus 
onto the pivotal moments I see in the progress of philosophical training.  
Synopsis of Chapters  
1. Socrates’ Request: Encomium, Education, and War 
 As indicated, I begin in Chapter 1 with the intent of establishing the substance of 
Socrates’ request as well as Timaeus and Critias’ role in fulfilling it, and this interest is 
ultimately born of a desire to solve what I call, the irrelevance problem.  The irrelevance problem 
indicates two kinds of obscurity.  Not only is it unclear what the topic of cosmology has to do 
with topic of war, but it is also equally unclear why Timaeus’ cosmological account precedes the 
martial account intended for the Critias.    
In short, my analysis of Socrates’ request is meant to address both arms of the problem.  
First, Socrates is not asking for a mere story about a war.  More precisely, he is asking for an 
encomium to his ideal city which includes both a martial component and, it seems, an 
educational component.  Concerning the topical arm of the problem, then, I argue that the 
educational and martial aspects of the request explain the presence of the topic of cosmology, 
construed as education, and the topic of war.  Second, drawing on the discussion of encomium in 
the Symposium, I argue further that Socrates’ request for encomium is actually a request for a 
particular structural or presentational order.  In proper encomium, one first presents the relevant 
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qualities in the subjects of praise which, in this case, means presenting the warriors’ education as 
philosophers.  Only after does one present the deed made possible by such qualities and for 
which we praise the subject, the deed being, of course, the victory of the Athenians over Atlantis.  
Thus, in the end, Critias’ role in the larger project is to present an account of this victory.  
Timaeus’ role, on the other hand, is not only to offer a picture of the philosopher’s cosmological 
education.  He must also speak first so that we might be mindful of the connection between 
philosophy and the warriors’ success on the battlefield.  
2. The Educational Program of the Timaeus in Outline: Medicine, Cause, and the 
Tripartite Structure of Timaeus’ Speech 
 
Establishing the substance of Socrates’ request and how, in particular, Timaeus will act to 
fulfill it can only serve as partial support for my interpretation.  Accordingly, I enter Chapter 2 
with the idea that I must further demonstrate the presence of a philosophy-centered educational 
program in Timaeus’ speech.  In fact, we might think of Chapter 2 as well as the two that follow 
as catering primarily to this task. 
Broadly speaking, then, I suggest that Timaeus thinks of education in two ways.  First, 
education is a medical enterprise intended to make us healthy or more specifically to help us 
recuperate from the psychic damage that we are told is a result of our embodiment.  In fact, it 
seems that Timaeus has taken many of the traditional subject matters such as gymnastics, music, 
and astronomy and incorporated them into the curriculum precisely according to their ability to 
produce health.   Moreover, as I argue, the epitome of such well-being and accordingly the 
pristine product of Timaean education is, in short, the philosopher, who is not only physically fit 
but who has also fully recuperated from the psychic damage incurred at incarnation. 
Second, education is, in a significant sense, a study of the causes, in particular, necessary 
and intelligent cause.  We see this in Timaeus’ description of the aspiring philosopher who 
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certainly studies both causes but also studies them in a particular order, namely beginning from 
the intelligent and then moving on to the necessary.  Further, given the three part structure of his 
speech and its connection to these two causes, we also see that the order in which Timaeus 
presents these three parts is itself parallel to the progress of the philosopher’s education—the 
first part of the speech being a study of intelligent cause, the second of the necessary, and the 
third, in short, the study of both.  Thus, it appears that Timaeus’ commitment to education is not 
at all superficial but rather even penetrates the very structure of his speech. 
In the end, I consider the medical and causal pictures of education to be the more 
explicitly stated formats.  By contrast, I conclude the chapter by introducing what I take to be the 
implied stages of Timaeus’ educational program, stages that will be the focus of Chapters 3 and 
4.  I divide these stages into two groups according to their place in the progress toward 
philosophy and the production of the philosopher, one marking the pre-philosophical stages and 
the other the philosophical.  Our progress through the former extends from our birth and the 
damage done to our immortal soul upon incarnation to the collection of astronomical data or 
observational astronomy.  The philosophical stages begin from mathematical astronomy and the 
healing it brings and conclude with the full-fledged philosopher who is master of his emotions 
and desires and consequently is a superior candidate for war.   
3. The Pre-philosophical Stages: Embodiment and the Existence and Convalescence of 
Intellect 
 
In chapter 3, I address the pre-philosophical stages of Timaeus’ educational program, 
stages that cover two areas of interest.  First, Timaeus suggests that our souls, in particular our 
immortal souls, are ideally composites of healthy, revolving, circular rings, one of which is our 
intellect and the others which are at least part of our faculty of sense-perception.  Moreover, our 
psychic revolutions, as Timaeus calls them, bear kinship to the orbits we see in the heavens, 
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orbits which, as we are told, are manifestations of the psychic revolutions of the living god that is 
the universe itself.  Upon embodiment, however, our immortal souls are distorted, and they lose 
their proper shape and motion, and the pre-philosophical stages technically represent not only the 
damage caused by incarnation but also the different phases in the educational progress toward 
the healing of our immortal souls and, in particular, our intellects.  This convalescence, as 
indicated above, follows on the heels of the final pre-philosophical stage which consists in 
collecting data on the speeds of the heavenly revolutions and which serves, in turn, as 
preparation for comparing them mathematically and consequently, in the very act of 
computation, restoring the proper shape and speed of our own intellectual revolutions.  
Sandwiched between our damaging embodiment and data collection, the second stage 
and area of interest concerns the mere existence of intellect.  I include this stage for two reasons.  
On the one hand, Timaeus seems to be at some pains to paint a motivating portrait of an 
unsavory character who does not believe in intellect, a character who, in some sense, is punished 
for his failure to believe and, accordingly, a character we should not be.  Thus, this phase, in 
some sense, is about choosing education and more specifically choosing to believe in intellect 
enough to pursue its treatment.  On the other hand, apart from suggesting a belief in intellect, 
Timaeus posits the existence of quantitatively distinct intellects, individual intellects.  In short, 
this has great bearing on the possibility of education, to the extent that moral responsibility or, 
more generally speaking, agency has such bearing.  In essence, education does not make sense in 
a world controlled entirely by necessity and the gods.  Rather, education assumes that virtue or 






4. The Philosophical Stages: Following Intellect and the Production of the Philosopher-
Warrior 
 
 Having chosen to believe in intellect and the need for treatment and further having 
gathered the astronomical data from the heavens to be applied in such treatment, we arrive at the 
philosophical stages.  I divide these stages in two as I think Timaeus also does.  The first stage 
involves following the heavenly revolution of intelligence, and as I argue, such devotion 
amounts to one sense of Timaeus’ use of the term philosophia.  “Following” in this instance 
indicates imitation, and the act of imitating, I claim, involves correctly calculating the relative 
speeds of the heavenly revolutions.  In fact, this calculation results in an intellect on our part that 
mimics the perfect spatial characteristics of the universe’s revolution of intelligence.   
The second stage and thus the second sense of philosophia involves following the 
intellect in us.  In short, this allegiance amounts to the exertion of control over mortal soul which 
is effected in part through an uncanny control over body.  More specifically, in this stage, we 
master our emotions and desires through advanced control over the circulatory system and 
organs inside us like the liver, to which the lowest desires of appetitive soul are attached.   
 In this final chapter, I also take into account the primary upshot of achieving the height of 
philosophy, the philosopher-warrior, and here I focus, in particular, on what makes him an ideal 
candidate for war.  First, the philosopher’s superior control over his own physiology translates to 
an equally superior control over his enemies, and as we might suspect, ultimately what is at issue 
is a body that supports or assists in the maintenance of intellectual dominion and even in the 
midst of the most passionate moments of battle.  Second, the philosopher is the ideal warrior 






 On the most general level, this dissertation is an exegetical project.  For starters, this 
means that I am thinking of the text in a certain way: namely, I conceive of the text as a network 
of the characters’ desires, reasons for the existence of those desires, and the fulfillment of those 
desires.  As already indicated, I am concentrating on what Socrates wants and how it is that he 
gets what he wants via the speeches of Timaeus and Critias.  This is, however, where my 
analysis of character ends.  I do not, for instance, try to develop or incorporate a more detailed 
portrait of Plato’s Socrates nor do I attempt to grasp at the historical Socrates.  I also do not draw 
on Platonic or historical portraits of Critias or the more mysterious Timaeus.   
Ultimately, this move is part of a larger strategy that involves staying as close to the text 
of the Timaeus as possible.  Concentrating on the network of the characters’ intentions and 
interactions means that I not only steer clear of situating the Timaeus within the history of 
physics that precedes Plato but also that I choose not to draw on other Platonic dialogues (with 
one exception—my appeal to the Symposium in Chapter 1).  Bypassing the former, I gather, 
should not be that alarming.  Bypassing the latter, however, will be particularly controversial 
given the long history of reading the Timaeus as a continuation of the Republic, an issue I discuss 
in some detail in Chapter 1.  In sum, I conclude that consulting the Republic is unnecessary for 
an adequate understanding of the Timaeus though I certainly do not mean to suggest that 
consulting the Republic is not or cannot be illuminating.  What I am claiming instead is that “the 
dialogue,” in this case the Timaeus, is a respectable unit of analysis in its own right and one 
distinct from what I take to be the more customary unit of analysis—i.e., Plato’s thought, an 
entity spanning multiple dialogues.  I am, however, not alone in wanting to address only a single 
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Platonic work.  Margaret Mackenzie shares a similar sentiment2  as does Sarah Broadie who tells 
us in her recent book on the Timaeus: 
In what lies ahead no conclusions have been allowed to hinge on potential evidence from 
dialogues other than the Timaeus-Critias.  This is partly because adequate evaluation of 
any such evidence would have led me beyond a reasonable limit.  It also seemed no bad 
project in itself to see how far one can get examining the Timaeus-Critias solely from 
within, so to speak.  Thus I have not attempted to establish any features of the Timaean 
account by inference from trends of Plato’s thought appearing in other dialogues or other 
late dialogues.  Such inferences require decisions on difficult and often indeed scarcely 
decidable questions such as whether a given pattern or habit of thought is in fact 
discernible elsewhere to the exclusion of contrary patterns, or whether some pattern 
found in one dialogue can be assumed to carry over to another.3   
For me, the drawback of starting our interpretation from outside the Timaeus, and again I am 
thinking of starting from the Republic, is that we run the risk of covering up the larger project 
that unites the Timaeus and Critias with the larger project of the Republic, as Cornford and 
Johansen may be seen to do (again, see Chapter 1).4  Accordingly, by narrowing the focus, I 
intend to draw out the unique project that envelops the Timaeus and Critias. 
I am interested in this unique project both in its own right and for methodological 
reasons.  In this dissertation, I aim to understand the Timaeus as a whole though I start from the 
assumption that if one wants to understand the Timaeus one must first establish the larger project 
                                                 
2 Described in Gill (2000): 63 with n. 19. 
3 Broadie (2012): 5-6. 
4 Cornford (1937): 5-6, and Johansen (2004): 7-9. 
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of which both the Timaeus and Critias are a part and then illuminate the Timaeus or more 
precisely Timaeus’ speech within the context of this project.  The further assumption is that the 
substance of this larger project is to be found in Socrates’ request.  In other words, the request is 
the source of the overarching narrative that unites the speeches of both Timaeus and Critias, and 
in the main this dissertation is a reproduction of the uniting narrative I find, a narrative 
established by what Socrates’ wants from Timaeus and company and concluded, at least for my 
purposes, by Timaeus’ detailed response to Socrates’ desires.   
 
 
1. Socrates’ Request: Encomium, Education, and War 
1.1 Introduction: The Irrelevance Problem and Socrates’ Request—A 
Contemporary History 
 
1.2 Socrates’ Summary of the Events of the Previous Day: Socrates’ Politeia and His 
Request 
 
  1.2.1 Socrates’ Request: Metaphorical and Literal 
  1.2.2 Encomium, Education, and War 
1.3 Critias’ Proposal for Fulfilling Socrates’ Request 
  1.3.1 Critias Connects with Socrates: The Two-fold Relevance of Solon’s Story 
  1.3.2 Critias’ Delegation to Timaeus 
1.4 Plato’s Symposium and the Order of Encomium 




1.1 Introduction: The Irrelevance Problem and Socrates’ Request—A Contemporary 
History 
 
This dissertation is the product of an attempt to deal with what one might call, “the 
irrelevance problem.”  This problem can be cashed out in two ways.  First, what does Timaeus’ 
story about the creation of the universe and mankind have to do with Critias’ story about ancient 
Athens at war with Atlantis?  Or more precisely, why does Timaeus’ story come before Critias’ 
full speech or even after Critias’ trial run? Alternatively, one might frame the problem by asking, 
what does Timaeus’ story have to do with Socrates’ request for a story about a war?  In fact, 
given this request, why is there a cosmological story at all?  In each case, the issue is the 
irrelevance of one to the other, whether it be in terms of the apparent incongruity between the 
speeches themselves or between what Socrates asks for and what he gets.   
I approach the problem from the latter point of view not only because it first struck me 
that way but also because I find the solution to the irrelevance problem ultimately through appeal 
to Socrates’ request and the unity it provides.  Surprisingly enough, however, in employing this 
approach, I find my own work as well as a large portion of contemporary scholarship on the 
matter in a unique position.  The vast majority of the history of critical engagement with the 
Timaeus pays no attention to the irrelevance problem nor to Socrates’ request, and I take it that 
this is a side-effect of the predominant tendency to read the dialogue selectively, the best 
examples of which are Cicero, who is primarily concerned with the theology and “mathematical 
cosmology” of the premier part of Timaeus’ speech,5 and Calcidius who has a similar focus 
                                                 
5 See Sedley (2013): 200-1.  Cicero incorporates only Tim. 27d-47b, a stretch of text that highlights the 
activities of the craftsman god, the demiurge.   
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though by contrast at least exhibits some interest in the formation of the elements.6  At the same 
time, this is not to say that the irrelevance problem or, just generally, concern for unity never 
shows up.  Certainly commentators as remote from us as Longinus had enough interest in the 
question to offer a solution at the very least—the war story is intended to serve as a kind of 
enticing carrot that will draw horsey readers through Timaeus’ dense exposition.7  Proclus too, 
from whom we get the above information about Longinus, weighs in on the issue claiming that 
the war story serves as an image of cosmological issues, an image meant to reinforce our 
understanding of the true focus of the Timaeus, the study of nature.8  So here I am definitely not 
claiming that no one has ever addressed the issue of relevance.  In fact, the issue appears to be 
quite old.  Rather, what I want to understand is what happened to put the issue and its attendant 
investment in Socrates’ request on the map with the current contrasting force of an interpretive 
imperative, a force represented I think by the two most prominent monographs on the Timaeus 
written in English in the last ten years: Johansen’s 2004 Plato’s Natural Philosophy and 
Broadie’s 2012 Nature and Divinity in Plato’s Timaeus.  In Johansen, not only is the irrelevance 
problem more or less the motivation for the entire account, but Johansen, at least in part, also 
                                                 
6 See Backhouche (2011): 25-30.  Calcidius addresses only 17a-53c.  At 53c, the demiurge leaves the 
narrative, for the most part, and Timaeus takes over with his mathematical speculations on the nature of 
the four elements—fire, air, water, and earth. 
7 Proclus: 83.19-25.  For some general information on Longinus, see Tarrant (2007): 35-7 and 74-6.  
Longinus was “the early teacher of Porphyry.”  Porphyry, of course, is most famous for his work with 
Plotinus. 
8 Proclus: 83.29-84.7 
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uses Socrates’ request as a principle of unity to help solve the problem just as I do.9  Similarly, 
Broadie begins her extended discussion of “The Timaeus-Critias Complex” from the irrelevance 
problem and also appeals to Socrates’ request as a unifying principle to be used for the solution 
of the problem.10  So again, what happened? 
  In short, Cornford happened.  I am tempted to think, however, that only one of his ideas 
is really at issue because, with respect to the matter at hand, only one thing really changed in his 
work, albeit a very big thing.  In Cornford’s 1937, Plato’s Cosmology, the long tradition of 
seeing a dramatic connection between the Republic, Timaeus, and Critias, a tradition at least as 
old as Thrasyllus11 and extending as far as Taylor,12 comes to an end.  Cornford claims that the 
dramatic date of the Republic, established by the festival of Bendis, and the dramatic date of the 
Timaeus, established by the Panathenaea, are in reality too far apart to assert that the 
conversation in the Timaeus takes place two days after the Republic.13  Now, in my assessment, 
                                                 
9 Johansen (2004): 4 and 7-8. 
10 Broadie (2012): 115-6. 
11 Diogenes Laertius: 1.3.60.  For a full treatment of Thrasyllus’ role in the editing of the Platonic corpus, 
see Tarrant (1993).  
12 Taylor (1968): 13.  For a post-Taylor commentator who commits to the dramatic connection, see Krell 
(1975): 408 (Cited in Schoos (2010): 103).   
13 Cornford (1937): 4-5.  In the European world, to which Cornford gives credit, however, Hirzel (1895): 
257, is the first to dissolve the connection.  He is followed in France by Rivaud (1925): 19.  I think it also 
important to note that Taylor (1968): 45, almost saved the dramatic connection between the dialogues, 
citing for the Timaeus the date of the Plynteria, also a festival of Athena, which follows directly after the 
Bendidea.  Cornford, however, notes not only that en tē panegurei (Tim. 21a2) “implies an important
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Cornford’s move here is a kind of catalyst for two things.  First, because the tight dramatic 
connection to the Republic has been dissolved, I suggest that contemporary scholars, Cornford 
included, are more likely to shift some or even much of their focus to the connection between the 
Timaeus and Critias, and they are because the two dialogues now make up a work in a 
significant sense distinct from the Republic.  Second, as a result of the new autonomy of the 
Timaeus and Critias, we are also more likely to look for unifiers within them rather than in the 
Republic, and as far as I am concerned this is where Socrates’ request enters the picture.   
In fact, I see the first appeal to Socrates’ request as a unifier not surprisingly in Cornford 
himself.  Cornford interprets the request in terms of a desire to see Socrates’ theoretical politeia 
factualized,14 though in this move Cornford has certainly not done away with all concern for the 
Republic.  To the contrary, it appears that themes from the Republic, in particular the factuality, 
or more appropriately, the feasibility of Socrates’ politeia, more or less do the unifying work.  
The important thing to note, however, is that Cornford, nonetheless, distills this theme through 
his feasibility interpretation of Socrates’ request and also equally importantly uses this 
interpretation to unify the speeches of Timaeus and Critias, claiming that Timaeus establishes the 
feasibility of the city’s morality by showing its presence in the stars while Critias establishes 
feasibility in his assertion that such a city did in fact exist in the past.15  So, in the end, what is 
important to see here is the beginnings of the two part contemporary move to explain not only 
the relevance of the Timaeus to the Critias but also to incorporate Socrates’ request into the 
                                                 
festival,” which it appears the Plynteria is not, but also claims that the Plynteria comes five days after the 
festival of Bendis rather than two.    
14 Cornford (1937): 3. 
15 Op. Cit.: 5-6. 
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explanation of this relevance.  In fact, in one way or another, this is the very thing we see in 
Johansen and Broadie both of whom (though they appear to be entirely unconscious of it) are 
ultimately working from Cornford’s template.  I will now address their accounts, accordingly.    
For Johansen, in essence, Socrates requests a story about a war,16 and like Cornford, 
Johansen draws on the Republic for unity while also distilling what he finds there through his 
interpretation of Socrates’ request.  Johansen asserts that Plato makes Socrates ask for a story 
about a war because in the Republic, though Plato discussed justice in the individual and within 
the context of the state, Plato failed to discuss justice in relation to other states and moreover 
failed to provide an adequate basis for this justice.17  Accordingly, Timaeus and Critias will 
remedy this deficiency, Timaeus offering a preface on human nature designed to provide the 
cosmological basis for this justice between states and Critias offering Solon’s story about the war 
with Atlantis as an illustration of such justice. 
What Johansen adds to Cornford’s template, however, is teleology construed as the 
notion that nature works for the best.18  For Johansen, Timaeus’ cosmology is, in fact, ultimately 
a study of teleology.  Teleology, it seems, is both the study of nature at its rational best, 
                                                 
16 I refer here mostly to the first Chapter of Johansen (2004), “What is the Timaeus-Critias about,” in 
which the primary focus is war.  See in particular: 8-11. 
17 Johansen (2004): 9 and 15-16.  Though in some sense it may be correct to say that Plato only partially 
addresses the issue of justice in relation to other cities in the Republic, I think it would be false to say that 
he does not consider this issue at all.  In book V, Plato is explicitly concerned with matters of military 
ethics—i.e. how soldiers are to deal with their enemies (Republic 468a-471c).  See also Jaeger (1943): 
254-8.   
18 Johansen (2004): 22. 
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victorious over the “injustice” of necessity, and a study of nature’s similarity to, support of, and 
demand for human nature at its own rational best, at its most just, at its most real.  In this respect, 
Timaeus’ cosmological story aligns with Critias’ war story to the extent that Critias’ story is also 
an example of human nature at its most real, human nature in the midst of battle, and the ways in 
which its most real aspects, its rationality, its justice, just like the kindred universe, triumph over 
the earthly irrationality and injustice typified by the Atlanteans.19  Teleology construed as nature 
working for the best, as nature working for justice is, in the end, the basis of this triumph in both 
contexts and thus the unifier of the two speeches.  
Broadie makes a similar move to Johansen’s minus the explicit appeal to teleology.  In 
fact, what she says may even amount to a criticism of his use of teleology as a unifier.  For 
Broadie, the victory of rationality (which for Johansen is just another way of saying teleology), 
while apparent in both speeches, is not enough to tell the full story of their unity.20  In addition, 
she emphasizes that one interested in unity must also, as we should expect, understand Socrates’ 
request but not so much in terms of what he is asking for, as Johansen does, but in terms of what 
Socrates represents as the character motivating the two speeches via his request in the first place.  
In short, Socrates represents a certain conception of philosophy, and in making Socrates request 
the honorable and generous reimbursement of Timaeus’ and Critias’ speeches, Broadie claims 
that Plato means to draw our attention to some higher unifying point about philosophy.  In fact, 
the theme of philosophy is the supreme unifier, and Timaeus’ cosmology and Critias’ 
historiography are unified by the fact that they are both genres of philosophy.21  Again, as with 
                                                 
19 Op. Cit.: 22. 
20 Broadie (2012): 115-6. 
21 Op. Cit.: 115-20. 
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Cornford and Johansen, in the end what we have here is the resolution of the irrelevance problem 
through appeal to a unifier found in Socrates’ request.             
Now all this being said, I see my own work as very much a part of this contemporary 
tradition and precisely to the extent that I look to Socrates’ request in order to resolve the 
irrelevance problem.  One might say that I depart from this tradition, however, insofar as I am 
taking both one step backwards and one step forwards.  I am taking a step backwards in the sense 
that I will not be appealing to any unifying themes above and beyond what I find in Socrates’ 
request.  I am taking a step forward in the sense that, unlike my predecessors, I leave behind the 
tendency to infuse Socrates’ request with any themes from the Republic or any understanding of 
what Socrates represents or how he is traditionally conceived.  It is my hope that the unity I find 
by taking both these steps is a stronger kind of unity than the traditional allegorical or thematic 
unity, a stronger unity I refer to as “structural unity” because, ultimately, I am pursuing an 
explanation of structure or, in particular, an explanation of the order of presentation—i.e. why 
Timaeus’ speech precedes Critias’ full account of the war.  The significance of this will become 
apparent below.  In the meantime, I think it is best to offer a rough division of Socrates’ 
introductory summary into parts so that I can elaborate on and delineate interpretations that focus 
specifically on Socrates’ request and also lay the groundwork for the presentation of my own 
interpretation.   
1.2 Socrates’ Summary of the Events of the Previous Day: Socrates’ Politeia and His 
Request 
The Timaues begins with Socrates’ summary of the events of the previous day.  
Essentially, the day before two things take place: Socrates gives a speech on the ideal politeia to 
Timaeus and company, and he requests that he be repaid for his speech with speeches to be given 
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by Timaeus and company.  Accordingly, Socrates’ summary can be divided in two.  The first 
part contains an overview that addresses the social structure of the politeia, the role and nature of 
its warriors, the education and remuneration of these warriors, and in some general way marriage 
and child-rearing.  The second part contains a metaphorical and literal description of the speech 
Socrates requested as well as an account of what motivates him specifically to approach Timaeus 
et al.  To make all this clear, I offer the following outline: 
First Part:  Socrates summary of His Speech (17c-19b2)  
1. The social structure of the politeia and the role and nature of the warriors (17c10-18a7) 
2. The education and remuneration of the warriors (18a9-c5) 
3. Marriage and child rearing (18c6-19a6) 
Second Part: Socrates Summary of His Request (19b3-20c3) 
1. The metaphorical description of the speech requested (19b3-c2) 
2. The literal description of the speech requested (19c2-8) 
3. Socrates’ motivation for asking Timaeus and company (19c8-20c2) 
For the time being, I am interested only in items 1. and 2. from the second part of the summary.   
1.2.1 Socrates’ Request: Metaphorical and Literal 
I start from Socrates’ metaphorical description of his request, which in some sense also 
amounts to a description of his most raw reason for requesting a follow up speech to his own.  It 
is as follows: 
All right, I’d like to go on now and tell you what I’ve come to feel about the political 
structure [peri tēs politeias] we’ve described.  My feelings are like those of a man who 
gazes upon magnificent looking animals, whether they’re animals in a painting or truly 
alive but at rest, and who then finds himself longing to look at them in motion or engaged 
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in some struggle that shows off their distinctive physical qualities.  I felt the same thing 
about the city we’ve described. (19b3-c2: tr. Zeyl with modifications)22 
Socrates is motivated by a feeling.  This feeling amounts to an experience of beauty, and more 
specifically to an experience of beautiful animals at rest, and as the passage says, whether they 
are images in a painting or truly alive but motionless.  Further, it seems that this feeling is one 
that craves more of the same, more of that feeling of beauty, and the intensity of this feeling, it 
appears, can be increased by seeing the beautiful animals actively engaged in conflict.   
As we see from the last line of the passage, the description of this motivating feeling is a 
metaphorical description, or analogy, for another feeling Socrates has, his feeling about the ideal 
politeia.  In other words, Socrates’ description here is analogous to or revealing of what, I 
suggest, he literally wants which is, as we will see, a speech not about animals in motion but 
about his city in motion, his city actively engaged in conflict with its enemies.   
As far as commentators like Reydams-Schils and Slaveva-Griffin are concerned, 
however, this metaphorical description of Socrates’ request is not merely metaphorical, as I have 
suggested.  To the contrary, it also contains information about the literal content of the speech 
Socrates wants or at least information that Timaeus and Critias can be seen to take up and weave 
into their own accounts.  Reydams-Schils, inspired by Proclus, sees in Socrates’ reference to 
animals at rest and animals in motion two ontological categories, unchanging being (animals at 
rest) and always changing becoming (animals in motion).23  Moreover, she contends that 
                                                 
22 For the most part, I use the translation of Zeyl (2000).  I indicate, however, when the translations are 
my own. 
23 Reydams-Schils (2001): 41. For similar work by Reydams-Schils on Socrates’ request see, Reydams-
Schils (2002) and (2011).  Also see Proclus: 60.12-20, for his claim to see being and becoming in the 
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Socrates is looking for a speech that incorporates these two aspects of reality and in a way that 
also serves as “a reality check” for his ideal politeia.24  In her assessment, however, Critias 
clumsily construes this request in terms of historical reality, speaking only to becoming and thus 
fails to give Socrates’ what he wants.  Timaeus, on the other hand, correctly understands 
Socrates’ request and fulfills it at least to the extent that he incorporates both being and 
becoming into his account and even explicitly employs the notion of living things.25   
Slaveva-Griffin also sees literal substance in the metaphorical description though I think 
her account is in some sense more abstract than that of Reydams-Schils.  Slaveva-Griffin claims 
that Socrates requests images and gets them from both Critias and Timaeus.  Critias delivers, at 
minimum, a mimetic account of ancient Athens while Timaeus capitalizes on the use of image 
not only as the mimetic form of his speech but also as a kind of content—the universe itself is an 
image of the eternal living thing.26          
 In the end, readings of Socrates’ request like those of Reydams-Schils and Slaveva-
Griffin typify one group of interpretations, a group I delineate, as one might suspect already, by 
the mining they do on what I have been referring to as Socrates’ metaphorical description.  These 
interpretations, though I think on some level necessary and even desirable, nevertheless, tend to 
                                                 
metaphorical description.  I do not offer an account of Proclus here, however, because Proclus is not 
really interested in Socrates’ request qua request nor qua unifier.  Rather, he is much more interested in it 
qua allegorical.   
24 Reydams-Schils (2001): 41.  Compare Cornford (1937): 5-6 for a similar feasibility interpretation of 
Socrates’ request. 
25 Reydams-Schils (2001): 49. 
26 Slaveva-Griffin (2005): 312 and 325. 
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be abstract or too general.  That is, they seem in some sense to be only minimally helpful when it 
comes to illuminating the specifics of Timaeus and Critias’ accounts.  On the other hand, the 
redeeming quality of such interpretations, apart from the fact that they appeal, at least implicitly, 
to Socrates’ request as a unifier, is precisely the work they do to expose the connection between 
the request and the form and content of Timaeus’ speech, something I will be at some pains to do 
myself in Chapter 2.           
 I single out another group of interpretations of Socrates’ request by the focus they place 
on the literal description of his request.  In fact, I suggest that, in some sense, this is the most 
popular way of interpreting the request.  The literal interpretation of the request is based on the 
following passage: 
I’d love to listen to someone give a speech depicting our city in a contest with other 
cities, competing for those prizes that cities typically compete for.  I’d love to see our city 
distinguish itself in the way it enters the war and in the way it pursues the war: exhibiting 
those qualities which belong to it by means of education and training—that is, with 
respect to the good results of its actions and how it negotiates with the other cities.  So on 
these matters, Critias and Hermocrates, I charge myself with being quite unable to offer 
fitting encomium to our city and its men. (19c2-19d2: tr. Zeyl with modifications) 
The typical take-away from this passage is, more or less, the view that Socrates is asking for a 
story about a war, and I reiterate that this is, in a sense, the majority view.27  Many scholars, 
however, also note that while Socrates certainly wants a story about a war, he also stipulates the 
                                                 
27 See Archer-Hind (1888): 61; Taylor (1928): 13; Sallis (1999): 27; as seen above, Johansen (2004): 8-
11; Zuckert (2011): 331; and to some extent Broadie (2012): 137. 
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incorporation of education into that story.28  And though I think these two interpretations are 
prevalent enough, they are never much more than interpretations in passing, claims made about 
the request over the course of some other account or argument.  That being said, I will add that 
both of these interpretations are, in one way or another, an additional source of the irrelevance 
problem, as I have framed it.  In other words, the presence of Timaeus’ cosmological story is 
particularly suspicious when we read into Socrates’ request a near exclusive emphasis on war.  
As we will soon see, however, solving the problem means doing away with this exclusivity by 
giving education and war equal weight in the request, an equal weight I achieve for the most part 
by emphasizing that Socrates requests an encomium.  Thus, in the end, I think it is safe to say 
that my interpretation, like the majority, relies entirely on the literal description of the request.  
Unlike the majority interpretation, however, I appeal not just to war or education but also to 
encomium.29   
1.2.2 Encomium, Education, and War 
 It is best to begin with what I referred to above as Socrates’ motivation to ask Timaeus 
and company for the speech he desires.  I should emphasize ahead of time, however, that the 
passage that follows takes place in the specific context of Socrates’ request for encomium.  The 
relevance of this context will become apparent soon enough.  For now, the passage is as follows: 
                                                 
28 See Gill (1977): 300; in some measure, Zeyl (200): xxvii; Johansen (2004): 8-11, who at least touches 
on the matter regardless of his emphasis on the war aspect of the request; and Howland (2007): 8. 
29 Erler (1997)(cited and described in Reydams-Schils (2001), 43), is the only other commentator I have 
found who is interested in encomium in the Timaeus though he is not necessarily interested in encomium 




Now on these matters [tauta oun], Critias and Hermocrates, I charge myself with being 
quite unable to offer fitting encomium [egkōmiasai] to our city and its men.  That this 
should be so in my case isn’t at all surprising. But I have come to have the same opinion 
of the poets, our ancient poets as well as today’s.  I have no disrespect for poets in 
general, but everyone knows that imitators as a breed are best and most adept at imitating 
the sorts of things they’ve been trained to imitate.  It’s difficult enough for any one of 
them to do a decent job of imitating in performance, let alone narrative description, 
anything that lies outside their training.  And again, I’ve always thought that sophists as a 
class are very well versed in making long speeches and doing many other fine things.  
But because they wander from one city to the next and never settle down in homes of 
their own, I’m afraid their representations of those who are both philosophers 
[philosophōn] and politicians [politikōn] would simply miss the mark.  Sophists are 
bound to misrepresent whatever these leaders accomplish on the battlefield when the 
engage any of their enemies, whether in actual warfare or in negotiations. 
 So that leaves people of your sort, then.  By nature as well as by training [trophē] 
you take part in both philosophy and politics at once.  Take Timaeus here.  He’s from 
Locri, an Italian city under the rule of excellent laws.  None of his compatriots outrank 
him in property or birth, and he has come to occupy positions of supreme authority and 
honor in his city.  Moreover, he has, in my judgment, reached the very height of 
philosophy [philosophias].  As for Critias, I’m sure that all of us here in Athens know 
that he’s no mere layman in any of the areas we’re talking about.  And many people 
whose testimony must surely be believed assure us that Hermocrates, too, is well 
qualified by nature and training to deal with these matters.  Already yesterday I was 
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aware of this when you asked me to discuss matters of government [peri tēs politeias], 
and that’s why I was eager to do your bidding.  I knew that if you’d agree to make the 
follow-up speech, no one could do a better job than you.  Of contemporary men, only you 
could give a full account that shows the city in a fitting war and exhibits the qualities that 
belong to it [ta prosēkonta].  So having spoken about the things you asked of me, I in turn 
requested that you speak about the things I was just saying. (19c9-20b7: tr. Zeyl with 
modifications) 
It seems that Socrates has been mildly devious.  We should recall the feeling of beauty he has 
about his city, a feeling that, just as with the beautiful animals, can be increased by seeing his 
city engaged in war.  It appears, however, that this feeling is not something Socrates is 
experiencing for the very first time when he describes it to Timaeus and company.  Rather, it 
looks like a feeling he has been intending to gratify for a while.  In fact, he has even considered it 
enough to know the kind of people that can help him gratify it, people like Timaeus and 
company, people who are both philosophers and politicians.  
 So the previous day when Socrates agrees to give a speech about his politeia, he agrees 
on the basis of two things.  First, he is already confident in the ability of his interlocutors to give 
the encomium capable of intensifying his feeling of beauty.  Second, Socrates agrees to speak 
because they have already agreed to give a follow-up speech.  It is a “this for that” scenario and 
one that takes place, I assume, even before Socrates begins his speech (though the text may be 
seen to suggest that he gives the details of the reimbursement speech he expects from Timaeus 
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and the others only after finishing his own speech about the city—eipon dē tapitaxthenta 
antepetaxa umin a kai nun legō).30 
 The next thing to consider are the details of the request.  Socrates describes his request 
here, the things he was just now saying (a kai nun legō), as a request for “a full account that 
shows the city in a fitting war (polemon) and exhibits the qualities that belong to it (ta 
prosēkonta).”  In this formulation, I notice a pair, war and qualities, a pair that Socrates also uses 
in two other places to describe what he wants.  The first additional instance is in the metaphorical 
description of his request and is, in some sense, also figurative.  There he describes his desire to 
see the beautiful living things “engaged in a struggle (kata tēn agōnian athlounta) that shows off 
their distinctive physical qualities (prosēkein).”  Further, the pair is also present in the literal 
description of the request: “I’d love to see our city distinguish itself in the way it enters the war 
(polemon) and in the way it pursues the war (polemein): exhibiting those qualities (ta 
prosēkonta) which belong to it [.]”  The qualities at issue are “education (paideiai) and training 
(trophēi),” both of which are in the dative, which suggests that the qualities are exhibited, in 
                                                 
30 I find that there is confusion over when Socrates first makes his request, some thinking that he made it 
the day before (Cornford (1937): 3 and myself) and some thinking that Socrates springs it on Timaeus and 
company the day of (Slaveva-Griffin (2005): 315, and Zeyl (2000): 5, implicitly in his translation—“And 
now that I am done speaking on my assigned subject, I’ve turned the tables and assigned you to speak on 
the subject I’ve just described.”).  I call attention to this confusion in a footnote rather than in the body of 
this chapter because it seems to make almost no real difference to any interpretation I have come across 
with the exception of Slaveva-Griffin (2005) who relies on the fact that the request is happening for the 
first time in the temporal present of the dialogue.  As we can see from the above, however, Timaeus and 
the others were already made aware of the details the day before. 
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some sense, as a result of their education and training.  In this way, they are educational 
qualities.  Thus, at this point, the substance of Socrates’ request amounts to displaying how these 
educational qualities contribute to specific aspects of the city’s military actions and more 
specifically to the good results (praxeis) of these actions which it should be reasonable to assume 
are, in sum, success on the battlefield.  
 The further claim is that the educational qualities and military actions are descriptive of 
the encomium Socrates’ wants to hear.  Recall the beginning of the motivation passage above: 
“So on these matters (tauta oun), Critias and Hermocrates, I charge myself with being quite 
unable to offer a fitting encomium (encomiasai) to our city and its men.”  The “oun” here is 
continuing the narrative about “these matters” (tauta).31  These matters are the details about the 
educational qualities and military actions Socrates’ has just presented and the continuation 
suggests that they provide the details of the encomium.   
 So directed by these findings, I claim that Socrates’ request is a request for an encomium 
with two parts.  One part concerns war, undoubtedly.  The other part, however, concerns 
education and, I take it, more precisely the education of warriors.   
 To start to gather information about this education, I return to the first part of Socrates’ 
summary, the summary of Socrates’ speech on the ideal politieia.  It might be good before 
digging in there, however, to explain why I do not make the further return trip to the Republic 
itself.    
 Recall Cornford’s dissolution of the dramatic connection between the Republic and the 
Timaeus and Critias.  As a result, the first part of Socrates’ summary, rather than indicating 
dramatic continuance, is reduced to an indication or even a mandate on Plato’s part that we keep 
                                                 
31 Lidell, Scott, Jones, and McKenzie, (1996): “oun.” 
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the Republic in mind when reading the Timaeus and Critias.  Taking Cornford and Johansen as 
examples here, responding to this mandate means resorting to the notion that the Timaeus and 
Critias are an extension or continuation of overarching tasks left incomplete in the Republic.  As 
far as Cornford is concerned, Plato failed to demonstrate the feasibility of Socrates’ politeia in 
the Republic and makes good on that failure in the Timaeus and Critias both by grounding the 
city’s morality in the structure of the universe and by establishing the previous existence of such 
a politeia in the distant past.  Similarly, Johansen claims that in the Republic Plato, though 
focusing on justice, fails to consider justice between states and remedies this failure with a war 
story that stretches, in one way or another, across both the Timaeus and Critias. 
In both cases, however, it is unclear to me what it is in the resemblance between the first 
part of Socrates’ summary and the Republic that suggests we follow one procedure over another 
or really any procedure at all.  In other words, why should we construe Plato’s mandate in the 
way Cornford and Johansen do?  What in the resemblance demands that we approach the 
Timaeus and Critias by finding an overarching, yet uncompleted task in the Republic and then, 
having found such a task, apply it by suggesting that the Timaeus and Critias complete it?  
In the end, what we see here most is that Cornford’s dissolution of the dramatic 
continuation only really excised the dramatic segment of the notion.  As evidenced by Johansen, 
the interpretation that sees the Timaeus as a continuation of the Republic is still very much alive, 
and it is in claims about the instructions supposedly dictated by the resemblance.  My point here, 
however, is precisely to the contrary.  There are no such instructions in the resemblance.  Apart 
from a lost convention, claims about continuation have no respectable basis in the text.  Again, it 
does not seem to me to be the case that the resemblance suggests any particular way in which we 
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should hold the Republic in mind and certainly does not suggest an interpretation and procedure 
as precise as that of Cornford and Johansen.  
Zuckert and Rowe also caution readers away from construing the Timaeus as a 
continuation of the Republic though on other grounds.  Zuckert goes so far as to suggest that we 
are missing the point of the Timaeus if we think, as both Cornford and Johansen do, that 
Timaeus’ cosmology is meant to ground the political agenda of the Republic.  In fact, in her 
assessment, neither Critias nor Timaeus can be seen to fulfill such a goal.  Critias fails because 
the social structure of ancient Athens is too different from that of Socrates’ politeia.  Timaeus 
fails not only because his account will not allow for the female guardians of Socrates’ state but 
also because, for Timaeus, all humans, at least initially, have the same nature.  Having identical 
natures destroys the foundation of Socratic social structure which is based entirely on the 
existence of different natures in different people.  Given these failures, she suggests that it would 
be odd to think that either dialogue is meant as continuing support for the Republic.32       
For his part, Rowe notes the absence of the philosopher-rulers in Socrates’ summarized 
politeia and in its identical twin, ancient Athens.  Instead of philosophers in the robust sense of 
the philosopher-rulers of Republic Book VII, what we have is something more like the dog-
philosophy of the guardians in the early books of the Republic.  Along the same lines, Rowe sees 
further contrast in Critias’ depiction of the successful politeia as a product of the divine 
intervention of Athena and Hephaestus rather than that of philosophers.33 
So given the lack of instruction in the resemblance as well as the significant differences 
between the two dialogues, how should we proceed?   I think most, even in the face of these 
                                                 
32 Zuckert (2011): 335 and 350. 
33 Rowe (1997): 51-2. 
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problems, will assert that we cannot do away with all attention to the Republic.  There is 
absolutely too much pressure to make the connection whether this pressure is coming from Plato 
himself or from the scholarly community.  In light of this pressure then, we might build on an 
observation that Cornford has made.  Namely, Socrates’ summary at the beginning of the 
Timaeus resembles most the early books of the Republic, books which I follow Jaeger in 
claiming are focused on the education of warriors.34  Thus, in short, we might conceive of the 
resemblance to the Republic, if it offers any direction at all, as a kind of pinpointing guidance 
that narrows our focus and alerts us to the discussion of the warrior’s education to come in the 
Timaeus and Critias.  And though in some respects this approach might be safer, in the end, I see 
it as just another version of the interpretations like Cornford’s and Johansen’s.  As such, it is 
equally unfounded.  Unfortunately, because we cannot find any precise procedure to follow in 
the resemblance, we are left only with speculations about how to proceed.  And in the end, 
because of the additional problem of the significant contrast between the Republic and the 
Timaeus and Critias, I do not make the return trip to the Republic.  Instead, I go only as far as 
Socrates’ summary of his politeia and now reconvene my search for information there about the 
warriors’ education. 
In the summary, I note first its military spirit.  It is natural to read the summary of the 
politeia entirely in terms of the phulakes, or warriors, whose sole job it is to fight in defense of 
all whether the threat be internal or external (to…en monon epitēdeuma…pro 
panton…polemein…ei te tis exothen ē kai ton endon ioi kakourgēsōn: 17d1-2).  Given Socrates’ 
request for a story about a war with other states, however, I emphasize the warriors’ actions in 
battle toward external threats.  These actions are described by Socrates’ as fierce (chalepous: 
                                                 
34 Cornford (1937): 4, and Jaeger (1943), generally speaking: 198-278; and for a summary: 279-80. 
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18a1; chalepoi: 18a8) and such ferociousness, it appears, springs from a warrior who is both 
superlatively spirited and philosophical (ton phulakōn tēs psuchēs…hama men thumoeidē, hama 
de philosophon dein einai diapherontōs, hina pros ekaterous dunaito…chalepoi gignesthai: 
18a4-7).35  Thus, in the context of my interpretation of the request, I am led to think that Socrates 
wants to hear a story about his warriors being fierce with their enemies and told in a way that 
highlights the educational cause of their ferociousness, a cause I take to be their education as 
philosophers. 
As should already be apparent from the foregoing discussion about the Republic, there 
may be tension at this point for some who, considering the Republic, do not see the presence of 
full-fledged philosophers at all in Socrates’ summary just as they do not in the initial books of 
the Republic.  At most for them, what we get there as well as here is, as mentioned above, a 
comical reference to dog-philosophers whose philosophical nature amounts to nothing more than 
the ability to distinguish between friends and enemies and treat them appropriately.  This 
philosopher, accordingly, if he is one at all, is certainly not the man who has left the cave, seen 
the form of the Good, and returned to rule out of obligation.  I think, however, that the absence 
of this philosopher is precisely the nuance or novelty of the Timaeus.   
Recall Broadie’s sophisticated interpretation of the request.  By making Socrates the 
impetus to both speeches, Plato is expressing his intention to expand the scope of philosophy.36  
If Broadie is right, it should be no surprise, contra those for whom there is tension, that what we 
find about philosophy in the Timaeus and Critias strikes us as different from Plato’s earlier work 
on the subject.  Zuckert has a similarly sophisticated take on the matter.  According to Zuckert, 
                                                 
35 Compare Johansen 2004: 10-11, who reads Socrates’ summary of the ideal politeia similarly. 
36 Broadie (2012): 116, 120, and 122. 
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through the contrast between Socrates’ silent presence and Timaeus’ monologue, Plato means to 
bring out a contrast between their two conceptions of philosophy the result of which is a broader 
conception of philosophy as a whole.37   
I also share Zuckert and Broadie’s general hunch that philosophy and the philosopher are 
in one way or another the focus of the Timaeus.  I depart from them, however, in the way I 
capitalize on this hunch.  While both seem to find the theme of philosophy in a sophisticated 
analysis of what the characters represent and the bearing these representations have on the 
meaning of the characters’ interactions, I, instead, find philosophy in the very mouth of Socrates 
himself and in one way or another right there in the substance of his request.  For this reason, I 
consider the step backwards from Broadie I mentioned above to be justified.  In other words, if 
her point is that we must consider both what the characters represent and their interactions within 
this representational context because it is only through such consideration that we can come into 
contact with the important theme of philosophy, I should be allowed to innocently neglect her 
demand because I encounter the important theme without such consideration. 
I do not mean to suggest here, however, that I have done away with all concern for the 
relationship between the characters.  Part of understanding Socrates’ request undoubtedly 
includes understanding how the characters interpret it and respond to it accordingly.  In what 
follows then, I establish that the characters understand Socrates’ request as a request for an 
encomium with an education and a war component and that they, Timaeus and Critias, work 
together to give him just that, Timaeus speaking to education and Critias to war.     
 
 
                                                 
37 Zuckert (2011): 331-2. 
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1.3 Critias’ Proposal for Fulfilling Socrates’ Request 
One of Hermocrates rare contributions follows directly on the heels of Socrates’ 
description of his motivation for approaching Timaeus and company.  As stated above, Socrates 
agrees to tell his story about the politeia if his interlocutors agree to give a follow up encomium 
with both an educational and martial component, an encomium they are qualified to give because 
each of them is both a philosopher and politician.  Hermocrates responds with the report that the 
group of them were considering the parameters of the encomium as soon as they left Socrates the 
previous day (hōste kai chthes euthus enthende…kai eti proteron kath hodon au tauta 
eskopoumen: 20b6-8).  In fact, Critias even told them about a potential request-fulfilling story 
during their trip home and is now encouraged by Hermocrates to offer it to Socrates as a test of 
its eligibility.  With Timaeus’ additional approval, Critias then tells an abbreviated version of 
Solon’s account of the war between ancient Athens and Atlantis.  This abbreviated trial run, 
however, appears to include much more than the relevant components of the encomium.  So 
before moving on to identify these components in Critias’ trial speech, I think it is important to 
explain the seemingly extraneous material.  
1.3.1 Critias Connects with Socrates: The Two-fold Relevance of Solon’s Story 
I suggest that we think of Critias as doing two things when he relays the abridged version 
of Solon’s account.  Consider the following passage.  Critias is addressing Socrates: 
While you were speaking yesterday about politics and the men you were describing, I 
was reminded of what I’ve just told you [Solon’s account] and was quite amazed as I 
realized how by some supernatural chance your ideas are in substantial agreement with 
what Solon said.  I didn’t want to say so at the time, though…I decided I would first have 
to recover the whole story, and then tell it…That’s why I was so quick to agree to your 
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request yesterday since I thought we would be well supplied if I gave this one. (25e2-
26a6: tr. Zeyl with modifications) 
First, as already suggested, Critias is making points of contact with the request for an encomium.  
In fact, he agrees to the request at the time because he already has the beginnings of an account 
that he is confident will fulfill it.  Second, Critias is making connections with Socrates’ story 
about the politeia.  As Socrates’ goes over social structure, education, and so on, Critias is 
reminded of the same subjects in Solon’s account, and the seemingly extraneous material we get 
in Critias’ trial speech is reference to these kinds of things and in a way that makes it even 
clearer why he has chosen Solon’s account.   
  To see how this works out, it is best to think of Solon’s account in terms of the story of 
Deucalion and Pyrrha, a story Solon presents to the priests in order to lure them into a discussion 
about ancient history.  Once long ago, there was a flood, a flood that spared only two people, a 
man, Deucalion, and a woman, Pyrrha.  From them, all Greeks descend.  This presentation 
(which in the text is more like a mere mention) is bait enough for the priests, and they respond by 
offering two revisions.  These revisions make up the bulk of Solon’s account.    
First, according to the priests, there have been not one but many such destructive floods, 
and the bigger point is that these watery disasters explain the sad state of learning in Greece.  
They explain why the Greek historical record, as represented by the story of Deucalion and 
Phyrra, is in such disrepair, why it is something more like a children’s tale than solid history.  
Every time the Greeks get established intellectually, a flood destroys the cities and with them 
most historical knowledge if not most other knowledge as well.   
Second, the Greeks do not descend from Deucalion and Pyrrha.  Rather, the true 
ancestors of the Greeks are unnamed Athenians, citizens of a city with excellent laws, laws 
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concerning class structure and phronēsis, as well as citizens of a city renowned for the noblest 
accomplishment on record—victory in battle over the aggressive military force of Atlantis. 
Now, concerning points of contact between Solon’s account and Socrates’ description of 
the ideal politeia, there is, in a sense, only one.  The social structure of ancient Athens as 
described in the second revision is organized according to occupation just as it is in Socrates’ 
city.  The warriors are to be separate from the craftsmen, the craftsmen from the shepherds, and 
so on for the rest.  This point of contact, however, seems to be the only one that is entirely 
outside of what is stipulated by the request for encomium, the only one entirely outside of 
education and war. 
In fact, as we have already seen above, one can easily read the discussion of natural 
disasters as devoted entirely to educational matters, as devoted to underscoring the importance of 
the city when it comes to learning.  The floods destroy the Greek cities, and the absence of an 
enduring polity amounts to the absence of learning and ultimately to the defunct scientific state 
of Solon’s Greece.  This, however, appears to straddle the two types of contact.  Certainly, it is 
safe to assume that, in his story of the previous day, Socrates emphasizes the city’s educational 
role just as seriously as the priests do in their dissertation on natural disasters.  I do not think, 
however, that this particular point is taken up as the definitive educational component of the 
encomium.         
Instead, I suggest that the educational component, and likewise the most obviously 
present war component, is to be found in the second revision.  To see this, notice first how the 
Egyptian priests structure their account of ancient Athens (23e4-6).  They describe some of the 
ancient Athenian laws and then talk about the Athenians most glorious deed.  The deed, of 
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course, is the war with Atlantis, but notice the character of the second law the priests discuss, the 
law concerning phronēsis, a law that it should be safe to say is a piece of educational legislation: 
In turn, regarding wisdom [peri tēs phronēseōs],38 you see, I suppose, the law here—how 
much care it has given from the beginning to the kosmos, discovering all things from 
those divine beings to human affairs, down to divination and the art of medicine which 
aims at health, and also to all the other disciplines [mathēmata] that follow. (24b7-c3: my 
translation) 
Aside from mention of wisdom (phronēsis), I take the law to be educational because it concerns 
“mathēmata.”  Certainly, the word has been used from the beginning of the Timaeus.  In his 
recapitulation of the previous day’s story, Socrates uses the word with respect to the education of 
his mythical warriors (mathēmasin: 18a9).  The Egyptian priests use the word in their first 
revision to criticize the state of Greek learning (mathēma: 22b8).  And now the priests use it in 
their presentation of the law concerning phronēsis.   
The priests do more than just mention the ancient Athenians’ educational legislation, 
however.  They also speak, generally, as though the laws were responsible for the Athenians’ 
excellence, a point which certainly lines up with Socrates’ request for an encomium that shows 
success in war as a result of education (24d3-e).  Further, it is noteworthy that in the context of 
the laws, the ancient Athenians are described as receiving their education and training from the 
goddess (tēs theou…hē tēn te humeteran kai tēnde elachen kai ethrepsen kai epaideusen: 23d6-7) 
and are also described generally as the pupils of the gods (paideumata theōn: 24d6).  In fact in 
                                                 
38 I follow Cornford (1937) and Zeyl (2000) in translating phronēsis as wisdom.  Compare Archer-Hind 




the end, it appears that the laws themselves are divine tutelage, a further indication that the law 
concerning phronēsis is an educational one. 
So what we have here already is a general picture of Critias’ construal of and response to 
Socrates’ request, a picture in which Critias offers a story, Solon’s story, that speaks to both the 
educational and martial components of the encomium.  The next thing to consider then is 
Timaeus’ role within the framework established by Solon’s story, a role which I reiterate ahead 
of time involves delivering the educational portion of the encomium, and in order to lay out 
Timaeus’ contribution, I think it is best to start by taking a look at Critias’ explicitly stated plan 
for fulfilling Socrates’ request.   
1.3.2 Critias’ Delegation to Timaeus 
Critias actually describes his plan twice, first generally and then shortly thereafter more 
specifically.  In its general formulation, Critias pledges to make a complete substitution.  In order 
to fulfill Socrates’ request, the citizens of Socrates’ city will be assumed to be those very 
Athenian citizens of Solon’s account (26c7-d5).  The two cities will harmonize in every way 
(pantōs harmosousi), and this substitution and total harmonization, I take it, includes not only the 
ancient Athenians’ deeds in war but also their laws.  Having reduced the two stories to one story 
about ancient Athens, Critias and the others will distribute the task of telling it amongst them.  
Socrates approves of this general plan, and Critias moves to state the more specific plan. 
In its specific formulation, Critias describes the division of labor that will culminate in 
his own speech about the war.  Timaeus will speak first, beginning with the generation of the 
universe (kosmos) and ending with the nature of men.  Critias will follow Timaeus taking from 
him the men newly born in his speech and from Socrates his supremely educated men.  These 
two groups of men will then undergo a kind of naturalization ceremony in which both groups are 
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made citizens of ancient Athens (27b1-6).  These Athenians will be the virtuous citizens in 
Critias’ speech. 
 It should be apparent, however, that as presented Critias’ specific formulation represents 
a potential problem for my interpretation.  Critias does not appear to think of Timaeus as 
contributing the educational component of Socrates’ request.  Rather, he points to Socrates.  In 
response to this, I have a few things to say. 
 If we take Critias’ remarks literally, we risk opening up other problems.  First, as already 
noted, Critias claims that after Timaeus is done speaking, he will take Socrates’ well-educated 
men and Timaeus’ raw men and proceed with something like a courtroom naturalization 
ceremony in which the two groups of men will be made citizens of ancient Athens.  Such a 
ceremony does not occur, and if we take Critias literally we will need to explain why there is no 
such ceremony following Timaeus’ speech.  The way I explain the ceremony’s absence, of 
course, is by suggesting that Critias does not mean to be literal here. 
 We could take this point a bit further, however, and suggest that the naturalization 
ceremony has in some sense already occurred.  In this case, we should pay attention to the 
general formulation of the plan noting that the transfer of Socrates mythical citizens into the 
realm of historical truth is described as having happened at the moment Critias mentions it (nun 
metenegknotes epi talēthes: 26c8-d).  Noting further the substitution and total harmonization, we 
should also think that at least Socrates’ well-educated men have lost their previous identities 
being entirely transformed into ancient Athenians.  Thus, in his specific description, Critias only 
means to repeat what he has already said in his general description but in a way that now 
includes Timaeus’ men.  In other words, Critias only means to make the minimal claim that any 
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and all men present in either Socrates’ or Timaeus’ accounts will be considered to be ancient 
Athenians.         
 We might still want to be literal, however, about Critias’ claim to take the educated men 
from Socrates and even so literal that we exclude Timaeus from having anything to do with 
education whatsoever.  In this case, I think we should recognize the possibility that Critias does 
not intend to take just any men from Timaeus.  After all, should we suppose that he will take the 
vicious cowards who will be reincarnated as women or even the most wicked and tyrannical men 
who will be reincarnated as mollusks?  Certainly, to the contrary, the men Critias wants will be 
just like Socrates’ men in the sense that they will be those who resemble most the virtuous 
Athenian citizens of Solon’s story.  What we should expect, then, is that Critias intends to take 
the men who follow the lead of intellectual soul, men who in the context of Timaeus’ speech are 
also supremely educated, men who are philosophers like Socrates’ philosophoi phulakes.  
Being too literal will also cause us to miss the educational color Critias uses in his 
portrayal of Timaeus’ role in the fulfillment of the request.  Notice the resemblance between 
Critias’ portrayal and the education of the ancient Athenians, its resemblance to the law 
concerning phronēsis and in particular to the succinct methodology expressed in the law.  As far 
as the law is concerned, one moves through the study of kosmos by moving through the 
mathēmata in a certain way, beginning from what I take to be the divine mathēmata and moving 
down to more human subject matter.  By beginning with Timaeus’ interest in astronomy and 
ending with the nature of men, Critias is describing the same movement.  In fact later in his 
speech, Timaeus himself returns our attention to this movement when he claims that vision has 
enabled us to see the divine stars and planets and the circling years, and in turn, has given us the 
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investigation of nature and ultimately philosophy, a definitively human affair (I discuss this more 
in Chapter 2). 
In the end, then, my considered position is that when Critias claims to take the well-
educated men from Socrates, we should not take him too literally but understand instead that 
singling out Socrates here is just the more explicit end of a description that also, albeit more 
subtly, includes Timaeus in the educational work to be done. 
So consequently what we see in Critias’ explicitly stated plan for fulfilling Socrates’ 
request is the equally explicit claim that the story that will fulfill the request is Solon’s story.  I 
realize that in some sense this is already obvious.  What I think is less obvious is that Solon’s 
story fulfills Socrates’ request in two ways.  First, the story is created by a man who is, in some 
sense, both a philosopher and a statesman.  Solon is one of the famous seven sages and in fact, if 
Critias is to be believed, the wisest of the seven, and it should go without saying that he is also 
something of a statesman.  On the other hand, it seems somewhat ironic that Solon, a poet, and 
his story, a poem, will fulfill the request when Socrates explicitly claims prior to the telling of 
the story that the poets are incapable of offering proper encomium to his city.  There seems to be 
even further tension in this regard when Socrates refers to Timaeus as a poet (Crit. 108b5) and 
by extension to what Timaeus has just delivered as a poem.            
To alleviate this tension, I think we must reinterpret what Socrates means when he says 
that the poets are incapable of properly praising his city.  He cannot mean that all poetry is out.  
After all, a poem in some sense will fulfill his request.  Socrates must mean instead that the poet 
in particular cannot fulfill his request.  Accordingly, it is not, I take it, Solon as poet who is at 
work here.  Rather, it is Solon as philosopher-statesman.39  Thus, poetry is acceptable as a 
                                                 
39 See Welliver (1977): 46, who also suggests that Solon is a philosopher and statesman. 
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medium for fulfilling the request but only if the person handling that medium is also both a 
philosopher and statesman.   
As should already be apparent, the second way Solon’s story acts sufficiently as 
fulfillment is its inclusion of both the educational and martial aspects of the request.  As noted 
above, not only does Solon’s account clearly include a story about a war but it also speaks to 
Socrates’ educational interests through the law concerning phronēsis, an educational law 
undoubtedly responsible for the ancient Athenians success in battle. 
Thus, I conclude that Critias’ plan for the speeches involves dividing Solon’s story in 
two.  Critias will tell the story of the war, and Timaeus will offer an account of the warriors’ 
education along the lines of that described in the law concerning phronēsis.  I say that he will 
offer an account “along the lines” of the law because I tend to think that while Timaeus both 
takes up the appropriate subject matter, ho kosmos (Tim. 28b3), and proceeds through it in 
accordance with the methodology suggested by the law concerning phronēsis, he adds to this raw 
structure his own beliefs (kat’ emēn doxan: 27d5; hōde oun tēn ge emēn autos tithemai psēphon: 
51d3; and houtos men oun dē para tēs emēs psēphou logistheis: 52d2; etc.).  So, in essence, what 
we get in Timaeus’ speech are his own views on education offered as a substitute for what is 
lacking in Solon’s account or at the very least what is lacking in Critias’ version of Solon’s 
account.40      
1.4 Plato’s Symposium and the Order of Encomium 
It is important to note further that Timaeus’ speech on education comes first, and the full 
account of the war second, and on a very plain level this certainly makes sense.  If the goal is to 
                                                 




give a speech about a city at war in a way that showcases its education, it stands to reason that 
one would first describe that education and then present the war.  If we look to the Symposium, 
as I think we must, however, we see that the order is not just something that makes sense.  
Rather, it is the proper way to make an encomium.41    
In the Symposium, we get a variety of encomia to Love.  Among the encomia given, those 
of Agathon and Socrates stand out, and they do to the extent that they both endorse a method of 
praise similar to what we see in the encomium that fulfills Socrates request.  This method of 
praise involves above all a proper order.  As Agathon suggests, when one praises anything 
whatsoever, one ought to state the qualities in the subject of praise and then what happens as a 
result of those qualities (eis de tropos orthos pantos epainou peri pantos logōi dielthein oios oion 
aitios ōn tugchanei peri hou an ho logos ēi.  houtō dē ton erōta kai ēmas dikaion epainesai 
prōton auton hoios estin epeita tas doseis: Symp. 195a2-3).  Socrates follows by lauding 
Agathon’s method (in fact, it is the only thing he appears to laud seriously) and adopts it insofar 
as the method amounts to stating first the qualities in the subject of praise and then the deeds, or 
actions (kalōs moi edoxas kathēgēsasthai tou logou legōn oti prōton men deoi auton epideixai 
hopoios tis estin ho Erōs husteron de ta erga autou.  tautēn tēn archēn agamai:199c4-7).  It is 
my claim, of course, that Timaeus’ and Critias’ speeches follow such an order, and as should 
already be obvious, Timaeus begins with the quality, education, and Critias follows with the 
action, the war. 
                                                 
41 For some general comments on encomium in the Symposium, see Richard Hunter (2004): 34-7 and 56-
7, and for the rules of encomium see in particular, 35 and 71.  For a more detailed treatment, see 
Nightingale (2000): 93-132. 
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It is additionally important to note that while Socrates approves of the order suggested by 
Agathon, he also offers a criticism.  Those who have praised Love before him have not taken 
into account the truth of what they say about Love (198d1-2).  Instead, they merely ascribe to the 
god the “greatest and most beautiful qualities” with no concern for whether Love has these 
qualities or not (198e1-3).     
Critias, on the other hand, certainly emphasizes, as does Socrates, the truth of his speech 
(Tim. 20d7-8 and 26e4-5).  That is the ancient Athenians and their laws really did exist, and the 
war with Atlantis really did happen.  Thus, I suggest that the factuality of Critias’ account is 
important because it fulfills a requirement of proper praise.  Encomium must show concern for 
the truth.     
1.5 Conclusion: Thematic vs. Structural Unity 
 As claimed above, my interpretation of Socrates’ request leads to an identification of the 
structural unity of the Timaeus and Critias, a characterization I made in contrast to Johansen and 
Broadie’s appeals to thematic unity.  I also claimed that structural unity is a more robust kind of 
unity than thematic unity.  What I failed to do, however, is say something about what these 
claims amount to. 
 Johansen’s grounding assumption, and a perfectly reasonable one, is that the Timaeus and 
Critias make up a compositional unity.42  Motivated by the problem of irrelevance, however, 
Johansen is interested to identify a unifying principle above and beyond composition.  
Ultimately, he finds it in a single theme, teleology.  Like Johansen, Broadie is also driven by the 
problem of irrelevance and, similarly, searches for a unifying theme.  She finds two.  Initially, 
she posits unity in the theme of the triumph of rationality.  To the extent that this theme fails to 
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incorporate what Socrates represents, however, she moves on to find unity in the theme of 
Socratic philosophy. 
Now, by my lights, those who employ the thematic approach offer only partial solutions 
to the irrelevance problem.  Their solutions are merely partial, I take it, because they stem from 
equally partial conceptions of the problem.   Ultimately, the problem is not just about the 
mysterious relationship between the contents of the Timaeus and Critias.  It is not just a problem 
about the connection between the topics of cosmology and war, and it appears to me that those 
who appeal to themes are using them solely to connect these topics.  In the end, what is lacking 
in the thematic solution to the problem is attention to the mysterious order in which the two 
dialogues are presented.  In other words, we also want to understand why the cosmology comes 
before the full account of the war and a successful solution to the irrelevance problem will 
include an explanation of this order of presentation or what I am referring to as “structural 
unity.”    
 In my mind, Johansen is more of an example of this lack of attention than Broadie.  
Broadie, at least, explicitly states the need for such explanation.43  I am not convinced, however, 
that she actually fulfills this need.  At most, via the theme of Socratic philosophy, she explains 
why the cosmology is included but not why it comes first.  In the end, she accounts only for the 
mere “coupling” of the two rather than the order in which they are coupled.44 
 All this being said, I do not think that there is anything defective about the thematic 
approach in and of itself.  It certainly seems possible to identify a unifying theme and use it to 
explain the structural unity of the Timaeus and Critias.  In fact, this is precisely what I intend to 
                                                 
43 Broadie (2012): 118. 
44 Op. Cit.: 167-8. 
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do in Chapter 2 with the topic of education and the presentational order of the three parts of 
Timaeus’ speech.  The point is that I do not see those who employ the thematic approach 
following through with an explanation of the order of presentation, a problem I take to be the 
more serious, urgent, and neglected arm of the irrelevance problem.   
In the end, my interpretation of Socrates’ request, I assert, addresses both arms of the 
problem.  Again, I claim that the substance of Socrates’ request is the unifier.  He wants an 
encomium in two parts, one educational and the other martial.  The educational and martial 
aspects of the request explain the presence of the topic of cosmology, construed as education, 
and the topic of war.   After all, it appears that the presence of both topics in one composition is 
precisely what we are trying to explain when we appeal to themes.  In other words, as far as 
Johansen is concerned, it is because Plato wants to talk about teleology that we find stories about 
cosmology and war in the same composition.  I am making a similar claim.  But instead of 
appealing to Plato’s interests, I appeal to Socrates’.  Because Socrates wants to hear about 
education and war, we find stories about cosmology and war.     
On the other hand, the proper method of encomium explains the presentational order of 
the speeches, their structural unity.  In proper praise, one first presents the qualities in the 
subjects of praise which, in this case, I claim is the warriors’ education as philosophers, a 
portrayal of which amounts to Timaeus’ elaboration on the law concerning phronēsis.  Only after 
does one present the deed made possible by such qualities and for which we praise the subject, 
the deed being, of course, the victory of the Athenians over the aggressive military force of 
Atlantis.   
 The upshot of the interpretation offered here in Chapter 1 is more generally speaking 
what I meant to have in a methodological sense all along—an account of the larger project of the 
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Timaeus and Critias and a picture of Timaeus’ role in this larger project.  I do not think, 
however, that one should construe the achievement of this goal as the end of all concern with 
Socrates’ request.  In a very important sense, every chapter in this dissertation is a further 
unpacking of the request or at least the educational portion of it.  Thus, I enter the next three 
chapters with the idea that I am demonstrating the presence of an educational program in 
Timaeus’ speech.  I aim to show the presence of this educational program not only because I 
think it reinforces my interpretation of Socrates’ request, however.  I also hope, as indicated 
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I reiterate that my initial motivation for exposing the educational aspects of Timaeus’ 
speech is my belief that doing so provides the further necessary support for the thesis that 
Socrates wants an encomium with an educational component.  In other words, if I can show 
Timaeus actually presenting an educational program, then we should have all the more reason to 
think that my interpretation of Socrates’ request is on the right track.  Technically speaking, 
however, I do not think it is enough to show the presence of just any educational program.  It 
must be a program that, at least minimally, maps on to what we see both in Socrates’ summary as 
well as in Critias’ abridged version of Solon’s story.  Thus, in the first part of this chapter, I 
return to these two pictures of education and then spend the remainder showing how Timaeus not 
only takes them up but also how he departs from them.  
Before moving on to these tasks, however, I should first note that while there is an 
overwhelming amount of literature on the topic of education in Plato, there is almost no work 
that has focused exclusively on the educational aspects of the Timaeus, and in some sense, this is 
not surprising.  The Timaeus is certainly not as glaringly educational as works like Meno, 
Protagoras, Gorgias, and Republic, and as a result, I think it has been treated as a kind of last 
resort when it comes to thinking about Plato’s views on education.  Jaeger is our best example 
here.  Offering an afterthought on the second book of his seminal three-volume work, Paideia: 
The Ideals of Greek Culture, he writes, “surveying the book now that it is finished, I could wish 
there had been a chapter on Plato’s Timaeus, to examine the relationship between his conception 
of the cosmos and the fundamental paideutic tendency of his philosophy.”45  Accordingly, the 
widespread neglect of paideia in the Timaeus is surely not the consequence of commentators’ 
                                                 
45 Jaeger (1945): xiv. 
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inability to see the educational aspects of the dialogue.  In fact, there are multiple 
acknowledgments of its educational components throughout the secondary literature46 and even a 
few articles here and there written specifically on the topic.47  These scattered instances, 
however, hardly amount to a sub-division of Timaeus studies.  Thus, in the end, I bear almost all 
the weight of coming up with an account of Timaeus’ views on education.  While I do briefly 
discuss in this chapter educational approaches to explaining the presentational order of the three 
parts of Timaeus’ speech, I postpone the important discussion of the possibility of education 
until Chapter 3.   
2.2. Preliminary Educational Data: The Educational Programs of Socrates and Solon 
 As shown in the previous chapter, one might reasonably think that both Socrates’ 
summary of the ideal politeia and Critias’ abbreviated account of Solon’s story are largely 
concerned with education.  What I did not provide, however, is some commentary on how rich 
these two brief accounts are.  By “rich,” I mean to suggest that they cover the gamut of 
educationally relevant areas of interest.  Thus, in both pictures, we see students, teachers, and 
subject matter.   
Each account portrays its pupils in the same way.  The students are warriors in training 
who are headed for philosophy.  For Socrates, more precisely, the goal is the creation of 
combatants who are ferocious with their enemies, and this ferociousness is the direct product of 
their education as philosophers (Tim. 18a4-7).  Similarly, the students in Solon’s story are 
aspiring soldiers who, resembling their mother Athena, are at the same time lovers of wisdom, 
                                                 
46 I refer the reader to Chapter 1 n. 28 though I add here Druart (1999): 176-8, and Carone (2005): 25. 
47 I am thinking, in particular, of Turbayne (1976): 125-140, and Scolnicov (1997): 363-74. 
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and, just as in Socrates’ account, their philosophical tutelage is administered for the sake of what 
it will enable them to accomplish as lovers of war (24c7-d6). 
The two accounts diverge, however, with respect to who is guiding the prospective 
warriors along this route as well as the particular pursuits that pave the way.  For Socrates, it is 
the state that educates the warriors, and the emphasized path runs through gymnastics and music 
(18a9-10).  In Solon’s account, it is the goddess who educates (23d6-7 and 24d6), and her 
teaching takes place, generally speaking, within the context of the law concerning phronēsis.  
This law stipulates the general study of the kosmos though specific sub-disciplines like medicine 
and divination are also indicated (24b7-c3).  Furthermore, not only does Solon specify subject 
matter, but he also, unlike Socrates, indicates the order in which the subjects are discovered 
(aneuriskō) or investigated.  This order can be taken to indicate that, within the context of the 
study of the kosmos, one first pursues divine subject matters and then moves on to human 
subjects (24b7-c3).  Lastly, and again distinct from Socrates, Solon indicates potential obstacles 
for education, in particular the cycle of destructive floods that periodically decimate the Athenian 
region and all accumulated learning with them (23b5-c3).       
2.3 Harmonizing the Two Accounts: Health, Disease, and the Education of Body and Soul 
 As I said at the outset of this chapter, showing the presence of an educational program in 
Timaeus’ exposition should also involve showing how Timaeus’ account corresponds to those of 
Socrates and Solon.  I say this for two reasons, one practical and one textual.  First, I think it will 
be helpful to have a comparable educational background against which we can view Timaeus’ 
own thoughts on education, and I do not think we can find better points of comparison, in some 
sense, than ones internal to the Timaeus itself.  Second, beyond this practical concern, I suggest 
that Timaeus is, in actuality, working from both of the programs presented above.  Recall the 
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harmonization Critias claims to effect between Socrates’ mythical city and that of Solon’s 
ancient Athens (26d3-4).  Given his role as a player in Critias’ scheme, Timaeus, I take it, is also 
participating in this harmonizing project.  In Timaeus’ hands, however, this harmonization does 
not appear to involve the mere reduplication or eliminative merging of the two accounts.  
Timaeus does not simply sprinkle items from each here and there throughout his speech nor does 
he incorporate some components at the expense of others.  Instead, Timaeus unifies the two 
accounts and all their educational cargo by coalescing them into a single context, a context that I 
suggest is first and foremost medical.   
Consider that, at his most explicit and comprehensive, Timaeus describes education 
(paideusis)48 as that enterprise which frees one from “the greatest disease” imparting to the 
contrary health and wholeness (an men oun dē kai sunepilambanētai tis orthē trophē paideuseōs 
holoklēros hugiēs te pantelōs, tēn megistēn apophugōn noson gignetai: 44b8-c2).  Thus, in part, 
what I hope to bring out are the ways in which Timaeus uses these medical notions to organize 
the educational components we find in Socrates’ and Solon’s accounts.  Accordingly, I begin 







                                                 




2.3.1 Health and Disease in the Abstract 
Commentators are undivided in their contention that, at the most general level, health is a 
kind of stability49 and disease a disruption of this stability.50  Insofar as it is a disruption, 
however, disease is a derivative concept, one dependent on the way in which health is 
conceived.51  Accordingly, in order to understand what disease is for Timaeus, we should first 
arrive at some idea of his conception of health. 
Timaeus’ notion of health is itself founded on a metaphysics of the mortal organism 
which can be taken to posit three things: 1) mortal organisms are composites of body and soul 
(87e1-6), 2) body and soul are each composites of basic constituents—body is composed of the 
four elements (earth, water, air, and fire)(42e7-43a1) and soul of three parts (intellect, spirit, and 
appetite) (87a3-4 and 89e4-5), and 3) these basic constituents are capable of interacting—a) the 
components of body can interact with one another (and this includes interaction with those 
elements outside the body as well), b) the components of soul can interact with one another, and 
c) the components of body can interact with the components of soul and vice versa.   
                                                 
49 For the use of the term “stability,” see—H. Miller (1957): 112; H. Miller (1962): 179; and Tracy 
(1969): 88 and 143. For the use of the synonymous language of “equilibrium,” see—H. Miller (1957): 
112; Tracy (1969): 143 and 151; for “balance”—Gocer (1999): 27; and for “symmetry”—Gill (2000): 70.  
Also see, Lautner (2011): 27, for the equally similar notion that health is indicative of the “undisturbed.” 
50 For “disturbance” see, Tracy (1969): 84.  For related language like “disruption”—Tracy (1969): 120, 
and Gill (2000): 64; “distortion”—Lautner (2011), 28; “deviation”—Grams (2009): 162; “alteration”—H. 
Miller (1962): 179; and “breakdown”—Tracy (1969): 85, and Gill (2000): 72.  
51 Compare H. Miller (1962): 179 and 183, who also claims that Plato’s account of disease assumes an 
account of health. 
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The ultimate stipulation that encompasses these three items suggests that there are 
paragons for being or interacting.52  Not only is there a way both body and soul should be as well 
as an exemplary manner in which they should interact.  There is also a way in which the more 
basic constituents of each should be and behave with respect to one another.  Health at its height, 
however, is the presence not just of one or even merely some of these ideals but rather this entire 
network of norms.53  In other words, it seems that, in the final analysis, health is not a 
“relativistic concept.”54 
2.3.2 Bodily Health and Disease 
Equipped with this general picture, I suggest that we consider first bodily health and 
disease if for no other reason than Timaeus’ suggestion that the condition of the soul is 
significantly dependent on the condition of the body.  Timaeus describes such health and disease 
in four ways.   
First, bodily well-being is associated with a protocol, something like natural and ideal 
rules for the addition or subtraction of elements to or from elements in the body.  This protocol 
stresses proper elemental type (the four elements also have sub-kinds: for instance, there are 
                                                 
52 Many commentators refer to the ideal as a bodily or psychic state of affairs in accordance with nature or 
kata phusin—Jaeger (1944): 21; H. Miller (1962): 181; Stalley (1981): 111-12; Ferngren and Amundsen 
(1985): 10; Lidz (1995): 531; and Gocer (1999): 30. 
53 Compare Tracy (1969): 139. 
54 See Gocer (1999): 27, who suggests that Plato “has nothing but contempt for what he considers the 
sophistical view that sees health as a relativistic concept that merely describes the degrees to which an 
individual fulfills his own potential…”  For a more general historical treatment that does some work to 
situate Plato’s thought, see Kudlien (1973).  
44 
 
different species of air), amount, and locale.  Accordingly, physical health requires that elements 
accrue or attach to the same kind of elements and in their proper place and depart from the same 
kind of elements in the appropriate amount and arrive at an equally proper place.  The 
accompanying notion of disease indicates, as we should expect from the above, a disruption of 
these conditions.  Thus, illness results from the admission of an inappropriate type of element 
into the body, too much or too little of any element coming into or leaving its kindred elements, 
or the presence of an appropriate element in the body but in a place where it does not belong.       
Second, bodily fitness suggests that there is an ideal procedure for the production and 
nourishment of structures like marrow, bone, flesh, and sinews.  All four of these structures arise 
or are reared like a child from components in the blood, components that are capable, it seems, of 
producing marrow, bone, etc. because of their kinship with their progeny (gignetai neuron men 
ex inōn dia tēn suggeneian: 82c7-d1).  Disease, on the other hand, specifies a reversal of this 
state of affairs though I think we should not take such a reversal to indicate a situation in which 
the flesh, for instance, produces the same components of blood which gave rise to flesh in the 
first place.  Rather, flesh dissolves into the blood and produces various new and unsavory entities 
in it.  The presence of these newcomers results, as Timaeus puts it, in a lack of mutual benefit 
(echthra men auta autois dia to mēdemian apolausin heautōn echein: 83a3-4) between the 
relevant citizens of the circulatory system.  These citizens then become enemies and 
consequently move through the veins in every direction, a circumstance which in turn destroys 
the blood, relinquishing it of its role as the provider of nourishment and moreover causing mass 
physiological starvation.  
Third, health seems to indicate a state of affairs in which apposite things are allowed to 
exit freely from the body, a free exit which appears to be the result of cleanliness or more 
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specifically clean outlets.  Thus, healthy lungs, for instance, are marked by a pristine wind pipe 
free from any liquid clutter (hreuma) that might interfere with the departure of air.  Disease, 
conversely, results from blockage.  When elements are pent-up inside the body, they do damage 
to the veins, sinews, skin, and blood, and disease, in this case, is to be equated with such damage.        
Lastly, physical health is a function of the size and strength of the body both in its own 
right and in relation to the size and strength of the soul.  The appropriately sized body is one 
undisposed to the frequent sprains and injuries indicative of those who have towering frames.  
Yet, when it comes to its relationship with the soul, a body too scrawny in the face of an 
overbearing psyche is likely to be susceptible to something like bad colds.         
Bringing all this together, bodily health appears to involve four levels of wellness.  First, 
there is the purely elemental level.  At this level, health describes a single and unwavering mode 
of interaction between identical elements.  Second, there is the composite level.  Here we have 
structures such as blood, flesh, and bone which are composed of particular elements though 
nonetheless structures whose health is described in terms of a mode of interaction between these 
structures rather than between the elements that constitute them.  Next, we have a kind of split 
level.  On the one hand, there is the body and on the other, the elements, and wellness here 
indicates a relationship between the two in which the appropriate elements are free to leave the 
body.  Lastly, there is the level of the organism as a whole which I designate as such because of 
Timaeus’ definition of the living thing as that which is composed of body and soul.  Health, in 
this case, describes an ideal relationship between the relative strengths and sizes of the corporeal 





2.3.3 Psychic Health and Disease 
When it comes to soul, Timaeus’ account is much more unified it seems.  Psychic health 
is conceived of in terms of strength (errōmenos) whether it be the strength of each individual part 
of the soul, the strength of the parts relative to one another (89e5-90a2), or the strength of the 
soul relative to the body (88b5-c1).  The vigor of each portion of the soul can be further spelled 
out in terms of specific tasks, what Timaeus refers to as the soul’s own motions (89e4-5).  These 
tasks, which mortals may pursue or fail to pursue, are assigned by the gods who create each part 
of the soul, and the pursuit and accomplishment of these tasks represents the height of a mortal’s 
psychological hardiness and accordingly his or her health.          
 Consider first, intellect whose task is two-fold.  On the one hand, intellect’s occupation is 
contemplative, and I use the word “contemplative” to describe its function because of Timaeus’ 
emphasis on our relentless exercise of it (aei therapeuonta to theion: 90c4).  Accordingly, by 
contemplation, I mean to indicate frequent activity.  In particular, the objects of this constant 
contemplation, objects laid down by the gods, are “the harmonies and revolutions of the 
universe” (90d3-4) and “that which is beneficial for all” (71a1-2).55  On the other hand, 
intellect’s task is to rule over both spirited and appetitive soul, a relationship between the three 
parts of soul, as Timaeus indicates, representative of the healthy psychic state of the philosopher 
(73a4-8 and 91e2-6) (more on this below and in Chapter 4).56   
Concerning spirited soul, its health is achieved through the fulfillment of its task as 
intellect’s militant partner, a collaboration in which both work to control appetitive soul within 
                                                 
55 For the interesting parallel of the physician’s expertise about the beneficial, see Holmes (2010a): 210 
with n. 54.  
56 Compare Carone (2007): 103, who presents intellect in terms of its theoretical and practical functions. 
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or to combat injustice stemming from external enemies (70a2-c1).  Appetitive soul, on the other 
hand, in a significant sense the primary spiritual adversary of all mortals, is meant for a 
surprisingly superior task.  While intellect contemplates the universe and the beneficial and 
spirited soul strives for success, appetitive soul, at its best, is destined for the apprehension of 
truth, an occupation it pursues in sleep via its capacity for divination (71e1-2).  Thus, nightly 
contact with “the riddling voice and vision” (72b3) of verity constitutes the health of the most 
lowly part of mortal soul.            
The corresponding diseases of the soul are conceived in an equally unified manner, being 
canvassed entirely in terms of the absence of intellect (anoia) or, in line with what has been said 
thus far, in terms of the failure of intellect to fulfill its tasks.  There are two species of this 
failure: madness and ignorance.57  These diseases, as already indicated above, originate in the 
condition of the body, and I suggest, are best distinguished according to which disordered, bodily 
circumstance gives rise to them as well as the scope of their psychic effect.  
Madness is the product of two related things.  It is the consequence of “excessive 
pleasures and pains” (86b5-e5) which in turn are the product of an excess of sperm or a blockage 
due to lack of an external vent for a troublesome humors (86e5-87b9).  Such conditions reduce 
the intellect to either forgetfulness or slow-wittedness and also utterly destroy our capacity to 
                                                 
57 For the view that madness and ignorance are two distinct types of disease see Tracy (1969): 124; 
Mackenzie (1985): 176; Joubaud (1991): 180; and Gill (2000), 60.  For the more obscure view that 
madness and ignorance are only two aspects of one disorder, namely, anoia, see Price (1995), 86; Stalley 
(1996): 365; and Lautner (2011), whose entire article is dedicated to the contention that madness and 
ignorance are merely two levels of the same disease.  Whether one or the other of these views is the case 
has no bearing on the more general arguments of this chapter. 
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accurately sense the external world.  Additionally, when in the grips of madness, spirited soul is 
filled with reckless abandon, or as the case may be, cowardice, while appetitive soul is afflicted 
by episodes of irritability or depression.58  Thus, madness is a collection of these less than ideal 
states of affairs existing simultaneously across the three parts of soul.   
Ignorance, by contrast, is a disease of the intellect alone.  It is caused by an asymmetrical 
relationship between body and soul in which the desire of the body for food is stronger than the 
desire of intellect for wisdom (88a7-b5).  The particular symptoms of this imbalance, like those 
of a mind in the grips of madness, are forgetfulness and slow-wittedness.   
2.3.4 Strength, the Greatest Disease, and the Work of Harmonizing the Accounts of Socrates and 
Solon 
  To sum up both the bodily and spiritual context, I point to the most salient connection 
between the two—the notion that health is a specific kind of strength.  As we saw above, at least 
at the level of the organism considered as a whole, the health of the body consists in its prowess.  
Similarly, strength defines psychic well-being though, in contrast to bodily fitness, strength 
encompasses every level of spiritual health.  Consequently, it might be reasonable to think that 
disease, insofar as it is a disruption or distortion of health, should be associated in one way or 
another with weakness.  We should recall, however, that in his principle description of education 
Timaeus does not refer to disease in such general terms.  Rather, he is marginally more specific, 
claiming that education leads to our escape from “the greatest disease.”  I say “marginally” 
because Timaeus uses the phrase, “the greatest disease,” or, “the greatest of diseases,” four times 
                                                 
58 See Tracy (1969): 124-134, for the connection between the diseases of the three parts of the soul and 
the above spectrum of vices. 
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throughout his speech while pinpointing only six categories of disease total.  Moreover, three of 
the four line up directly with the categories rather than just being types within them.   
The first greatest malady occurs when the production or nourishment of bodily structures 
such as flesh and sinews is reversed (84c5-6), and the second is to be associated with a particular 
type of physiological blockage (85c2). The final two instances of the greatest diseases, by 
contrast, are specifically illnesses of the soul.  On the one hand, Timaeus cites excessive 
pleasures and pains which, as already indicated, amount to madness (86b6), and, on the other, the 
equally extreme infirmity, ignorance (88b5).   
Thus, the natural question is: which of these greatest diseases does education help us 
escape?  Some commentators emphasize ignorance59 and others madness60 though none include 
the other two options, and we’ll see why momentarily.   I, however, hazard the assertion that 
education helps us to escape from every one of the above and more generally speaking from all 
disease, and as I move to show education’s versatility in this regard, I mean simultaneously to 
exhibit the ways in which Timaeus can be said to harmonize the accounts of Socrates and Solon. 
I first address the story of our incarnation which envelops Timaeus’ principle statement 
about our educational liberation from disease.  In short, the demiurge makes our immortal souls 
which, before embodiment, are pristine and healthy compartments of our capacity for intellectual 
activity as well as our capacity for sense-perception.  He then hands them over to his divine 
progeny who in turn install them into mortal bodies (42e7-43a6).  Consequently, a terrible 
psychic tumult ensues caused by the voluminous torrent of food in the veins which utterly 
damages both our ability to reason and our ability to accurately perceive the external world 
                                                 
59 See Bury (1929): 98 n. 2, and Brisson (2001): 243 n. 281. 
60 Joubaud (1991): 180. 
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(43e6-c5).  This damaged condition is referred to by Timaeus as anous (44a8), a term 
synonymous with the all-embracing category of psychic illness, anoia, which I described above 
as the failure of intellect to perform its proper tasks.  Accordingly, it should be no surprise that 
scholars choose to emphasize either ignorance or madness as the dour disease from which 
education frees us, and on the face of it both might seem like equally legitimate interpretive 
choices.   
Ignorance is certainly a feasible description of the damaging effects of our incarnation 
given that it is produced by the body’s intellectually overpowering, enormous intake of food.  At 
the same time, madness appears to be equally appropriate to the extent that it is aligned with a 
damaged capacity for veridical sense-perception.  What is missing for those who want to claim 
madness here, however, is any explicit reference to the bodily diseases Timaeus claims are 
responsible for madness, things like pent-up humors or excessive pleasures and pains.  Thus, we 
should perhaps embrace the safer conclusion that by anous Timaeus means to suggest something 
more like ignorance, which is a disease of the intellectual component of immortal soul, than 
madness, which spans all three parts of soul.  The significance of this will become progressively 
clearer as we proceed through the rest of this chapter as well as the remaining chapters.  For the 
time being, let it suffice to say that what is entailed here is an intellect-centered educational 
program.      
As far as the harmonizing project is concerned, what we should notice further about the 
incarnation story is its similarity to Solon’s account of the cyclical flooding of Athens.  As 
indicated in the previous chapter and above, the heavenly floods (hreuma ouranion) rush into the 
city of Athens like a disease (nosēma) and carry off all the educated urbanites on raging rivers 
(potamon) that rush them out to sea, leaving only the ignorant hill-people to rebuild.  Likewise, 
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Timaeus presents an image of our helpless immortal souls being tossed about on a raging river 
(potamon…polun) as the waves of nourishment flood in (katakluzontos) and out, leaving us as 
ignorant, in a sense, as the Athenian mountain dwellers.  Thus, what we see in Timaeus’ account 
of our embodiment is an analogue to the flood that causes the Athenians’ ignorance,61 though 
with one noteworthy difference.  Rather than stressing the loss of any knowledge, as Solon might 
be taken to do (23a7-b2), Timaeus stresses instead the loss of our pre-incarnate health,62 and he 
does so, as we have just seen, by describing the initial catastrophe of our incarnation as anous, an 
ignorant condition which refers to the damaged capacities of immortal soul and not to some 
absent epistemological cargo.63  Accordingly, the corresponding notion of health in this case 
ultimately amounts to a reclaiming of the proper powers of the immortal soul rather than, in 
contrast to Solon, the recovery of any true propositions it may have at one time possessed. 
This goal of health, however, is certainly not disconnected from the goal of both 
Socrates’ and Solon’s educational programs—the production of philosophers.  In fact, as 
indicated in passing above, Timaeus’ description of the proper tasks of the immortal soul, in 
particular those of intellect, is in direct alignment with his description of the philosopher.  In 
short, the philosopher is one in possession of a contemplative and sovereign intellect, and 
accordingly, to call someone a philosopher just is to call him healthy.  Thus, the harmonization 
                                                 
61 Howland (2007): 15, also notes this similarity between the two stories.  For further commentary on the 
similarity, see Wersinger (2001): 7-14. 
62 See Kalkavage (2001): 25, and Lautner (2011): 27, who also claim that the soul is healthy before 
entering the body.   
63 Compare Mackenzie (1985): 176 n. 55, who asserts that, in the context of the Timaeus, ignorance 
suggests a “disability” rather than a lack of knowledge. 
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of Socrates’ and Solon’s paideutic frameworks consists in recasting the philosopher as the 
paradigm of physical and psychic well-being and then further incorporating the components of 
each system according to their ability to produce such well-being.       
 Consider the subjects emphasized by Socrates, namely gymnastics and music.  Taking 
gymnastics first, we see that in Timaeus’ system frequent physical exercise is invoked for its 
preventative (amunō) effects.  Such exercise maintains a peaceful and therefore healthy 
geography in which the constituent elements of the body get along like friends because they are 
placed next to friends (88e2-89a1).  Bodily health may not be the only thing at stake here, 
however.  It also appears that gymnastics contributes to the health of the soul albeit in an indirect 
manner.  By maintaining bodily health, we shore up the source of psychic disease, though this 
prevention does not itself alone lead to total psychic health.64  As we will see below and in some 
depth in the next chapter, there are further measures that must be taken to make the soul healthy.  
Lastly, gymnastics has a curative role to play, and in this role, exercise acts as the best purgative 
for the body (89a5-6).     
In the end, however, gymnastics is not only something to be employed with respect to 
bodily or even psychic health.  It also provides a further conceptual framework within the 
medical context for packaging pursuits which lie beyond the scope of physical exercise.  Thus, 
we see Timaeus reducing the subjects outside of gymnastics to species of exercise and further 
reducing the motions produced by each to the nourishment proper to each entity nourished.  
Therefore, at its foundation, Timaeus’ educational program is a dietetic system focused on 
delivering the appropriate “gymnastic” motions to their rightful consumer.65  Music consequently 
                                                 
64 Compare the similar assertion of Ferngren and Amundsen (1985): 8, and Tracy (1969): 101.  
65 Compare Tracy (1969): 140. 
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is invoked for the kindred motions it feeds our immortal soul, in particular our intellects, whether 
these motions act in a curative or preventative fashion.  Astronomy, too, is also to be pursued 
curatively or preventatively to the extent that the heavenly revolutions act as nourishment for our 
intellects.   
Consider next the subject matters emphasized by Solon—the study of the kosmos, 
medicine, and divination.  Firstly, Timaeus uses the scope of medicine, as I am in the midst of 
demonstrating, as an organizing concept intended to schematize the various aspects of education.  
We should be careful, however, not to confuse “concept” with metaphor or analogy here.  In the 
Timaeus, the medical context is not at all analogical as it might be in many of Plato’s other 
dialogues.66  Rather, in particular, we should take the disease and health of the soul literally67 
and, as some have stressed, primarily because the diseases of the soul originate from diseases of 
the body.68   In any case, it should suffice to reiterate that Timaeus incorporates medicine into his 
picture of education according to education’s capacity to heal and maintain health.  In fact, in 
Timaeus’ account, education even replaces the ancient Athenian “medical art which aims at 
health” (24c1-2) insofar as education, rather than medicine, is the emphasized enterprise 
responsible for transporting us to well-being.   
The bolder conjecture is that Timaeus also uses this take on medicine to organize the 
investigation of the kosmos, reducing the study of the universe, in a sense, to the study of healthy 
and unhealthy motions.  In astronomy, for instance, we investigate the healthy heavenly 
                                                 
66 For a copious list of works on the use of medical analogy in Plato, see Holmes (2010b): 368 n. 3. 
67 For others who agree that health and disease are to be applied literally to soul in the Timaeus, see Tracy 
(1969): 124; Mackenzie (1985): 176; and Stalley (1996): 358 and 365.  
68 Stalley (1996): 358.
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revolutions, and we do because the study of such motions either curatively or preventatively 
nourishes the kindred motions in ourselves (47b6-c4).  In the study of the elements, we 
investigate the constant, element-arranging vibration of the receptacle because, ultimately, 
imitating this vibration results in our own bodily health (88d6-89a1).  In turn, such study 
contributes to our understanding of unhealthy corporeal motions which are, at base, deviations 
from or disruptions of the proper arrangement of the four elements within our bodies.69   
Lastly, divination, as we saw above, is equally enveloped by the medical context.  As 
Timaeus claims, each of the three regions of the soul has its own proper motions and accordingly 
its own proper fare, and the fitting food for appetitive soul is the nourishing motion of divination, 
motion which comes in the form of dreams that make contact with the truth.          
 The further work of coalescing the accounts of Solon and Socrates involves the 
incorporation of the purveyors of education.  In Socrates’ case, the state appears to be the party 
responsible for educating its citizens, and there are certainly echoes of this in Timaeus’ case.  
What seems to be emphasized by Timaeus, however, is the potential of the poorly governed state 
to reinforce the illnesses of its already diseased citizens.  One also gets the feeling that the 
mismanaged society is altogether commonplace (87a7-b8).  Accordingly, though not ideal, it 
seems that education is something to be pursued outside the context of the politeia, something to 
be sought on one’s own.70   
                                                 
69 Compare Proclus: 6.10-13, who suggests that medicine involves the study of those things which are 
against nature, or para phusin, and in contrast to natural philosophy which studies what is according to 
nature, kata phusin. 
70 Compare Carone (2005): 53 and 75. 
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Appropriately enough, the universe itself has been set up to accommodate this lonesome 
pursuit.  Just as in Solon’s case, where the goddess educates the first Athenians by providing 
them with laws, Timaeus’ demiurge embeds our tutelage in the law-like arrangement of the 
universe, creating the shining sun so that we might see the revolutions in the heavens and from 
them effect a cascade of discoveries from number, to the notion of time and the study of the 
nature of the universe, and eventually arrive at the greatest of human findings, philosophy.  
Consider the following passages which I take to be evidence of this divinely dispensed 
education. 
And so that there might be a conspicuous measure of their relative slowness and 
quickness with which they move along their eight revolutions, the god kindled a light in 
the orbit second from the earth, the light we now call the Sun.  It would shine upon the 
whole heaven and as far as possible bestow upon all those living things that can learn 
from the revolution of the Same and uniform, a share in number.  In this way and for 
these reasons night and day, the period of a single circling, the wisest one, came to be.  A 
month has passed when the Moon has complete its own cycle and overtaken the Sun; a 
year when the Sun has completed its own cycle (39b5-7)…As my account has it, our 
sight has indeed proved to be a source of supreme benefit to us, in that none of our 
present statements about the universe could ever have been made if we had never seen 
any stars, sun, or heaven.  As it is, however, our ability to see the periods of day and 
night, of months and years, of equinoxes and solstices, has led, on the one hand, to the 
invention of number and, on the other, has given us the idea of time and opened the path 
to inquiry into the nature of the universe.  From these pursuits we have, in turn, acquired 
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philosophy, a gift from the gods to the mortal race whose value neither has been nor ever 
will be surpassed. (46e6-47b1: tr. Zeyl with modifications) 
Here we not only see that the demiurge’s “kindling” of the Sun is intended to transport us to 
number via observations of the periods of day and night, etc. but also that the discovery of 
number leads to the further acquisition of the notion of time and the investigation of nature, and 
finally, the philosophical enterprise itself, and it appears that we even discover all these in this 
particular order. 
 In order to understand the relationship between endeavors such as philosophy and the 
other pursuits mentioned both here and above, however, I return to the context of health as 
strength.  In short, given strength’s connection with perpetual activity (89e6-90a1), we should 
think that our attention to each of these areas and thus our education in general must be equally 
unceasing.  Intellect should never discontinue its contemplation of the stars or the beneficial, as 
Timaeus himself makes clear (90c4).  Spirited soul should never stop its just contestation nor 
appetitive soul desist in its divination.  And, of course, as Timaeus makes equally apparent, we 
should subject our bodies to constant agitation through exercise (88d7-8).  At the same time, this 
relentless exercise of all our most important aspects does not appear to be perfectly balanced.  
While a healthy education, so to speak, neglects no pertinent subject matter, it nonetheless 
privileges intellectual pursuits over all others.71  As Timaeus puts it, the student of mathematics 
should not ignore gymnastics nor the athlete the pursuits of the mind though, he makes it clear 
that both, and really every mortal living thing, should make sure to engage the intellectual above 
else.          
                                                 
71 Compare Gill (2000): 68, who suggests that “physical and mental education need to be brought into 
proportion with one another.” 
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 In the final analysis, this program of constant care offers us a good way of thinking about 
Timaeus’ educational program as a whole.  In essence, there are three points of view from which 
we can scrutinize education.  First, there is what one might call “the education of the body” 
which, through the nourishing motions of gymnastics, establishes stability in the body by 
shaking its elemental constituents into their proper locales.  This is a crucial step toward total 
health, as we have seen, to the extent that diseases of the soul like madness and ignorance 
originate in the instability of the elements within us.  Next, there is “the education of mortal 
soul” which involves both the motive fare of truth-filled, dreaming divinations to be consumed 
by appetitive soul and the sustenance of victory for its spirited counterpart.  Lastly, we have “the 
education of intellect” which offers a diet of music and astronomical observations meant to cater 
to both its contemplative and sovereign functions.  And all three of these levels, I reiterate, are in 
a significant sense never truly completed in the course of one’s life but must be constantly 
engaged and the last of them more than the others.  While residents of the mortal form, our 
education is unending and exceedingly intellectual. 
2.4 Causal Investigation: The Curricular Sequence of Timaeus’ Educational Program 
 What remains to be addressed is the order in which one should proceed through Timaeus’ 
educational program.  For instance, consider the law concerning phronesis described in Solon’s 
account which I recall again in order to refresh our memories:  
In turn, regarding wisdom [peri tēs phronēseōs], you see, I suppose, the law here—how 
much care it has given from the beginning to the kosmos, discovering all things from 
those divine beings to human affairs, down to divination and the art of medicine which 




Contained in the above, I suggest, is a general way of proceeding which regulates a more specific 
sequence.  On the general level, the law stipulates that one ought to proceed from the discovery 
or investigation of the divine to the investigation of the human, and this progress, it appears, acts 
as a package for our advance through the more specific areas of interest.  Ultimately, what I see 
in Timaeus’ own account are echoes of this kind of order as well as nuanced additions. 
For starters, Timaeus, like Solon, posits an order of discovery of the subject matters 
though I think one that is not as illuminating of the sequence of progress through the curriculum 
as we might like as interpreters.  To reiterate,72 Timaeus’ short history starts with the observation 
of the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, leads to the invention of number, the notion of time, 
the investigation of the nature of the all, and lastly to philosophy, which appears to be the final 
destination.  Apart from philosophy, we might be tempted to think that astronomy, mathematics, 
and perhaps even the investigation of the four elements are indicated here and further that 
Timaeus means to suggest that they have been discovered and perhaps are even to be studied in 
this order.   
Also included in Timaeus’ history, though as a kind of afterthought, is music (47c4-e2).  
Rather than discovering music, however, mortals receive it directly from the gods as a gift and 
also receive the kindred things that come with music like harmony and rhythm, the only 
stipulation being that we must use music only for intellectual purposes and not for pleasure.  If 
we obey this command, the muses then dispense the attendant harmony and rhythm.  In any 
event, it is unclear where music falls in the curricular sequence, though another temptation might 
be to put it at the end with philosophy given Timaeus’ tendency to pair the two not only as he 
                                                 
72 See 55-6 above. 
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could be taken to do in this history of discovery but also as we see him doing when he advises 
the athlete not to ignore these two pursuits in particular.   
Rather than force the issue, however, I think we should be cautious.  Even if it does seem 
clear that the sequence including number, time, the investigation of nature, and philosophy 
represents an order of discovery, it is not at all clear that it represents an order of investigation.  
Further, even if it were apparent, I do not think we could then show that any of these pursuits are 
in fact distinct from one another as Brisson suggests when he calls our attention to the lack of 
disciplinary autonomy at the time when the Timaeus was written.73  Instead, we should think that 
pursuits like the above are, in some sense, inextricably linked.  Thus, no matter how tempting it 
may be, I do not think we can derive with any precision a curricular sequence from Timaeus’ 
history. 
 Taking a step backwards, then, what we might glean instead from Timaeus’ account of 
the discovery of philosophy and music are two contrasting pictures that suggest two kinds of 
divine tutelage.  The first is aloof.  As we have seen, the demiurge creates the cosmos to be an 
educational catalyst which ignites a trajectory in us toward philosophy that we work on our own 
to complete.  The second is immanent.  The demiurge’s divine children, in particular the muses, 
work hand in hand with us.  They not only give us music, but if we use it properly, they also 
equip us with harmony and rhythm.   
These two divine approaches with all their accompanying subject matters and everything 
they are meant either to inspire or instill in us should, it seems, be enough for our salvation from 
disease.  But, in the end, it does not appear that they are.  Timaeus adds one more layer of his 
own—cause.  His recommendation that we pursue causal investigation is not only something 
                                                 
73 Brisson and Meyerstein (1995): 17. 
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above and beyond what is strictly put in place by the gods for mortals, but it is also where we 
find Timaeus’ most explicit statement on the order in which we should pursue our education. 
 Before moving on to discuss this order, however, I think it is important first to link causal 
investigation (conceived in its most general sense as a mere study of causes and without regard 
to the order in which we study them) with the educational context, a connection I see played out 
in two ways.  First, Timaeus isolates a pair of causes, the intelligent and the necessary, and 
proposes that we investigate them because, ultimately, this is how the aspiring philosopher 
(ton…nou kai epistēmēs erastēn: 46d7-8) proceeds.74  In other words, causal investigation is for 
those who hope to become philosophers, and given that the entire educational enterprise is 
devoted to the creation of such individuals, I see in causal inquiry a pursuit as educational as the 
gymnastics or astronomy also charged with such production.  Second, Timaeus indicates that 
studying the causes leads to happiness (68e6-69a2), and happiness, in turn, is implicitly 
connected to health which as we have seen is the most explicit way of conceiving of the goal of 
education.  Take the contemplative function of intellect discussed above and in particular the 
astronomical contemplation which amounts to one sense of intellect’s well-being.  Timaues 
aligns this same sense of well-being with our “supreme happiness” (90c4-d1), and given that 
health and happiness are synonymous and further that causal investigation contributes to the 
production of this happiness, it appears once more that we should consider the investigation of 
the causes to be a component in Timaeus’ educational curriculum. 
 When it comes to the order of causal investigation, there are again only two relevant 
causes, the intelligent and the necessary (the latter of which I will also refer to as necessity).  
                                                 
74 For others who see the presence of the aspiring philosopher here, see Gordon (2005): 270; Howland 
(2007): 23; and Zuckert (2011): 351.  
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Accordingly, progress through the two, on some level, cannot be that complicated.  The aspiring 
philosopher either pursues necessary cause first and then moves on to the intelligent or vice 
versa.  Commentators who remark on the issue, however, are united in their contention that the 
former is the case,75 and their position is founded on the following passage. 
And so all these things were taken in hand, their natures being determined then by 
necessity in the way we’ve described, by the craftsman of the most perfect and excellent 
among things that come to be, at the time when he brought forth that self-sufficient, most 
perfect god.  Although he did makes use of the relevant auxiliary causes, it was he 
himself who gave their fair design to all that comes to be.  That is why we must 
distinguish two forms of cause, the divine and the necessary.  On the one hand, the 
divine, for which we must search in all things if we are to gain a life of happiness to the 
extent that our nature allows, and on the other hand, the necessary, for which we must 
search for the sake of the divine.  Our reason is that without the necessary, those other 
objects, about which we are serious, cannot on their own be discerned, and hence cannot 
be comprehended or partaken of in any other way. (68e-69a: Tr. Zeyl with modifications) 
The first thing to point out here is that divine cause is not some other cause in addition to 
intelligent cause, and though everyone accepts this conflation without a second thought, it should 
be reasonable to do so given Timaeus’ habit of associating the intellectual with the divine (41c6-
8, 44d3, and 65d6).  What may or may not be reasonable, however, is the tacit rationale behind 
the construal that divine cause is the culmination of the order of investigation, a rationale, I take 
it, built on a conception either of what it means to do one thing for the sake of another or of what 
it means to be unable to do something without also doing something else.  What I am suggesting 
                                                 
75 I am thinking here of Strange (1999): 406; Karasmanis (2005): 180-1; and Zuckert (2011): 340. 
62 
 
is this.  The commentators who accept that we begin from necessary cause and then move on to 
intelligent cause must think that doing ‘x’ for the sake of ‘y’ indicates a temporal order in which 
‘x’ comes first and ‘y’ second.  Accordingly, when Timaeus suggests that we search out the 
necessary for the sake of the divine, he means that we must investigate the necessary first and 
then arrive at the divine.  The case is no different with the claim that we cannot apprehend divine 
cause alone.  Again, for these commentators, if necessary cause is also required, it is as a pre-
requisite.       
 At first glance, this conclusion seems like a perfectly reasonable one to draw.  Many 
things that we do for the sake of other things precede those things for which they are done just as 
“sine qua non” things often precede what they make possible.  What makes this construal 
problematic, however, is the fact that Timaeus prescribes an order of investigation elsewhere in 
the text that is quite to the contrary.  Consider the following passage. 
Now all of the above are among the auxiliary causes employed in the service of the god 
as he does his utmost to bring to completion the character of what is most excellent.  But 
because they make things cold or hot, compact or disperse them, and produce all sorts of 
similar effects, most people regard them not as auxiliary causes, but as the actual causes 
of all things.  Things like these, however, are totally incapable of possessing any reason 
or understanding about anything.  We must pronounce the soul to be the only thing there 
is that properly possesses understanding.  The soul is an invisible thing, whereas fire, 
water, earth, and air have all come to be as visible bodies.  So anyone who is a lover of 
understanding and knowledge must of necessity investigate first those causes that belong 
to the intelligent nature, and second all those belonging to things that are moved by others 
and that set still others in motion by necessity.  We too, surely, must do likewise: we 
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must declare both types of causes, distinguishing those that possess understanding, and 
thus fashion what is beautiful and good, from those which, when deserted by intelligence, 
produce only haphazard and disorderly effects every time. (46c7-e6: Tr. Zeyl with 
modifications) 
Here the lover of understanding and knowledge, the aspiring philosopher mentioned above, 
begins his investigation not from necessity but from intelligent cause, and again this should 
produce problems for commentators who want to assert the reverse.  So how should the apparent 
contradiction between the two passages be resolved? 
 Stephen Strange, for instance, attempts to alleviate this tension by appealing to Aristotle’s 
views on the order of presentation.   Thus, as far as Strange is concerned, when Timaeus suggests 
that we prioritize the necessary, he is speaking of investigation.  But, when Timaeus stipulates 
the priority of the intelligent, or of final cause, he is following a procedure for presentation like 
the one we see advocated by Aristotle.76  
I have two complaints about this solution.  The first is methodological.  I myself am 
hesitant to use Aristotle to resolve problems in Plato, the most obvious issue, of course, being 
chronology.  In short, Plato wrote before Aristotle, and I think we should be suspicious of those 
who cast Aristotle’s thought backwards onto Platonic works just as we are, generally speaking, 
of those who flirt with anachronism.  Moreover, I think we should be particularly suspicious 
when it comes to imposing Aristotle’s notion of final cause on the Timaeus, as Strange is doing, 
something which, as we saw in Chapter 1, is also the case with Johansen whose entire book on 
                                                 
76 Strange (1999): 406 n. 19. 
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the Timaeus is, in essence, about final cause.  Apart from the anachronism of doing so,77 the 
other major issue is Aristotle’s own contention in the Metaphysics (I.7 988b6-15) that Plato does 
not, in fact, use final cause at all.  Rather, he uses only material and formal cause (I.6 988a8-
11).78  Thus, Strange’s move here is doubly suspect, and I recommend against it.    
The second complaint I have is textual.  Neither of the above passages support a 
distinction between the orders of investigation and presentation.  In fact, both passages speak of 
investigation alone (Tim. 46e1—metadiōkein; and 68e7—zetein).  Thus, I think if we are going 
to resolve the contradiction, we should dispense with the tacit assumption that is creating it in the 
first place, namely the assumption that ‘x’ for the sake of ‘y’ or ‘x’ as the sine qua non of ‘y’  
indicates a one-way temporal flow in which ‘x’ precedes ‘y’.  Accordingly, rather than thinking 
of necessary cause as if it were the gateway to intelligent cause, we should think instead that our 
understanding of the former acts to reinforce our understanding of the latter.  Ultimately, we 
include the study of necessary cause at all because comprehending it expands our grasp of 
intelligent cause, and it does, I take it, because studying necessity, in short, offers an additional 
angle on the sovereign function of intellect.  So, in the end, we start from intelligent cause and 
then gather additional, though essential, information about it from our further study of necessary 
cause.   
The question that naturally follows is: why this order rather than the reverse?  Timaeus’ 
answer, I suggest, can be boiled down to the following proposition: if the universe and the things 
                                                 
77 See Brisson (2009): 212 n. 1, who suggests outright that Johansen’s work is a case of anachronism.  Of 
course, it follows that Strange’s work is as well. 
78 For an excellent piece on how Aristotle is right not to see final cause in Plato and more specifically in 
the Timaeus, see Johansen (2010).  For a similar claim, also see Sedley (2007): 114 n. 47. 
65 
 
in it have come to be by the agency of the demiurge acting on necessity, then we must think that 
there are two causes, the intelligent and the necessary, and study them by starting from 
intelligent cause.  Though somewhat vague, I suggest, nonetheless, that this represents Timaeus’ 
most straightforward reasoning about the issue.  What more we might glean about this reasoning 
will have to come, of course, from an analysis of the coming to be of the universe and what it 
means for the conception of the causes.  I will keep this analysis as brief as possible. 
I think it is best to start the discussion from what is arguably the central claim of 
Timaeus’ cosmology—the universe is the most beautiful of the things that come to be (29a5).  
This superlative status is the product of the fact that the universe is modeled on the eternal, 
unchanging, intelligible forms (28a6-b1 and 29a2-b1).  Accordingly, the cause of this cosmic 
beauty must be intelligent so that it can grasp the relevant intelligible forms.   
In a significant sense, there is no comparable justification for the existence of necessary 
cause.  Necessity is a mere given.  What Timaeus does enact, however, is a particular notion of 
necessity which, for the purposes of our discussion, works out in two ways.  On the one hand, 
necessity is unintelligent and therefore cannot on its own produce anything beautiful.  Rather, 
outside the influence of intellect, it brews only ugly disorder (46e5-6).  On the other hand, as a 
consequence of this impotence, necessary cause is demoted from its place of honor as what one 
might call “the master cause,” a status given to it by the preponderance of physicists against 
whom Timaeus is reacting (46d1-2).  It is installed instead in its lesser role as an auxiliary 
(sunaitia) or servant (upēretēs, or the verb, upēreteō: 46c7 and 68e4) cause.   
We should in turn wonder, however, how Timaeus justifies this conception, or put 
another way, how he justifies the implicit claim that intelligence, rather than necessity, is the 
master cause.  In the absence of any directly stated support on Timaeus’ part, we might come to 
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his assistance by noting two things.  First, the demiurge, the personification of intelligent cause,79 
is superior to necessity to the extent that he is capable of wise persuasion (48a4-5).80  In fact, it is 
through such sage swaying that intellect asserts its superiority and consequently effects 
necessity’s servitude.  Second, at least in the context of the body and soul of the universe, 
intelligence is sovereign because it is created before the body, and being the body’s elder, it is 
accordingly its master (34c4-35a1). 
What this helps us to notice is that Timaeus is in fact a little more specific than I initially 
gave him credit for being.  If we take a closer look at the two passages in which Timaeus 
prescribes an order of investigation, we will see that in both cases he starts from the notion of 
master and servant causes.  At the 46c7 passage, he begins by identifying necessity as a servant 
cause just as he does at 68e1, and both carry with them, of course, reference to intelligent master 
cause.  Accordingly, we might recast the summary proposition above as follows: if the universe 
has come to be through the cooperation and instantiation of master and servant causes, then we 
should begin our causal investigation from master cause.  In one sense, this is the end of the 
road—i.e. I do not think Timaeus has anything more specific to say about the order of 
investigation.  On the other hand, I see two promising, though of course, speculative avenues to 
answering the further question now before us: why begin from master cause?   
The first avenue is perhaps obvious.  At least in the ideal context of creation, there is 
never a case in which intelligence is not privileged over all else.  The universe itself is an 
intelligent living thing because intelligence is better than unintelligence; the intelligent demiurge 
                                                 
79 Others who also contend that the demiurge is intellect personified include: Morrow (1950): 151; 
Vlastos (1975): 26; Strange (1999): 402 n. 12, 403, and 407; and Karasmanis (2005): 170. 
80 For a thorough account of intellect’s persuasion of necessity, see Morrow (1950) and Strange (1999). 
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subjugates necessity; the soul, the symbol of intelligence, is meant to rule the body, the symbol 
of the necessary, and in our case it is also meant to rule mortal soul; intelligence even wins out 
over the possibility of the longer healthier mortal life, a possibility foregone by the gods for the 
sake of the shorter, more painful though better life of reason (75a7-c3).  Accordingly, it should 
be perfectly acceptable to think that Timaeus would extend this priority into the context of causal 
investigation, and if my account is correct, he has expressed this priority by suggesting that we 
begin from intelligent cause.          
Second, this privileging of intelligence is representative of the desires and, most 
importantly, the thought processes of the divine demiurge.  This should grab our attention 
because of its connection to our earlier discussion of health.  Recall that the well-being of our 
intellects is dependent on what we feed them, so to speak, and what we feed them are motions.  
The proper motive victuals for the intellectual side of our immortal souls are the unwandering 
revolutions of the god that is the universe, revolutions that amount to his thoughts.  Thus, again 
by extension, feasting on the demiurge’s cogitations should be equally conducive to our 
intellectual health though we should still wonder how it is that his cogitations or activities can be 
described as starting from intelligent cause.   
The most pronounced and relevant example of this kind of thought process, I suggest, 
concerns the order in which the demiurge creates the soul and body of the universe, the former 
being aligned with intelligent cause and the latter with necessity as mentioned above.  As we 
have already seen, the demiurge creates the soul first and then the body because by doing so he 
effects the appropriate master/servant relationship between the two.  Thus, when we begin from 
intelligent cause, we are mimicking the demiurge’s own thoughtful progress, a progress carried 
out in the instantiation of both intelligent and necessary cause in the living universe, and in doing 
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so, we are nourishing our intellects and thereby, in a certain respect, accomplishing our 
educational goals.   
2.5 The Educational Structure of Timaeus’ Tripartite Speech 
 Having worked out both the connection between education and causal investigation as 
well as the order in which we are to proceed through this investigation, I now want to show how 
this sequence doubles as the structure for Timaeus’ entire account, and by “structure” I mean to 
indicate, in particular, the order of presentation.  Thus, my greatest claim here is that Timaeus 
arranges his speech as he does in imitation of the causal progress through his educational 
program. 
 It will be important first, however, to offer a general picture of Timaeus’ presentation.  I 
will be most concerned with its tripartite structure, a division unanimously agreed upon81 by 
contemporary scholars and an interpretation ultimately to be attributed to Cornford.82  Though 
not the first to recognize these divisions,83 he is, I think, the first commentator to truly foster 
them, and he is to the extent that the three part interpretation makes up the overall structure of his 
commentary on the Timaeus.  In subsequent years, Brisson has followed suit, reiterating the 
tripartite view in the introduction to his translation,84 and Zeyl, more recently, has done the 
                                                 
81 For a near exception see Brague (1985): 60-1, who recognizes three divisions though only two actual 
parts.  I discuss his interpretation below. 
82 Compare Runia (1986): 298, who also attributes the origination of this interpretation to Cornford. 
83 Certainly both Archer-Hind (1888): 164-5 and 254, and Taylor (1928): 297 and 492, recognize the 
three parts. 
84 Brisson (2001): 66-69. 
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same.85  In the end, the combination of these three works accounts for or even just amounts to the 
general agreement we find today.86 
I take it that these commentators base their interpretations on Timaeus’ explicit reflection 
on the structure of his speech.  On two occasions, Timaeus alerts us to how he conceives of his 
composition, and these alerts can be taken to indicate a comprehensive structure arranged in 
three parts.  The first instance of this self-commentary marks the division between the first two 
sections of Timaeus’ account and is itself made at the outset of the second.  His reflections are as 
follows:  
Now in all but a brief part of the discourse I have just completed I have presented what 
has been crafted by intellect.  But I need to match this account by providing a comparable 
one concerning the things that have come about by necessity. (47e3-5: Tr. Zeyl)   
Timaeus characterizes each part, as we can see, with respect to effects.  These effects are, in turn, 
distinguished by both their source and the manner in which they have been produced by that 
source.  Accordingly, the first part of Timaeus’ account is a presentation of the things crafted 
(dedēmiourgemena) by intellect and the second of things that have been generated, and perhaps 
even in the sense of birthed (gignomena), by necessity.  Consequently, it should be no surprise 
                                                 
85 Zeyl (2000) is more recently followed by the less well cited translation by Kalkavage (2001) who 
organizes his introductory essay according to the three part interpretation.  
86 For others who also adhere to the three part interpretation, see Morrow (1950); Vlastos (1975), in 
particular: 66; O’Brien (1984): 107; Strange (1999); and Zuckert (2011): 338. 
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that contemporary commentators describe these parts with titles like, “The Works of Reason” 
and “What Comes about of Necessity,”87 or the more abstract, “The Effects of Necessity”.88       
In addition to identifying the subjects of each section, Timaeus’ further reflections 
indicate that the second part is not a straightforward continuation of the first part but instead a 
new beginning (archēn authis…palin arkteon ap’ archēs: 48b2-3; authis archē: 48e2).  By this, 
Timaues means simply, it seems, that the second segment of discourse requires a more elaborate 
ontology than the first, and he responds, accordingly, by adding to the initial section’s two-entity 
ontology of being and becoming, a third entity—“the wandering cause” or, as Timaeus later calls 
it, chōra (52a8 and 52d3), a particularly tricky word that might be translated as “space” or 
“place” though really neither translation is ideal.  
The second instance of Timaeus’ reflection takes us into more blatantly causal territory.  
It acts as a transition that marks the division between the second and third sections of Timaeus’ 
discourse and is as follows.    
And so all these things were taken in hand, their natures being determined then by 
necessity in the way we’ve described, by the craftsman of the most perfect and excellent 
among things that come to be, at the time when he brought forth that self-sufficient, most 
perfect god.  Although he did makes use of the relevant servant causes, it was he himself 
who gave their fair design to all that comes to be.  That is why we must distinguish two 
forms of cause, the divine and the necessary.  On the one hand, the divine, for which we 
                                                 
87 Cornford (1937): 33 and 159. 
88 Zeyl (2000): liv.  Also, see Brisson (2001): 66-8, who mimics Cornford (1937), and Vlastos (2005), 28, 
who designates the first part of Timaeus’ speech as “Triumphs of Pure Teleology” while uniting the final 
two divisions under the rubric, “Compromises of Teleology with Necessity.” 
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must search in all things if we are to gain a life of happiness to the extent that our nature 
allows, and on the other hand, the necessary, for which we must search for the sake of the 
divine.  Our reason is that without the necessary, those other objects, about which we are 
serious, cannot on their own be discerned, and hence cannot be comprehended or 
partaken of in any other way. 
We have now sorted out the different kinds of causes, which lie ready for us like 
lumber for carpenters.  From them we are to weave together the remainder of our 
account.  So let us briefly return to our starting point and quickly proceed to the same 
place from which we arrived at our present position.  Let us try to put a final head on our 
account, one that fits in with our previous discussion. (68e1-69b2: Tr. Zeyl with 
modifications) 
Timaeus includes here both subjects from his previous self-reflection—intellect personified in 
the divine demiurge and his servant necessity—and connects each of them to the causes which 
they represent—intelligent and necessary cause respectively.  Further, Timaeus speaks as if all 
that he has gone through up to this point has been in the service of sifting out these two causes.  
Thus, matching the causes to the prior two divisions of Timaeus’ discourse, it should be 
reasonable to conclude that the upshot of “The Works of Reason” is intelligent cause and that of 
“The Effects of Necessity” necessary cause.   
What we also see is that intelligent and necessary cause are to be collected together to 
constitute the third part of the presentation.  One important thing to note here, however, is the 
shift in emphasis from the construction of the cosmos to the construction of Timaeus’ own 
account.  The causes are now not only the kinds of things that can be used to build a universe and 
its contents but also the kinds of things that can be used to build an exposition.  As a result of 
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Timaeus’ stress in this instance on the latter, it may seem strange that commentators give the 
final part the title, “The Cooperation of Intellect and Necessity,”89 insofar as the title seems to 
ignore account construction altogether, pointing instead to a situation in which the two world-
producing entities collaborate for the first time and in contrast to the “isolated” activity found in 
each of the previous parts of Timaeus’ presentation.90  I do not disagree, of course, that Timaeus 
portrays both intellect and necessity at work on the main project of the final section, the 
construction of human beings.  I only mean to point out that if commentators are drawing on 
Timaeus’ self-reflection when they create their descriptions of each part, the way the third 
section is described by them seems to be missing something important and should be recast more 
literally as, “The Account Constructed from Intelligent and Necessary Causes.”  
In any case, just like the second part, the outset of the final part is also associated by 
Timaeus with another beginning.  What is different, however, is that this final division requires a 
return to the actual beginning, so to speak, namely the beginning of the creation story that has 
been intimated at various points throughout Timaeus’ presentation (30a3-6; 47e3-48a5; and 
                                                 
89 A title consistently used by Cornford (1937): 279; Brisson (2001): 68; and Zeyl (2000): lxxvii. 
90 By putting “isolated” in scare quotes, I mean to draw our attention to the fact that each of the first two 
parts employs both intellectual and necessary cause and not just intellect, in the case of the first, or just 
necessary, in the second.  The fact that commentators ignore the ubiquity of the two when titling the parts 
should not be a strike against them, however (see Guthrie (1978): 320, who critically calls attention to the 




52d2-c3).91  This return is to be contrasted with the entirely fresh ontological start made at the 
outset of the second section.   
The fact that Timaeus offers no third ontology has lead commentators like Brague to 
deny that there is a third part to the discourse at all, his fundamental claim being that the parts are 
established according to the ontology that supports them—two ontologies means two divisions.92  
I think Brague would be hard pressed, however, to show that Timaeus himself conceives of the 
divisions this way.  Regardless, Brague’s critique should lead us to recognize that the tripartite 
interpretation, at its best, relies on Timaeus’ awareness of his “causal project”—two parts 
intended to sift out two causes that will then act as the constituents of the third and final part of 
the account.   
        If I am correct in my characterization of this causal project, it would seem, consequently, 
that Timaeus is not thinking of a linear progress through the divisions:  
     Part 1 → Part 2 → Part 3   
 
Rather, his reflections indicate something more like the following: 
Part 1 
      → Part 3 
Part 2  
 
In fact, we might even press on the language used by Timaeus in his first self-commentary.  I am 
thinking in particular of the word, parathesthai, which can be taken to indicate setting one thing 
beside another.93  Thus, when Timaeus tells us that he must set beside his account of the things 
                                                 
91 Compare Zeyl (2000): 62 n. 81. 
92 Brague (1985): 60-1. 
93 Liddel, Scott, James, McKenzie (1996): “paratithēmi.”
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made by intellect an account of those things which have come to be by necessity, we should take 
his suggestion quite literally. 
 Subsequently, we are left to think about two things: a) the relationship between part 1 and 
part 2 and b) the relationship between parts 1 and 2, taken as a kind of unit, and part 3.  In fact, 
commentary on Timaeus’ progress through the divisions, whether it is based on the causal 
context or not, naturally falls into these two categories and briefly going over this commentary 
should give us some added perspective on our ultimate concern—the order of presentation.  
The interpretations of Taylor and Strange focus on the order of the first two parts alone.  
Taylor explains this order “scientifically” and more precisely in terms of the method he finds in 
Plato’s Phaedo.94  The method stipulates that one start from assumptions and then draw out the 
consequences that follow from these assumptions.  Only when one has fleshed out all such 
consequences should he then move on to consider the assumptions themselves.  Thus, in the first 
part, Timaeus starts by assuming the elements and shows how the world is constructed from 
them.  Following, in the second part, he analyzes the elements he previously assumed.95   
Strange’s approach, like Taylor’s, is also scientific but rather than appealing to Plato, as 
we saw above, he appeals instead to Aristotle.  To reiterate, according to Aristotle, an 
investigator ought to discuss final cause (what I have been referring to as intelligent cause) 
before necessary cause, and he ought to do so because the former is logically prior to the latter.  
So given that Strange reads the first part of Timaeus’ speech in terms of the operations of final 
                                                 
94 Taylor (1928): 298. 
95 Additionally, one might consult Ashbaugh (1988) whose views, though I think obscure, bear similarity 
to Taylor (1928) in that she also accounts for the chronology in terms of hypotheses or assumptions.  See, 
in particular, Chapter 3. 
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cause and the second part in terms of the necessary, he concludes that the one precedes the other 
as a matter of science or logical priority.96 
The interpretations of Turbayne and Naddaf, by contrast, both address the order of 
presentation by focusing on the concluding section as something that follows from the first two.  
Turbayne, who understands Timaeus’ primary concern to be medicine, sees in the first two parts 
a paradigm—the universe—upon which Timaeus will model the constitution of the human being 
and in turn gain the required ground for his discussion of disease and therapy.97  Moreover, 
drawing on his reading of the Republic, Turbayne sees in this paradigmatic approach an 
underlying pedagogical technique that works to illuminate its subject matter—man—by 
metaphor.  Just like the Republic’s enlightening metaphor that man is a city, we see in the 
Timaeus the notion that man is a universe.98  Thus, in sum, the first two parts set up an 
instructive metaphor meant to guide the medical discussion of the third part.   
                                                 
96 Strange (1999): 406 n. 19.  Also see Karasmanis (2005): 180, who suggests that in the order of 
scientific presentation, general principles like those of intelligence seen in the first part of Timaeus’ 
speech, precede the natural research of the second and third parts because they supply the means by which 
natural research is conducted.   
97 Turbayne (1976): 126. 
98 Op. Cit.: 128.  Outside of the order of presentation, what I think is noteworthy about Turbayne’s views 
is his passing suggestion that Timaeus’ speech is something like a medical textbook (128 and 139 n. 7).  
Generally speaking, I think there must be something to this textbook notion.  Notice how many times 
Timaeus gives us a name for something.  As we can see from O’brien (1984): 147-9, in the short stretch 
of text from 58d-68b alone, Timaeus offers upwards of fifty terms and certainly offers more outside of 
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Naddaf,99 on the other hand, claims that, in the Timaeus, Plato is following the peri 
phusēos tradition of natural science, a tradition defined in large part by accounts that begin from 
the birth of the universe (cosmogony), then move on to the birth of man (anthropogony), and 
finally finish up with the birth of society (politogony).  Accordingly, Timaeus’ order of 
presentation progresses as it does because he offers the first two moments of the traditional peri 
phusēos account: the coming to be of the universe, taken up by the premier parts of Timaeus’ 
speech, and the coming to be of man undertaken in the final section.  In the end, however, 
Naddaf suggests that, rather than being a mere matter of tradition or convention, those working 
within the peri phuseōs tradition begin from the birth of the universe because they are interested 
in knowledge, and knowledge of the universe is required before one can truly move on to 
knowledge of man.  Thus, what we see in Timaeus’ order of presentation is an order of 
dependency or priority and an emphatically epistemological one. 
First, I do not think the position I am about to espouse is at odds with any of the 
interpretations just presented nor do I think that any of them are at odds with one another.  What 
I will say, however, is that each of the above, taken on its own, is incomplete.  Not one of these 
commentators has addressed both a) the relationship between the first two parts and b) the 
relationship between the premier parts and the concluding section (though I certainly do not deny 
that any one of their positions might be modified or even mixed with the others).  Thus, by 
contrast, I aim to offer a complete account and will do so by appealing to the educational 
context.  Additionally, each of these commentators, with the possible exception of Turbayne, 
                                                 
this small bit of his account, and this constant presentation of terminology leads me to think of Timaeus’ 
speech as a sort of proto-encyclopedia. 
99 Naddaf (1997): 36.
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draws his explanation of the order of presentation from a source outside the Timaeus, and while 
there may be nothing inherently wrong with this approach, I think it would be preferable if we 
could find an explanation within the dialogue itself.  
Starting with the first two parts, I suggest that the order of presentation mimics the order 
of causal investigation.  After we have paired intelligent cause with “The Works of Reason” and 
necessary cause with “The Effects of Necessity” and further connected these pairings with 
Timaeus’ prescribed order of progress through the causes, it should be reasonable to conclude 
that Timaeus starts from “The Works of Reason” because he is following the proper procedure 
for causal inquiry.  I need to make two clarifications, however.  First, by “proper,” I mean to 
indicate instrumentality.  The procedure is the proper one because only by following it can the 
aspiring philosopher reach the height of philosophy which is the goal of education.  Second, the 
words I have been translating as “investigate” connote pursuit or search.  Accordingly, I suggest 
that the first two parts mimic the philosophy student’s progress toward the completion of this 
search—the discovery of the causes.   
Regarding the relationship between the premier parts and the concluding section, I claim 
that our educational progress toward this discovery starts from the universe outside of us, from 
everything that is not human, not mortal.  This is where we find the causes.  We do not find them 
in ourselves.  The philosopher does not start by inquiring into his own mortal being, and I say 
this based on a combination of two things.   
First, as Critias himself points out beforehand and Timaeus reiterates right before the 
closing of the dialogue (90e1-3), the expository task is to begin from the generation of the 
universe and end with the nature of human beings, and Timaeus’ order of presentation certainly 
reflects this.  The first two divisions, on the whole, canvass the generation of the body and soul 
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of the universe and the final division, the generation of humans or more generally mortals.  
Second, as we have already seen, sections one and two are traversed for the sake of exposing the 
causes which, in turn, will be applied in the third section.  Thus, combining these two points, I 
conclude that we study the universe first, and therefore the two parts are presented first, because 
the universe is where we find the explanatory materials that will subsequently be applied to 
ourselves.   
 I might also claim, however, that we start from the universe because this is where the 
demiurge himself intended us to begin.  Recall that he produced the sun to shine on the heavenly 
revolutions so that we would be able to see these revolutions and learn number from them.  
Timaeus reiterates the point though with one important addition.   He makes such cosmic 
observations and the numbers we find in them the first stage in the short history of the discovery 
which extends from number to philosophy.  Thus, starting from the universe may very well mean 
starting from the observation of the heavens, and we should respect this point of departure most 
because it is the one the demiurge himself has established.           
Lastly, I note the correlation to the progress of discovery described in the law concerning 
phronēsis.  The law suggests that we investigate first divine beings and then make our way to 
human affairs, and we might see echoes of this in Timaeus’ account to the extent that universe 
itself is a god.  Thus, starting from the universe also means starting from the divine.   Again, 
not only is such a sequence part and parcel to education.  It is also a sequence sanctioned by the 
goddess Athena, and one equally sanctioned, it would seem, by the demiurge in Timaeus’ 





2.6 Conclusion: The Implicit Stages of Timaeus’ Educational Program    
 In this chapter, I have discussed Timaeus’ most explicit remarks on education.  As we 
have seen, education is, first and foremost, geared toward the production of philosophers and is, 
in a significant sense, medical.  The goal is health, and I might also reiterate that Timaeus uses 
this goal to harmonize the educational programs exhibited in both Socrates’ and Solon’s 
accounts.   Moreover, for Timaeus, education is an exercise in causal investigation, and the 
progress through this investigation, as we have also seen, reaches into the very structure of 
Timaeus’ speech.    
By contrast, to conclude this chapter, I offer what is largely implicit in Timaeus’ account.  
More specifically, I outline what I take to be the implied stages of Timaeus’ educational 
program, stages that will be the focus of Chapters 3 and 4.  I divide these stages into two groups, 
one marking pre-philosophical stages and the other philosophical stages.  In order to understand 
the progress through these stages, however, it will help if we first briefly recast human beings 
and the universe in Timaeus’ more specific quasi-physical terms.     
Humans have an immortal soul and two types of mortal soul, one spirited and one 
appetitive.  The immortal soul is composed of two circular revolutions, the revolution of the 
same which apprehends unchanging, intelligible things, and the revolution of the different which 
apprehends changing, sensible things.  Further, the universe, although not possessing mortal 
soul, is also a living thing and has an immortal soul similar to our own in the sense that it too has 
a revolution of the same that apprehends the unchanging and one of the different that apprehends 
the changing.   
When the divine children of the demiurge first take our immortal souls and install them 
into human bodies, both the revolutions of the same and different are distorted and deformed.  
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They lose their circular shape and, as we will see, also their speed, direction, size, and position.  
As a result, the revolution of the different is rendered incapable of reporting accurately on the 
sensible world.  Intellect, on the other hand, is stripped not only of its contemplative ability, I 
take it, but also of its sovereignty.  These tragic losses suffered by our immortal souls act as the 
motivation or justification for our education.  The stages follow accordingly. 
The first of the pre-philosophical stages involves the return of the true character of the 
revolution of the different and with it the return of correct sense-perceptions.  I include it to the 
extent that it acts as a significant starting point, and more precisely, because it suggests that the 
real healing work of education is to be performed on intellect.   
The second pre-philosophical stage involves the acceptance of the existence of intellect 
whether it be in us, in the universal soul, or perhaps even in the creative entity that organizes the 
universe.  I recognize this as an important moment in our education mostly because Timaeus 
seems to be at some pains to paint a motivating portrait of an unsavory character who does not 
believe in intellect, a character who, in some sense, is punished for his failure to believe and, 
accordingly, a character we should not be.  In the language of the present chapter, this 
unattractive individual is unhealthy and acts accordingly as the emblem of the uneducated.  Thus, 
choosing education is not first choosing to heal intellect but first believing in reason enough to 
pursue its treatment.     
The final pre-philosophical stage is, in a sense, the most explicitly stated in the text 
though it is a potentially thorny one for my dual classification of the stages.  In this phase of 
education, simply put, one investigates “the harmonies and revolutions of the universe” (47b7 
and 90d3-4).  I claim that this stage is thorny because, as with many transitions, it is difficult to 
decide where one thing ends and another begins and especially in light of my suggestion that our 
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education is ongoing.  Thus, I suggest that we separate the search and its fruits from what we do 
with the fruits of this search, and I assert accordingly that the final pre-philosophical stage 
involves only the search and its fruits—the observation and collection of astronomical data, so to 
speak.   
The first philosophical stage, consequently, involves what we do with the data we have 
collected or in other words the mathematical calculations we make concerning it, and this spells 
simultaneously the convalescence of intellect.  As Timaeus states more specifically, this healing 
amounts to “following” (90d1) or “imitating” (47c2) the heavenly revolution of intelligence.  By 
contrast, the second philosophical stage involves following the revolution of intelligence in 
ourselves which means, in essence, mastering our mortal souls and body.   
I also include in my presentation of the philosophical stages the most important upshot of 
philosophy for our purposes, the philosopher-warrior, an individual who marks the culmination 
of the narrative that starts with Socrates’ request for a story about a war and thus also the 
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 In the previous chapter, I argued in essence for two things.  First, I argued that Timaeus 
lays out an educational program.  Demonstrating the presence of such a program in his speech 
was part of the further support for my contention that Socrates requests an encomium with an 
educational component.  The additional requirement of this demonstration, stemming in part 
from Critias’ claim to harmonize the accounts of Socrates and Solon, was that Timaeus’ program 
should also show signs of this harmonization, and what we saw was Timaeus incorporating all 
the educationally relevant aspects of each into a medical context in which the epitome of health 
is the philosopher.  Second, regarding my interest in structure, I argued that Timaeus uses the 
paideutic context to organize his tripartite speech.  These parts I construed, on the one hand, in 
terms of cause—aligning the first with the study of intelligent cause, the second with the 
necessary, and the third with a combination of the two—and, on the other, in terms of the study 
of the divine universe, which takes up the first two parts, and the study of mortal living things 
found in the concluding section.  The progress through these three divisions, as I claimed, 
mimics the development of the philosopher in both the causal sense where the philosopher 
begins his studies from intelligent cause and in the theistic sense where he starts from the divine.   
In addition to these more explicitly stated educational aspects, I see the progress toward 
the creation of philosophers as a series of implied stages that build on one another.  In the present 
chapter, I focus on what I call, “the pre-philosophical stages,” and there are three such stages.  
The first can be divided into two phases: the initial state of embodiment, what most think of in 
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terms of the condition of the human infant,100 and the state of maturity101 that follows, which I 
will be describing with the term “emphrōn.”  In both its phases, this stage is illuminating because 
of what it tells us generally about the shape of Timaeus’ educational program.  In short, it tells us 
that education aims at intellectual repair.  The second stage involves the acceptance of or belief 
in the existence of intellect, whether it be our own, that of the universe, or even the existence of a 
creative intellect like the demiurge.  I include this stage in the progression, first of all, because 
Timaeus appears to be at some pains to show us a picture of someone who does not believe in 
intellect and is punished for it, a picture that serves as a warning and accordingly, it seems, as a 
motivation for becoming educated in the specific intellect-centered way Timaeus suggests.  I also 
include it because of the implication the existence of intellect has not only for Timaeus’ own 
educational program, but also for the very possibility of education itself.   Without intellect and 
more precisely individual intellects, we would not be responsible agents and such agency acts as 
the cornerstone of education.  The final pre-philosophical stage is the most explicitly stated and 
emphasized by Timaeus.  It involves the study of “the harmonies and revolutions of the 
universe,” something that many feel free to describe as “astronomy”102 though something I 
qualify in the context of the pre-philosophical stages as “observational astronomy.”  
                                                 
100 Cornford (1937): 147 and 149 n. 3; Tracy (1969): 124; Sedley (1999): 317; Zeyl (2000): 30 n. 42; and 
Carone (2007): 102. 
101 Compare Taylor (1928): 272, who equates this state with one’s akmē, something I do not mean to 
indicate with my use of the word “maturity.” 




Accordingly, at this stage we are merely gathering astronomical data that we will then analyze 
mathematically in our transition to philosophy.  
Beyond my general interest in education and Timaeus’ order of presentation, one thing I 
also mean to draw attention to in this chapter is how markedly physical or quasi-physical the 
progress through these implied stages is.  I say “quasi-physical” because while intellect is not at 
all bodily for Timaeus (it is not made of the elements), it is nonetheless spatial, and in making 
this claim, I am committing to what is typically referred to as “the literal interpretation” of 
Timaeus’ notion of the soul, a reading as old as Aristotle.103  The literal interpretation takes 
seriously the idea that the soul, in particular the immortal soul, has a proper size and shape as 
well as a proper place and motion.  Part of what will be tested in this chapter, however, is the 
legitimacy and usefulness of this literal construal, and this testing will take place in the context 
of the claim that the pre-philosophical work of education is most immediately aimed at 
correcting the disfigured spatial characteristics of intellect which are incurred at incarnation.   
Accordingly, I begin with an assessment of the damage and what is responsible for it in the 
interest of further pinpointing what spatial characteristics education will be acting on and acting 




                                                 
103 See De Anima: 1.3 406b26-407b11.   For more recent interpretations, see Sedley (1997): 329-30 (a 
later reiteration of his position—Sedley (1999): 317-18); Johansen (2000): 90-1; Sorabji (2003): 154; and 
Lautner (2005): 236.  For the non-literal interpretation see, Cherniss (1944): 184; and Lee (1976): 85 with 
n. 28.  I address the non-literal interpretation in the conclusion below. 
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3.2 Becoming Emphrōn: Our Initial Recovery from the Crisis of Embodiment 
In what follows, I will be responding primarily to one passage, and though long, I think it 
is absolutely essential to start by presenting it in its entirety.  I will return to focus on particular 
parts of this principle passage when I commence the discussion of body below.  
And they went to invest this body—into and out of which things were to flow—with the 
revolutions of the immortal soul.  These revolutions, now bound within a mighty river, 
neither mastered that river nor were mastered by it, but tossed it violently and were 
violently tossed by it.  Consequently the living thing as a whole did indeed move, but it 
would proceed in a disorderly, random, and irrational way that involved all six of the 
motions.  It would go forward and backward, then back and forth to the right and left, and 
upward and downward, wandering every which way in these six directions.  For mighty 
as the nourishment-bearing billow was in its ebb and flow, mightier still was the 
turbulence produced by the disturbances caused by the things that struck against the 
living things.  Such disturbances would occur when the body encountered and collided 
with external fire or for that matter with a hard lump of earth or with the flow of gliding 
waters, or when it was caught up by a surge of air-driven winds.  The motions produced 
by all these encounters would then be conducted through the body to the soul, and strike 
against it.  That is no doubt why these motions as a group came afterward to be called 
“sensations,” as they are still called today.  Moreover, it was just then, at that very 
instant, that they produced a very long and intense commotion.  They cooperated amidst 
the continually flowing channel to stir and violently shake the revolutions of the soul.  
They completely bound that of the Same by flowing against it in the opposite direction, 
and held it fast just as it was beginning to go its way.  And they further shook the 
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revolution of the Different right through, with the result that they twisted every which 
way the three intervals of the double and the three of the triple, as well as the middle 
terms of the rations of 3/2, 4/3, and 9/8 that connect them.  These agitations did not undo 
them, however, because they cannot be completely undone except by the one who had 
bound them together.  They mutilated and disfigured the circles in every possible way so 
that the circles barely held together and though they remained in motion, they moved 
without rhyme or reason, sometimes in the opposite direction, sometimes sideways, and 
sometimes upside down—like a man upside down, head propped against the ground and 
holding his feet up against something.  In that position his right side will present itself 
both to him and to those looking at him as left, and his left side as right.  It is this very 
thing—and others like it—that had such a dramatic effect upon the revolutions.  
Whenever they encounter something outside them characterizable as same or different, 
they will speak of it as “the same as” something, or as “different from” something else 
when the truth is just the opposite, so proving themselves to be misled and unintelligent.  
Also, at this stage souls do not have a ruling revolution taking the lead.  And so when 
certain sensations come in from outside and attack them, they sweep the soul’s entire 
vessel along with them.  It is then that they, however much in control they seem to be, are 
actually under their control.  All these disturbances are no doubt the reason why even 
today and not only at the beginning, whenever a soul is bound within a mortal body, it at 
first lacks intelligence.  But as the stream that brings growth and nourishment diminishes 
and the revolutions regain their composure, resume their proper courses, and establish 
themselves more and more with the passage of time, the revolutions are set straight, to 
conform to the configuration each of the circles takes in its natural course.  They then 
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correctly identify what is the same and what is different, and render emphrōn the person 
who possesses them.  And if this state be reinforced by the right program of educational 
training, he’ll turn out perfectly whole and healthy, and will have escaped the greatest 
disease. (43a4-44c2: tr. Zeyl with modifications) 
First, recall that, in the previous chapter, we saw Timaeus claiming that the goal of education is 
health and that the achievement of this goal also amounts to the successful avoidance of the 
gravest malady.  In the passage above, we see not only the context for this claim but we see more 
specifically that the state of being emphrōn is exactly where education begins.  Accordingly, 
understanding this state of affairs is of the utmost importance.  Second, notice that I have not 
translated emphrōn.  I have not because, for my purposes, the translation of the word is at least 
partly what is at stake, some translating it as, “intelligent”104 or “thoughtful,”105 others as, 
“sensible”106 or “sane.”107  What I have translated is the immediately surrounding context of the 
word though this is additionally at issue, some reading it as “render emphrōn,”108 like the above, 
and others as “put in the way to become emphrōn,”109 and here we see two points of view.  On 
the one hand, there are those who suggest that the state of being emphrōn, in some sense, has 
been achieved when the physiological busyness of our younger years subsides, and it makes no 
difference in this regard if translators bill emphrōn differently as “intelligent,” “sensible,” or 
                                                 
104 Bury (1929) and Zeyl (2000). 
105 Kalkavage (2001).  Also, see Tracy (1969): 124. 
106 Brisson (2001): “sensé.” 
107 Taylor (1928). 
108 Bury (1929) and Zeyl (2000). 
109 Archer-Hind (1888); Cornford (1937); and Kalkavage (2001). 
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“sane.”  The overarching point is that some state of affairs has been realized, and emphrōn 
describes this state of affairs.  On the other hand, there are those who think that the condition 
Timaeus is describing is merely a stage on the way to becoming emphrōn and not itself an 
instance of being such. 
 The short passage that each is working with is the same (i.e. the two positions do not 
appear to be the product of dueling manuscripts): emphrona ton echonta autas gignomenon 
apotelousin (44b7).  The first group, as we have seen, translates the passage, generally speaking, 
as “they render the thing possessing them emphrona,” and what we might think is that this 
translation has ignored gignomenon altogether.  The second group, on the other hand, while 
certainly attending to the gignomenon, seizes solely on the futurity of becoming, rendering the 
passage, again generally speaking, as “they set the thing possessing them on the road to 
becoming emphrona.”  I do not see, however, any grammatical reason to privilege this construal 
of becoming over the equally plausible sense the word has as a completed change of state.110  
Thus, when the first group seems to ignore gignomenon they may instead simply be drawing on 
its sense of completed change and absorbing this sense into apotelousin as in “they render the 
change of state to emphrona in the thing possessing them.”         
Ultimately, the position I develop is something of a compromise between these two ways 
of navigating gignomenon, a compromise that amounts to positing two ways of understanding 
what it means to be emphrōn.111  While I assert that the starting point for our education is or can 
                                                 
110 See Cornford (1937): 24-5, for a succinct discussion of these two senses of becoming. 
111 Compare Taylor (1928): 272-3, who can also be taken to offer a compromise.  He suggests that our 




be properly described as emphrōn, in line with the first group, I also realize, in line with the 
second, that there is additional work that must be done to achieve the yet to be completed 
emphronic state of affairs education can be taken to promise.  In order to adequately comprehend 
either of these takes on the matter, however, I think we first have to understand the “crisis” of 
embodiment that precedes the initial recovery being emphrōn represents, and understanding this 
crisis requires that we generate answers to the following two questions: what is immortal soul 
such that embodiment is a problem for it, and what is body such that embodiment is a problem 
for immortal soul?  I begin with the former. 
3.2.1 The Spatio-Motive Character of Immortal Soul: The Revolutions of Intellect and Sense 
 The immortal soul is a composite of eight disparate entities which, ideally, rotate in 
circles.112  We should not think, however, that these entities are singular like planets whose 
motion through space merely traces out a circular shape.  Rather, the components of immortal 
soul are circular rings that rotate in circles because, again ideally, they are circles (36b8-d7).113  
These psychic rings, as indicated above, are nonetheless non-physical.  For Timaeus, physicality 
entails visibility and tangibility and such attributes are products of the presence of fire and earth 
(31b4-6).  The soul, to the contrary, is, almost by definition, something invisible and intangible 
(46d5-7) being composed of intermediate forms of being, same, and different (35a1-6).114  At the 
                                                 
112 For an early criticism of Plato’s views on the circular motion of soul, see Aristotle De Anima 406b26 
ff.  For an explication of this criticism, see Claghorn (1954): 108-11. 
113 Compare Lee (1976) who offers a similar analysis not only on this point but also on much of what 
follows. 
114 See Cornford (1937): 59-60, for a brief commentary on the obscure passage (35a1-6) in which the 
materials of the soul are discussed.
91 
 
same time, the soul does not appear to be entirely incorporeal either, at least not by our modern, 
post-Cartesian lights.115  The soul has a markedly spatial character, and as I think we see in the 
principle passage presented at the outset, the immortal psyche is in fact a sort of spatial network 
composed of two parts.  The revolution of the Same, or what I will be referring to primarily as, 
“the revolution of intellect,”116 is composed of one ring which in turn encompasses the seven 
rings of the revolution of the different, or as I prefer, “the revolutions of sense.”     
As far as our revolution of intellect is concerned, and going on what we know about the 
universe’s immortal soul, we can say that at its best (or in line with our medical narrative, at its 
healthiest) intellect is a ring moving in the same way and in the same place (tēi kata tauta kai en 
tautōi periagomenēi: 36c2; and en tautōi kata tauta: 40a8).  Motion in the same way, I take it, 
indicates that the revolution of intellect has a single speed and direction.  Motion in the same 
place, on the other hand, describes, of course, the soul’s position, but it also describes its shape 
and even its size.    
Starting from motion in the same way, it should be reasonable to suggest that the 
revolution of intellect moves at a single speed—one revolution per day.  I say this because, for 
Timaeus, the passing of one day is explained in terms of one revolution of the entire universe, 
and this motion is connected to that of intellect (39b2).  Moreover, intellect turns in a single 
direction (36c6), and as Timaeus indicates, its direction is to the right, from east to west.         
  Things are much more complex, I think, when it comes to motion in the same place.  
With regard to position, the intellect of the universe does not move with respect to latitude or 
                                                 
115 For a concise discussion of the incorporeality of the immortal soul, see D. Miller (1997): 182-3. 
116 I also refer to the revolution of the Same as “the revolution of intelligence,” “the intellectual circuits,” 
and in some cases merely as “intellect.” 
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longitude117 though simply because there is no space outside of the universe into which it could 
move.  This absolutely stationary state does not apply to all intellectual beings, however.  
Consider, for instance, the heavenly gods that inhabit the universe’s revolution of intelligence.  
While the motion of their intellects is described as motion in the same place, they nonetheless 
also have forward motion (40b).  At least in an accidental sense, their intellects traverse latitude 
and longitude though I think without changing position within their own bodies in any way.  If 
we look to our principle passage above, however, it appears that by contrast intellect in mortals 
may change positions within the head.  As Timaeus indicates, it is not just the body that is moved 
but rather the entire living thing (to…holon kineisthai zōon: 43a7-b1), and I see this as a case in 
which the revolution of intellect changes its position because of Timaeus’ further suggestion, 
later in the speech, that a living thing, as a whole, is a composite of body and soul (87e5-6).118  
Thus, in addition to body, it appears that the revolutions of soul, including that of intellect, are 
also moved in each of the six directions—forward, backward, right, left, upward, and downward 
(43b2-5).  The soul’s change in position is further reinforced by what Timaeus has to say at 
47c3-4 where he speaks of our “wandering” (peplanēmenas) revolutions.   Just as the 
“wanderers,” the sun and the six other orbiting planets (38c5-6), are thought to wander because 
of the fact that they move through the heavens (the revolutions inhabited by the planets certainly 
do not wander),119 we should also think that the revolutions of immortal soul wander to some 
degree through our heads.  
                                                 
117 I borrow the “latitude and longitude” language from Skemp (1947): 57. 
118 Compare Tracy (1976): 98, who makes a similar assertion. 
119 See Cornford (1937): 114. 
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Changes in position also seem to be closely tied to the soul’s shape and perhaps even its 
size to the extent that motion in the same place can also be construed as motion “within the same 
limits.”120  Thus, technically speaking, the stationary revolution of a square will not qualify as 
motion in the same place on account of the fact that its extremities do not maintain a “solid of 
rotation” but rather trace out a jagged orbit the peaks and valleys of which do not at all comport 
with the actual shape of the square.121  Thus, when the circular shape of our intellectual 
revolution is distorted, we should also think that like the square it has deviated from its position.  
Additionally, size seems relevant here not only for the simple reason that Timaeus suggests our 
immortal souls have a size (88a7-8) but also because shrinking or growing seems to be a change 
of position.  I am thinking here of the way a ring in a ripple might be said to expand.  So that 
when intellect increases in size do to frequent use, in some looser way, we should also consider it 
to be changing position.              
Moving away from specific data about soul into more general comments made about 
motion itself, one might further describe revolution in the same place by appealing to Timaeus’ 
general “law” of motion.  The law states that rest (stasis) can only come about in a state of 
uniformity (omalotēs) (57e1-3).  It should seem curious then that the revolution of intellect is 
also often referred to as uniform (omoios) (36d; 39b7;  39d6; 40b2; and 42c4-5) and thus by 
extension should be considered to be at rest.  What we might conclude from this, however, is not 
that uniformity means something different when applied to intellect.  Instead, I suggest that we 
understand rest to mean the absence of motion from place to place.  Thus, rather than describing 
the ideal revolution of intellect in terms of the maintenance of position, as above, we should 
                                                 
120 Lee (1976): 74 
121 Op. Cit.: 75. 
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simply say that it is at rest or even better yet stationary (which I think amounts to a better 
translation of stasis in this case).122   
I think it would be inappropriate, however, to use this law of motion also to explain the 
mere revolving of intellect because in the context of the law, intellect, possessed of uniformity, is 
not really moving at all.  This has interesting consequences for self-motion, something that is of 
interest to the extent that the beating taken by immortal soul upon embodiment appears to 
interfere with the soul’s claim to the title of self-moving thing (37b5).123  What I mean is that 
calling intellect a self-mover might suggest a situation in which intellect is both the mover and 
moved, and the problem is, in short, that mover and moved simply do not make sense in the 
absence of motion, an absence of motion dictated by the characterization of motion given in the 
general law.  Motion is motion from place to place, and as long as intellect is not moving from 
place to place but is instead stationary, mover and moved do not apply. 
In any case, what does explain intellect’s circling, I claim, is the demiurge.  As Timaeus 
indicates, the demiurge sets intellect spinning, and apparently intellect will continue to spin for 
all time (34a3-4).  On the other hand, as we see in our principle passage, mortal intellect ceases 
its circling at least for some stretch of time following the introduction of the immortal soul into 
the body.  At the prodding of Timaeus’ use of words like “bind” (epedeō) to describe the 
stoppage, however, I assume that the motion of mortal intellect is not something that needs to be 
restarted after the departure of what is binding or blocking it.  Rather, the un-revolving intellect 
of the newborn is like a stationary car with the accelerator engaged and with the front fender of 
                                                 
122 See Lidell, Scott, Jones, and McKenzie (1996) who offer “stationariness” as a definition of stasis. 
123 See Cornford (1937): 149 n. 3, for the suggestion that self-motion is at stake. 
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the car pushing squarely on an obstructing barrier that if removed would release the car into 
forward motion.  The consequences of this for being emphrōn will become clear below.   
At this point, I do not want to give the impression that I have done away with Timaeus’ 
claim that the soul is a self-moving thing,124 however.  But before I can move on to discuss the 
soul’s self-motion in more detail, I need first to discuss briefly the revolutions of sense. 
As already indicated, the revolutions of sense are seven circular revolving rings contained 
within and connected to the revolution of intellect (36c3-4).  Because the two are connected, the 
revolutions of sense are moved in the direction that intellect moves.  Nevertheless, the 
revolutions of sense, as Timaeus notes, move in addition not only in a direction opposite to that 
of intellect—to the left from west to east—but they also move more slowly.  This slower speed is 
presented by Timaeus in contrast to intellect’s ability to complete a full rotation in one day.  For 
instance, the revolution of sense inhabited by the moon takes a month to complete and that of the 
sun an entire year.  Accordingly, the speeds of each revolution of sense vary not only with 
respect to intellect but also with respect to one another (36d2-7).         
In contrast to his description of intellect, Timaeus does not openly attribute motion in the 
same way and in the same place to the revolutions of sense and regardless of the fact that each of 
the revolutions maintains its own speed, direction, position, shape, and size.125  On the other 
hand, it appears that, even though these revolutions are not intellect, Timaeus considers the 
revolutions of sense to be intelligent or phronimos, and he does at least by implication when he 
both refers comparatively to the revolution of intellect as “the wisest of the circular revolutions” 
                                                 
124 See Cornford (1937): 148 n. 1, for the similar assertion that the soul in its own right is a self-mover. 
125 See Op. Cit.: 114, for the idea that the sensory circuits themselves are in fact as unwandering as the 
revolution of intellect. 
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(39c2) and then follows this claim immediately with a “list” of sense revolutions which proceeds 
from fastest to slowest, the fastest below intellect being the moon and the next fastest being the 
sun, though Venus and Mercury move at the same speed as the sun and perhaps, accordingly, are 
equally as phronimos (more on this below).        
In order to further explain the motion of the revolutions of sense, I suggest that just like 
with intellect, we appeal again to the demiurge who, as Timaeus suggests, is the one who sets 
these revolutions in motion (34a2-3; 36c2-3; and 36d4-5), and, as indicated above, I think this 
must apply equally to our own souls.  Recall, however, that the revolutions of sense are moved 
by intellect, a control underscored by Timaeus in his claim that intellect rules over the 
revolutions of sense (36c7-d1).  Further, its ruling is associated with the fact that the revolution 
of intellect is not divided (36d1-2).  Intellect is one thing and accordingly rules like a monarch 
over the masses denoted by the seven divisions of the revolution of sense, and this scenario 
facilitates our return to the discussion of self-motion insofar as we can clearly see here the 
presence of the mover and moved.             
 According to Timaeus, motion takes place in a state of non-uniformity between mover 
and moved, and this non-uniformity is further spelled out in terms of inequality, or in the Greek, 
anisotēs (57e3-58a1).  Isotēs, the root word negated in anisotēs, while certainly possessed of a 
quantitative sense, also carries with it a strong political connotation.126  And although these 
specific words are not used, nonetheless, we see their political color at work in Timaeus’ 
comments on the relationship between the universe’s body and soul.  For Timaeus, the former is 
to be ruled by the latter and for no other reason than it just seems obvious to him that the body, 
being younger, should be ruled by its elder, the soul.  He cannot in the case of the soul alone, 
                                                 
126 See Lidell, Scott, Jones, and McKenzie (1996): “isotēs.” 
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however, appeal to the inequality between young and old, and I take it that he cannot because 
there is no real sense in which the revolution of intellect is “born” before the seven revolutions it 
should, as a result, govern.  Rather, Timaeus appeals instead to quantity, asserting that the 
revolution of intellect is one entity and the revolution of sense seven.  Further, he elaborates on 
this inequality with reference to the fact that the revolution of intellect is wiser than the 
revolutions of sense, and the connection between ruling and this superlative, ranking language is 
reiterated and reinforced in our own case where because intellect is best (beltiston), it, at the very 
least, ought to rule (hegemonein) (70b8-c1).  Thus, if we are to think, like Timaeus, that the 
immortal soul considered in itself is a self-moving thing, we should assert that it is such a thing 
to the extent that the revolution of intellect rules over the revolutions of sense and further that it 
does because in one way or another the inequality between them supports self-motion.   
It is important to add that self-motion most certainly refers also to a relationship between 
immortal soul and the body it inhabits, and I say this on account of what Timaeus claims about 
plants.  Plants lack the ability to move their bodies from place to place because of the fact that 
they lack immortal soul (77b6-c5).  Thus, self-motion from the psycho-somatic and mortal point 
of view describes a complex relationship between the revolutions of intellect in the head, the 
circulatory system, the marrow, and, at least implicitly, what is most commonly referred to as 
“spirited soul,” one of the two parts of mortal soul.127         
Now I have gone into so much detail about the constitution and motive capacities of 
immortal soul because, as I suggested at the outset of this discussion, knowing about such things 
                                                 
127 Explaining the body at rest, which means ultimately explaining what uniformity between immortal 
soul and body amounts to, is a complicated and perhaps even an intractable matter that I do not think I 
need to consider here.  For a concise attempt at addressing the issue, see D. Miller (1997): 183-4. 
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should help us to determine what our initial state of emphrōn entails.  More precisely, as we will 
soon see, something happens when the growth of our body slows down that effects a kind of 
natural healing of immortal soul, and it is this natural healing that Timaeus claims results in 
being emphrōn.  So what I have been hoping to chisel out thus far is an array of potential 
candidates for this healing.  For instance, should we say that being emphrōn means that intellect 
has recovered its speed though not its size?  Or that the revolutions of sense have recovered their 
circular shape but not their positions?  Or, more generally speaking, that being emphrōn means 
that the immortal soul has achieved self-motion?  Moreover, being able to answer these kinds of 
questions should also help us to know with some degree of precision what aspects of our 
immortal souls education is meant to correct.  After all, recall that education starts from this 
emphrōn state.  So as I move on to discuss body, I am also moving on to give, as far as possible, 
an account of the aspects of soul mangled by embodiment as well as an account of the lingering 
psychic casualties that, I assert, persist after our initial recovery, the latter representing the spatial 
elements upon which education will act. 
3.2.2 The Troublesome Body in Brief and the Emphronic Immortal Soul 
In contrast to what we can say about soul that is relevant to understanding what it means 
to be emphrōn, I think there is really only one relevant thing to say about body.  At its most 
fundamental, the mortal body is an entrance and an exit, something that receives inputs and 
returns outputs (42a4; 43a5-6; and 43b5-6).  These inputs and outputs are those associated with 
nourishment and sensations and are, at least initially, the things that cause the most problems for 
immortal soul.  They cause problems because, on the most general level, nourishment and 
sensations just like immortal soul are also spatial and motive.  Before adding any more detail, 
however, let’s make a return trip to a section from our principle passage above. 
99 
 
And they went to invest this body—into and out of which things were to flow—with the 
revolutions of the immortal soul.  These revolutions, now bound within a mighty river, 
neither ruled over that river nor were ruled by it, but tossed it violently and were violently 
tossed by it…For great as the nourishment-bearing flood was in its ebb and flow, greater 
still was the turbulence produced by the disturbances caused by the things that struck 
against their bodies.  Such disturbances would occur when the body encountered and 
collided with external fire (i.e. fire other than the body’s own) or for that matter with a 
hard lump of earth or with the flow of gliding waters, or when it was caught up by a surge 
of air-driven winds.  The motions produced by all these encounters would then be 
conducted through the body to the soul, and strike against it…It was just then, at that very 
instant, that they produced a very long and intense commotion.  They cooperated within 
the continually flowing channel to stir and violently shake the revolutions of the soul.  
They completely bound that of the Same [the revolution of intellect] by flowing against it 
in the opposite direction, and held it back in its ruling and going.  And they further shook 
the revolution of the Different [the revolutions of sense] right through, with the result that 
they twisted every which way the three intervals of the double and the three of the triple, 
as well as the middle terms of the rations of 3/2, 4/3, and 9/8 that connect them.  These 
agitations did not undo them, however, because they cannot be completely undone except 
by the one who had bound them together.  They mutilated and disfigured the circles in 
every possible way so that the circles barely held together and though they remained in 
motion, they moved without rhyme or reason, sometimes in the opposite direction, 
sometimes sideways, and sometimes upside down—like a man upside down, head 
propped against the ground and holding his feet up against something.  In that position 
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his right side will present itself both to him and to those looking at him as left, and his left 
side as right.  It is this very thing—and others like it—that had such a dramatic effect 
upon the revolutions.  Whenever they encounter something outside them characterizable 
as same or different, they will speak of it as “the same as” something, or as “different 
from” something else when the truth is just the opposite, so proving themselves to be 
misled and unintelligent.  Also at this time, not one revolution among them is ruling or 
taking the lead.  
Timaeus describes our nourishment as if it were a strong river which rushes through the channels 
of the body and which not only rattles the body itself but crashes into the immortal soul.  And 
while this violent flood of food is certainly at odds with all our psychic revolutions, what is 
emphasized by Timaeus when it comes to the distortion of these revolutions is sense-perception.  
Timaeus has nothing to say specifically about the revolution of intellect apart from mention of 
the fact that the violent bombardment intellect experiences brings it to a halt, or more specifically 
holds it back in its “ruling and going” (archousan kai iousan), and this near silence about 
intellect acts as the driving force behind my interpretation of our initial state of emphrōn. 
 First, notice that Timaeus is appealing to the various rings of the revolution of sense 
when he speaks of the circles in the plural maintaining their circling.  It seems apparent that he is 
referring only to the multiple revolutions of sense because, as we just saw, intellect’s circling has 
been entirely frozen.128  So are we to think that what we have here is a healing narrative solely 
applicable to the revolutions of sense?  It is certainly tempting to think so.   
                                                 
128 Pace Reydams-Schils (1997): 263, who claims that “the two revolutions of Same [intellect] and Other 
[sense]” are “still…running.” 
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Consider the chain of “they-s” and “them-s” in the above passage.  Timaeus is talking 
about the circling of the revolutions of sense and continues: “they cannot be completely undone”; 
“they remain in motion”; “It is this very thing…that had such a dramatic effect on the 
revolutions”; “they encounter something outside of them”; and “not one revolution among them 
is ruling or taking the lead.”  Intellect, it appears, is nowhere to be found.  On the other hand, it 
may be suggested that Timaeus restarts the chain of they-s and them-s when he refers to what 
“had such a dramatic effect upon the revolutions.”  By bringing in language like “the 
revolutions” as well as the accompanying general claim about them, it is as if Timaeus has now 
returned to talking about the whole immortal psyche, both sense and intellect.  So when he states 
shortly thereafter that “not one revolution among them is ruling or taking the lead,” we should 
perhaps resist the thought that one of the sensory revolutions will eventually take the lead and 
begin reporting accurately on the external world.  Rather, we should think instead that intellect is 
not ruling and moreover that its ruling is at stake here.   
What Timaeus says immediately following, however, should make this intellect-inclusive 
reading strange.  He claims that “they encounter something outside of them” and that 
“they…speak of it [.]”  If intellect is neither ruling nor moving, it would be odd to include it in 
this particularly active context of encountering and declaring.  In fact, if we take the immortal 
soul of the universe as a guide, what appears to be integral to making declarations at all is the 
actual revolving of the soul (37b3-c3).  So again, if intellect is not moving, it cannot be making 
any declarations.   
A further reason to entertain the idea that Timaeaus is thinking only of the sensory 
circuits is the emphasis he places on the sensible world: “the external fire…the hard lump of 
earth…the flow of gliding waters…the surge of air-driven winds.”  In short, these are the objects 
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apprehended by the revolutions of sense.  And appealing once more to the universe for guidance, 
it seems that these revolutions are not only the proper bards of the sensible world, but also do a 
fine job of reporting on what they find there without the help of the revolution of intellect.  On 
their own, spinning straight (orthos), they produce firm and true beliefs (37b6-8).  Therefore, 
part of lacking a leader means not lacking the rule of intellect, but rather it seems lacking any 
“straight” revolution. 
 Timaeus continues: “and so when certain sensations come in from the outside and attack 
them, they sweep the soul’s entire vessel along with them.  It is then that they, though appearing 
to rule, are actually ruled.”  Here we might suggest again that when Timaeus claims that the 
sensations attack “them,” he is still referring to the revolutions of sense as he also is when he 
refers to “they.”  In other words, just because sensations sweep the soul’s entire vessel along 
with them, we should perhaps not think, as a result, that all of a sudden Timaeus means to turn 
our attention to the revolution of intellect.  At the same time, this seems to me to be a more 
reasonable place to assert that Timaeus is restarting the chain of they-s and them-s, and in 
speaking of “the soul’s entire vessel,” he is now speaking of both intellect and sense.129   If we 
follow this through, however, I think we will run into trouble.  Consider what Timaeus says next:   
All these disturbances are no doubt the reason why even today and not only at the 
beginning, whenever a soul is bound within a mortal body, it is at first unintelligent.  But 
as the stream that brings growth and nourishment diminishes and the revolutions [both 
intellect and sense] regain their composure, resume their proper courses, and establish 
themselves more and more with the passage of time, the revolutions are set straight, 
                                                 
129 Compare Cornford (1937): 149 n. 4, who takes the whole vessel to refer to both the revolutions of the 
immortal soul and the body. 
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conforming to the configuration each of the circles takes in its natural course.  They then 
correctly identify what is the same and what is different, and render emphrōn the person 
who possesses them.  And if this state be reinforced by the right program of educational 
training, he’ll turn out perfectly whole and healthy and will have escaped the greatest 
disease.    
What I am in the midst of developing is the claim that education, at least in its pre-philosophical 
phase, aims to repair our broken intellects.  Accordingly, the reason I am reluctant to include 
intellect in the recovery of the revolutions described above is that doing so runs the risk of 
leaving education with no work to do.  If intellect heals naturally upon the cessation of the rapid 
rate of our physical development, what need would there be for learning anything?   
I am not merely operating under the pressure of my own argument here, however.  There 
are certainly prominent reasons to think that intellect has not been fully healed in this initial state 
of being emphrōn.  Consider what Timaeus has to say about astronomy.  He suggests that we 
study the unwandering, heavenly circling of intellect for the sake of correcting our own flawed 
intellectual revolutions (47b5-c4 and 90c6-d7).  If our noetic revolutions have already been 
healed naturally, however, what need would there be for correcting them?  What need would 
there be for astronomy? 
My main point here is that we should be cautious when ascribing recovery to intellect at 
this early stage.  Nonetheless, I am also hesitant to think that only the revolutions of sense have 
recovered, that in this first case of being emphrōn our intellects are still utterly in shambles, and I 
am hesitant for the following reasons.   
First of all, sensations in conjunction with the flood of food have an immediate impact on 
the revolution of intellect.  Timaeus explicitly says so himself:  
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That is no doubt why these motions as a group came afterward to be called “sensations,” 
as they are still called today.  Moreover, it was just then, at that very instant, that they 
[sensations] produced a very long and intense commotion.  They cooperated with the 
continually flowing channel to stir and violently shake the revolutions of the soul.  They 
completely bound that of the Same [the revolution of intellect] by flowing against it in 
the opposite direction…    
What we see here is that sensations are the true culprit of the cessation of intellect’s circling.  It 
does not appear, however, that they are culpable because of anything about sensations per se.  
Rather, the problem seems to be caused by their presence in the veins and thus in the midst of the 
torrential stream of nourishment that rushes through the body.  In infancy especially, the 
aggressive rate of growth is a primary factor in this disruption in the sense that growing at such a 
pace means that there is much more food in the veins at all times (81b4-5).  In other words, there 
is more food entering the body than leaving it and a great force is created by this voluminous 
presence causing sensations to act equally forcefully on the revolutions of immortal soul and 
more specifically in this case on the revolution of intellect.  And, as we saw above, when the 
amount of food in the veins is reduced on account of the equally reduced rate of growth, one 
becomes emphrōn.  Thus, to the extent that being emphrōn is a result of the cessation of the 
violent flood of sensations and food that binds intellect in the first place, it should be reasonable 
to think that, when the flood subsides, intellect could, at the very least, begin turning again 
(recall the car analogy above).   
I am also hesitant to the extent that I trust the judgment of commentators who will 
undoubtedly be skeptical about the claim implicit in the suggestion that only the sensory 
revolutions have been healed, namely the claim that the external, sensible world can be reported 
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accurately without the assistance of intellect.  I think it is important first, however, to emphasize 
what I am not addressing here.  The issue does not concern the mere possibility of sense-
perception.  In our principle passage above, we see that the revolutions of sense do not stop 
reporting on the external world just because intellect is indisposed.130  Rather, they continue to 
announce what strikes them.  What they fail to do is make correct announcements.  Thus, I am 
presently concerned with the ability of the revolutions of sense to offer a veridical picture of the 
sensible realm without the aid of intellect.  Second, what I am grappling with here is the 
relationship between the rational and sensitive capacities of immortal soul alone.  Alternatively, 
much of the literature on sense-perception in the Timaeus focuses on the relationship between 
mortal soul and “rational soul,” rational soul being an appellation that blends both of our 
immortal revolutions, in some sense, indiscriminately.131  By contrast, I ignore mortal soul, and I 
do because Timaeus himself does not appear to have it in mind.  The further contrast is that 
rather than thinking in the more vague terms of the rational soul, I mean instead to understand 
the relationship between its components and pinpoint the role of each in sense-perception.  
Accordingly, in speaking of skeptical commentators, I am thinking in particular of those like 
Johansen who claim that the circuits of sense go amiss because they lack the “regulating 
influence” of the revolution of intellect.132   
                                                 
130 See Timaeus’ similar assertion about sense-perception’s continued operation in bouts of madness at 
86c2-3. 
131 For appeals to rational soul, see Brisson (1999): 160 and 162; Silverman (1990): 151; and Ganson 
(2005): 9.    
132 Johansen (2004): 144. 
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For the sake of assessing Johansen’s claim and the implications it has for being emphrōn, 
I return to the suggestion made above concerning the independence of the sensory revolutions.  
For Timaeus, the foundation of veridical sense-perception consists in the material out of which 
the revolutions of sense are made, the proportionate structure of these revolutions, and their 
circular motion, and what we see in the story of our embodiment are the literal consequences of 
damage to the latter two components.  The intervals and the bonding ratios of particular circuits 
are utterly deformed (though not changed—they are merely twisted) and the disparate circles 
move in a direction opposite to that which is proper as well as being upside down while doing so 
(43e3-4).  The result of these deformities are not just merely incorrect judgments, however.  
Instead of just getting things wrong, the opposite and upside down revolutions report the world 
in an equally opposite fashion, the analogue of which is someone standing on his head claiming 
incorrectly that things on his left are on his right (43e4-8).  Accordingly, the problem is more 
precisely that the revolutions of sense make pronouncements that are the exact opposite of what 
is the case, and it appears that they do because they are literally upside down and running in the 
reverse direction of that which is proper.  So if the natural recuperation of the sensory 
revolutions entails that, upon healing, they are right-side up and rotating in the appropriate 
direction, why would Johansen go further to claim that their recuperation also involves the return 
of the regulation of intellect? 
When speaking of the immortal soul of the universe earlier in his speech, Timaeus’ 
assertions about the composition and motions of the revolutions are accompanied by the claim 
that the sensory circuits report their findings to intellect and/or vice versa, and Johansen assumes 
that this communication assists in the process of sense-perception.133  I think, however, that the 
                                                 
133 Op. Cit.: 172 
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passage is too vague to support this contention.  There is nothing precise enough in Timaeus’ 
claim about the intercourse between the two to suggest what the purpose, result, or content of 
this psychic sharing is.  The only thing Timaeus says is that the affections are communicated to 
the whole soul (legei kinoumenē dia pasēs eautēs: 37a6-7). 
 More generally speaking, if we decide, contra the implications of Johansen’s account, 
that only the revolutions of sense are healed in our initial emphronic state, we may also be 
coming face to face with the consequences of denying that sense-perception requires concepts.  
Take Brisson, for instance, who asserts that the “rational part of the soul” must be involved in 
human sensing (as opposed to the a-rational sense-perception we find in plants) because 
knowledge of the Forms must be involved.  For Brisson, sense-perception is holistic, including 
not just the affections (pathēmata) received from the external world but also the final delineation 
of these affections by concepts such as “red” or “hot,” names he maintains are derived from 
anamnesis or recollection, “an activity that allows thinking and naming to take place.”134  As 
already indicated, what is unclear about appeals like Brisson’s to “the rational part of the soul” is 
whether or not he intends to designate merely the revolution of intellect, or just sense, or both.  
While I seriously doubt that he means to isolate the sensory capacities of immortal soul, it seems 
to me that one holding to the imperative involvement of concepts in sense-perception might 
reasonably claim, at least in part, that the revolutions of sense are in fact capable of the 
                                                 
134 Brisson (1999): 162: sense-perception indicates “the process as a whole.”  Contrast Brisson’s process 
account with Silverman (1990) who offers an affection exclusive account claiming that sense-perception, 
properly construed, involves only mortal soul.  In other words, whatever further psychic processing our 
sensations undergo after reception by mortal soul should not be included in the activity of sense-
perception per se.  
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conceptual without the aid of intellect.  Consider the positions of Proclus and more recently 
Cornford who suggest that the materials of which the immortal soul is made allow it to interact 
with both Being and Becoming, what we might call, “the like knows like doctrine.”135  Now 
certainly not only intellect but also the sensory revolutions are made of such materials.  So if 
concepts have an exclusive connection to Being or the Forms and access to concepts is an 
imperative of sense-perception, we should think that the revolutions of sense are equally as 
capable as intellect in accessing concepts and simply in virtue of the materials of which they are 
made.  Given their “rational” capacity, we might also think that the sensory circuits are a 
candidate for acting as the agent of intelligence that serves as the terminus of our sensations, to 
phronimon (64b3-6), as Lautner believes,136 and there are certainly reasons to think he is on the 
right track.  Recall that, at least by implication, the heavenly revolutions of sense inhabited by 
the Sun and the other “wanderers” are phronimos or intelligent.  Further, what makes psychic 
revolutions (specifically the rings rather than the planets or stars attached to the rings) intelligent 
                                                 
135 Proclus: 298, and Cornford (1937): 94. 
136 Lautner (2005): 244.  For an extended discussion of the nature of to phronimon, see O’Brien (1984): 
140 and 140 n. 33, who claims that it is the “seat of consciousness” (for a similar assertion see, Burnyeat 
(1976): 49) as well as “a part or function of the mortal soul” (O’Brien (1997) is a later echo of these 
claims).  For a contrasting take, see Brisson (1997): 313-15, who disagrees with both of O’Brien’s 
contentions, problematizing his claim about to phronimon being the seat of consciousness and further 
claiming that to phronimon should be equated with rational soul.  Lautner continues the conversation with 
the suggestion that to phronimon may describe the revolutions of sense.  For the most recent extension of 




in the first place is the simple fact that they move unfalteringly in the same spot, and this is 
something that should technically apply not only to intellect’s coursing but to the sense orbits as 
well.  Additionally, and this is in some sense more speculative, identifying the revolutions of 
sense with to phronimon would be especially helpful in the case that our initial state of being 
emphron may entail, on the one hand, the total absence of intellect’s involvement though on the 
other the presence of accurate sense-perception.  In fact, it would work out quite nicely if the 
demiurge, knowing the effects of the tumultuousness of embodiment on the revolutions of 
intellect (and he and his progeny certainly are able to see into the future in this way), engineered 
some safeguard in the revolutions of sense that would enable us to report accurately enough that 
we could make it to astronomy and thus start work on healing our intellects.  And what I am 
trying to suggest with the like knows like doctrine is that such a safeguard could be present, in 
part, in the very make-up of the revolutions of sense.     
 At this point, however, we should wonder about the degree of independence I have just 
allotted to the sensory circuits.  In fact, the following question immediately comes to mind: if the 
revolutions of sense are so capable on their own, what need is there in the bigger picture for 
intellect at all?  In my assessment, we have arrived at this question mostly because of our 
construal of the like knows like doctrine.  In more precise terms than the above, the immortal 
soul is capable of “knowing” both the realm of Being and Becoming because it is an intermediate 
form of the two which in turn amounts to being like the two, and in the present case this 
intermediate form is a product specifically of the materials out of which the immortal soul is 
made.  Taking the like knows like doctrine in this material way, however, risks the uselessness of 
intellect.  In this case, there seems to be nothing it can do that the revolutions of sense cannot 
also do.  Accordingly, I suggest thinking instead in terms of the indivisible and divisible.  The 
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undivided intellectual revolution knows indivisible Being, and the revolution of sense which the 
god divided into seven disparate circuits knows divisible Becoming.  And fusing this construal 
with the spirit of Johansen’s regulating intellect, we get something like the following picture 
which I think should be preferred. 
First, let me make it clear that the crisis of embodiment does not affect the materials out 
of which immortal soul is made.  What is at stake, broadly speaking, is motion.  Recall that 
intellect has been frozen and is not moving at all and the revolutions of sense are rotating upside 
down and in the reverse direction from what is proper.  Thus, on the one hand, being emphrōn 
means that the revolutions of sense must be right-side up, untwisted, and moving in the proper 
direction.  On the other hand, intellect must be moving too.  I am reluctant, however, to claim 
that intellect’s motion transmits concepts relevant to sense-perception.  Again, for Timaeus, the 
revolutions of sense when spinning straight report the divisible world of Becoming correctly by 
themselves.  Thus, I conclude that the regulating motion of intellect, at this stage, acts like 
nothing more than a coordinating entity that herds the revolvings of the sensory circuits.  In sum, 
being emphrōn spells, at the very least, the return of the self-moving soul in which the mere 
motion of intellect controls the motions of the revolutions of sense, and with this return comes 
accurate sense-perception.    
Additional reasons for settling on this characterization include, first, the fact that Timaeus 
himself aligns self-motion with being emphrōn when he implicitly connects self-moving things 
with causes of an emphronic nature (ton de nou and epistēmēs erastēn anagkē tas tēs emphronos 
phuseōs aitias prōtas metadiōkein, hosai de hup’ allōn men kinoumnenōn hetera d’ ex anagkēs 
kinountōn gignontai, deuteras: 46d7-e2).137  Second, granting intellect even this minor amount of 
                                                 
137 See Cornford (1937): 162, for the idea that self-moving soul is to be linked with intelligent cause. 
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control helps us to avoid the awkward conclusion we were flirting with above—i.e. one of the 
sensory revolutions has taken the lead when faithful sense-perception finds its footing in us.  
Instead, intellect has established its rule but only in the mundane way it rules in every self-
moving thing.  In other words, this is not at all the kind of ruling Timaeus means to indicate 
when he speaks of intellectual rule as indicative of the philosopher.    
I also add that both the revolutions of sense and intellect appear to have settled down as 
the word galēnē indicates (hai periphorai lambanomai galēnēs: 44b2-3).  At its most literal, the 
word suggests a calm sea at rest, and I take this as an indication that our immortal soul is no 
longer moving from place to place.  Instead, it is standing still and accordingly is already 
unwandering in some sense.  
In the end, having completed the chiseling project mentioned above, I suggest that the 
spatial characteristics of immortal soul in this initial state of emphrōn are as follows.  The 
revolutions of sense have healed enough to report the external world correctly though some 
additional healing of their speed is perhaps to come.  Intellect, on the other hand, has regained 
motion in the proper direction.  What remains to be healed are its speed and shape. 
3.2.3 Final Thoughts on Emphrōn: Its Translation and What It Represents  
Let’s return momentarily to our other motivating concerns—the translation of the word 
emphrōn and the state of affairs it is meant to describe.  Recall the suggestion that my own 
position is a compromise between two possible interpretations stemming from the accompanying 
word gignomenon in the following passage: emphrona ton echonta autas gignomenon 
apotelousin.  On the one hand, we could think Timaeus is suggesting that our initial recovery 
from the trauma of incarnation represents a completed change of state to being emphrōn, and in a 
significant sense, I have been assuming this interpretation throughout most of the above.  On the 
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other hand, gignomenon also carries with it a sense of futurity, and it is also possible that our 
initial recuperation is just a stage on the way to later becoming emphrōn.    
The compromise I am suggesting involves recognizing the senses in which both 
interpretations are correct, and the upshot of the compromise is a better understanding, I hope, of 
how we should translate the word in the context of the Timaeus.  The sense in which the first 
interpretation is correct draws on Timaeus’ claim that self-moving cause is emphronic, and as I 
have just argued, in the context of our initial convalescence, self-motion has been achieved.  
What this means is that rotating intellect is managing the motions of the revolutions of sense, as 
Timaeus indicates when he describes the soul of the universe as self-moving, and the completed 
change to this state can, accordingly, be described as emphrōn.  The sense in which the second 
interpretation is correct exploits the fact that the universe itself is said to be emphrōn.  Insofar as 
one of the aspiring philosopher’s goals is to mold his own intellect after the universal soul and 
further that this molding has not taken place in our initial and natural recovery from embodiment, 
it should be reasonable to suggest that being emphronic like the universe is something yet to 
come.   
In both cases, I think the translation “intelligent” is to be preferred as long as we keep in 
mind what intelligence means at each phase in the progression.  By emphasizing this 
developmental point, I intend primarily to counteract the implication that the work of education 
has already been accomplished naturally.  Lastly, as may already be apparent from the previous 
chapter, I suggest that we steer clear of translations like “sane.”  There is no sufficient indication 
that madness is at issue.  Again, mortal soul is a major player in madness, and Timaeus does not 
invoke it as a character in the story of our embodiment.        
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3.3 The Existence of Intellect and the Possibility of Education: A Short Digression from the 
Quasi-Physical, Literal Account 
 Having established that education begins from being emphrōn which means from 
properly functioning revolutions of sense and a merely rotating intellect, we can now move on to 
what I consider to be education’s first stage—the acceptance of or belief in the existence of 
intellect, not only in ourselves, I imagine, but also in the universe and perhaps even in the creator 
of the universe.  
 Above all, I include this stage because Timaeus himself seems at some pains to present 
and dismantle a picture of an unsavory character that does not believe in intellect, and moreover, 
someone Timaeus suggests we should not be, someone who is even punished (denied happiness) 
precisely because of his failure to believe and who I think, accordingly, acts as a motivation to 
enlist in the precise intellect-centered educational program espoused by Timaeus.  For lack of a 
better name, let’s call this unsavory character, “the materialist.”  The materialist makes 
appearances over the course of the argument for intellect as cause (46c7-e6), in the brief 
argument for the forms (51d3-e6), and in the concluding remarks on the punitive significance of 
the variety of reincarnations (91d6-e1).  In each case, it is important to notice that Timaeus 
criticizes specifically the materialist’s beliefs (dochazetai de hupo tōn pleistōn: 46d1; phainetai 
tisi: 51d6; and hēgoumenōn: 91d8, respectively).  
The materialist first appears as someone who fails to distinguish between cause (aitia), 
which Timaeus aligns with intellect, and auxiliary cause (sunaitia or summetaitia) which is 
connected to sensible entities like the elements.  In fact, the materialist has a kind of tunnel 
vision for the latter and fails to believe that there is any cause above and beyond those that can 
be sensed.  Because he does, however, he also fails to explain the beauty of the universe.  
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Generally speaking, his explanatory failure is enough for Timaeus’ refutation of him, the upshot 
of interest being contained in the following claim: if the universe is beautiful, intellect exists and 
if for no other reason than the universe’s beauty requires it.  It cannot be made beautiful by 
sensible auxiliary causes alone nor, I take it, by a creator only possessed of sense-perception.138  
There has to be something more. 
The materialist next appears in Timaeus’ argument for the existence of the Forms which, 
in short, says that the Forms’ existence can be established if it can also be shown that 
understanding, the product of the revolution of intellect, and true opinion, the product of the 
revolutions of sense, are actually distinct entities.  The materialist does not seem to recognize a 
difference between the two products and, accordingly, is implicated in the belief that only true 
opinion exists and consequently in the belief that there is no other faculty above and beyond 
sense-perception. 
Timaeus refutes this view by comparing the different origins and characters of 
understanding and true opinion.139  Concerning their origins, understanding is produced via 
intellect through teaching, while true opinion comes from persuasion.  Concerning their 
characters, understanding is unaffected by persuasion, always in the company of a true account, 
and rare among men.  True opinion, to the contrary, not only comes from persuasion, but can be 
                                                 
138 Compare Broadie (2012): 27-38, and her fascination with the thought that the demiurge might have 
used a sensible rather than an intellectual model for the universe.  What I see on the margins of her 
discussion is the puzzling picture of a godly version of the materialist. 




changed by it as well.  Moreover, true opinion is always without an account and is possessed by 
all men.  Thus, the consequence of interest to us—because the two are different, intellect exists.   
 Holding sense-exclusive views is, according to Timaeus, grounds for punishment, and 
again the materialist, or more precisely in this instance, the meteōrologikos is the prime example.  
Because the meteōrologikos believes that sight offers the most solid proof or exhibition of the 
meteorological subject matter he studies, he is reincarnated as a bird rather than being returned to 
his original psychic condition and home in his kindred star which is what would have happened 
if he had instead appealed to his intellect.  He is not even really wicked, however, which I 
assume means he did not physically harm others nor do anything similar.  Again, his only failure, 
which is still a big failure, is his evil sense-exclusive point of view. 
 In the end, the materialist’s position seems to be something as problematic as the body 
and in some senses even much more problematic.  In fact, the materialist looks to be a distracting 
representative of an alternative intellectual movement luring souls away from the proper path.  
And, for Timaeus, this allure is most succinctly captured in the sense-exclusive point of view, a 
point of view as capable as the body and mortal soul of keeping immortal souls from tending to 
or searching for intellect on any level.    
 This kind of general call to believe in intellect, however, appears to be only part of the 
story.  If we follow Broadie, what we should see in addition is the more precise belief, whether 
implied or otherwise, in intellects that exist individually at every level of the spectrum and most 
relevantly in each mortal living thing.  In fact, as far as Broadie is concerned, the idea of 
intellects that are not only quantitatively distinct from one another but also quantitatively distinct 
from the cosmic intellect is one of Plato’s greatest innovations in the field of cosmology.140  
                                                 
140 Broadie (2012): 94-5 and 99.  Also see 20-1. 
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More precisely, it is so important because it ushers in the notion of cosmically free moral agents 
responsible for their own behavior, and as we saw above, agents that can be turned into birds for 
failing to believe the right thing.141     
 This notion of morally responsible intellects is brought to bear on the very possibility of 
education itself by commentators like Jaeger and Scolnicov.  For Jaeger, the famous myth of Er 
found in Republic Book X is a prime example.  Among other things, the myth presents a picture 
of reincarnation in which the souls of the deceased are able to choose the nature of their next 
lives, and in this free choice, Jaeger sees the fundamental ground and possibility of education.  
Further, it seems that this notion of moral responsibility is one that Plato’s predecessors had not 
taken seriously given their commitment to the idea that the gods are responsible, at least in part, 
for the wickedness in human lives.  This conception of the gods, however, is one that, according 
to Jaeger, Plato intends to correct with his emphasis on choice of life in the myth of Er.142     
Transferring this spirit to the Timaeus would mean, I take it, asserting that humans are 
capable of escaping wickedness because being morally responsible also means being, in some 
sense, left alone by the gods.  Certainly, the gods of the Timaeus are morally aloof (anaitios: 
42d4) from the affairs of humans, and accordingly it should be a certainty that escaping 
wickedness—which is just a negative way of stating the goal of education—is a possibility.  
Scolnicov also sees the issue more or less in terms of the same kind of escape though, for him, 
the wickedness we are escaping more precisely is the indeterminacy of the corporeal, of 
necessity.143  Our freedom from the corporeal, and thus the foundation of our agency and 
                                                 
141 Op. Cit.: 101-104.   
142 Jaeger (1943): 368-70. 
143 Scolnicov (1997): 370. 
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education, is the possibility of persuading the corporeal to participate in the determinacy of the 
intelligible, something that amounts more pointedly to an escape from injustice and an escape to 
true justice through the educational healing of the revolution of intellect.  And though, 
technically, we are capable of achieving such things, Scolnicov lacks confidence in the fact that 
we will.144   
I am certainly sympathetic to Scolnicov’s pessimism here.  In fact, at times Timaeus 
himself seems pessimistic or at least humble in the face of our formidable healing project and 
even to the point of seeming ambivalent about our freedom to complete or even get started on 
such a project.  In one sense, when we fail to heal our intellects, it would appear that our diseased 
bodies and our equally “diseased” cities are to blame (86a7-b9).  As Carone emphasizes, 
however, Timaeus is not relieving us of responsibility here but rather pointing to a kind of shared 
responsibility.  While it is true that the city, our caretaker, is to be blamed “more” than those 
under its care,145 we are nevertheless still responsible for our escape from wickedness, a 
responsibility cashed out in terms of the imperative engagement of intellectual pursuits.146     
 Thus, in sum, we might think that Timaeus is motivating a belief in the existence of 
intellect and that he does so in three ways.  First, Timaeus attempts to persuade us of intellect’s 
existence through arguments, and his defense of the existence of the forms as well as the 
argument for the two kinds of causes are instances of this attempt.  Secondly, these arguments 
appear to be aimed at an unsavory character, the materialist, who as we see in the specific case of 
the meteōrologikos, will be punished for his failure to believe.  Moreover, the materialist’s 
                                                 
144 Op. Cit.: 374. 
145 Carone (2005): 60. 
146 Pace Gill (2000): 59, who operates under the assumption that Timaeus is relieving us of responsibility. 
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punishment acts, in some sense, as a further “argument” meant to lead to a belief—believe in 
intellect and be rewarded, fail to believe, and be punished.  Finally, it seems that the moral 
context of such punishment includes a more precise belief in the individuality of intellect, an 
individuality that provides the freedom and responsibility that mark the very possibility of 
education itself.  Therefore, at the deepest level, it is not so much our belief in intellect that 
produces the possibility of rigorous engagement in Timaeus’ educational program but rather 
Timaeus’ own belief in or mere positing of the existence of individual and thus free and morally 
responsible intellects.  After all, it appears that if intellect is not free to do as it wills, there can be 
no true education. 
3.4 “Harmonies and Revolutions” Part 1: Preparing the Way for Healing the Speed and 
Shape of Intellect 
In contrast to the implicitly stated nature of the second stage, we have the final pre-
philosophical stage which is a component of the most explicitly stated (though not so explicitly 
articulated) of all the educational stages—the investigation of the harmonies and revolutions of 
the universe.  More precisely, the final pre-philosophical stage acts as the first half of a two part 
investigation of these harmonies and revolutions, the second half marking the premier 
philosophical stage. 
In the first half of this investigation and thus in the final pre-philosophical stage, we are, 
in essence, merely observing the heavens and collecting astronomical data, and I posit such an 
observation and collection phase for two reasons.  On the one hand, I am working backwards 
from how I conceive of the first philosophical stage.  In short, the initial philosophical stage 
involves a sort of mathematical synthesizing in which one makes calculations about the entire set 
of relevant astronomical data.  In other words, the project is not to become an expert merely on 
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the phases of the moon or the strange retrograde motions of the planets.  The object is rather to 
address the entirety of celestial motions, and in order to do this, I assume that all the pieces must, 
in some sense, first be in place.  I am not sure that this means, however, that each of us must go 
through the process of collecting all these pieces from scratch, so to speak.  If we were meant to 
do so, the data collection phase would take at least thirty years given Saturn’s somewhat lengthy 
orbit.  In any event, whether we discover the data for ourselves or simply collect it from our 
predecessors (and I do not think we can decide between the two), the point is that we must first 
have all of it in place in order to make the kinds of calculations Timaeus requires us to make.    
On the other hand, in positing a data collection stage I am following the work of Dicks 
and Vlastos.  In short, both interpreters see a division in Plato between observational and 
mathematical astronomy.147  In particular, they suggest, as I have just done, that the products of 
observation are the prerequisites to the more rigorous pursuit of mathematical calculations 
concerning these products, or as Vlastos puts it—the “purely empirical astronomer” has only 
“learned what it is necessary to learn before astronomy” without having actually “learned 
astronomy” which again is a mathematical pursuit.148  Thus, in discussing this final pre-
philosophical stage, I mean to draw out exactly what we are getting from our observations so that 
I can, in turn, talk in detail in the next chapter about the further mathematical synthesis that 
constitutes the first philosophical stage.     
In particular, then, we will want to know what Timaeus means when he speaks of 
harmonies and revolutions, and I single out these two items on account of the following passage. 
                                                 
147 Dicks (1970): 108, and Vlastos (1980): 8, 12, and 14. 
148 Vlastos (1980): 10.
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Now there is but one way to care for anything, and that is to provide for it the 
nourishment and the motions that are proper to it.  And the motions that have an affinity 
to the divine part within us are the intellections and revolutions of the universe.  These, 
surely, are the ones that each of us should follow.  We should correct the revolutions in 
our heads that were thrown off course around the time of our birth, by coming to learn the 
harmonies and revolutions of the universe, and so make thought like the object of 
thought, as it was in its original condition. (90c6-d5: tr. Zeyl with modifications) 
Now I suggest that the above is actually indicative of the first philosophical stage, which 
involves learning or, more specifically, actually adopting in one’s own intellect the spatial 
characteristics found in the heavenly revolution of intelligence.  Nonetheless, what I am claiming 
about the final pre-philosophical stage is that it involves collecting together some amount of 
information on universal harmonies and revolutions because ultimately the learning that effects 
the healing of our intellects is a matter of mathematically synthesizing all such data.  So what are 
these harmonies and revolutions, and what sort of information are we supposed to collect about 
them? 
 Starting from harmonies, I think it is important to note first that Timaeus considers the 
universe itself to be harmonious (36e6-37a1) though this, it seems, can mean two things.  First, 
harmony can refer to the extremely complex and arcane way the soul of the universe itself fits 
together, an organization described by Timaeus in terms of proportions. 
And he [the demiurge] took the three mixtures and mixed them together to make a 
uniform mixture, forcing the Different, which was hard to mix, into conformity with the 
Same.  Now when he had mixed these two together with Being, and from the three had 
made a single mixture, he divided the whole mixture again into as many parts as his task 
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required, each part remaining a mixture of the Same, the Different, and of Being.  This is 
how he began the division: First he took one portion away from the whole, and then he 
took another, twice as large, followed by a third, one and a half times as large as the 
second and three times as large as the first.  The fourth portion he took was twice as large 
as the second, the fifth three times as large as the third, the sixth eight times as large as 
the first, and the seventh twenty-seven times that of the first. 
 After this he went on to fill the double and triple intervals by cutting off still more 
portions from the mixture and placing these between them, in such a way that in each 
interval there were two middle terms, one exceeding the first extreme by the same 
fraction of the extremes by which it was exceeded by the second, and the other exceeding 
the first extreme by a number equal to that by which it was exceeded by the second.  
These connections produced intervals of 3/2, 4/3, and 9/8 within the previous intervals.  
He then proceeded to fill all the 4/3 intervals with the 9/8 interval, leaving a small portion 
over every time.  The terms of this interval of the portion left over made a numerical ratio 
of 256/243.  And so it was that the mixture, from which he had cut off these portions, was 
eventually completely used up. (35a6-36b6: tr. Zeyl)   
In short, the portions the demiurge “takes away” or “cuts off” are to be thought of as musical 
notes and the intervals between them as indicative of where these notes fall on the staff, as it 
were.149  The relevant psychic harmonies, in turn, are to be construed accordingly.  I do not, 
however, pursue this angle on the harmony of the world soul further because it does not seem to 
me that there are any astronomical observations that could put us in touch with this kind of 
information.  Moreover, to the extent that our own souls retain the kind of proportions expressed 
                                                 
149 See Cornford (1937): 66-72, and Handschin (1950).  Also, see Plutarch, 1027b ff. 
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above even in the face of the distortions caused by our embodiment (43d3-7), there is really 
nothing that learning such proportions would do to fix our immortal souls and thus no reason at 
this point to study them.150   
 The second sense, then, in which we might think the universe is harmonious, and 
accordingly the one I take up, is derived ultimately from what Timaeus tells us explicitly about 
harmony (80a3-b8).  In short, harmony is a mixture of high and low tones.  Further, the highness 
and lowness of the tones is a product of their speed though these individual speeds are not the 
only velocities to consider.  In addition, the tones themselves are moving through space and just 
as if one group of them, specifically the slower tones, were chasing the faster ones and in the end 
overtaking them (katalambanousi katalambanontes: 80b1-2).  In fact, this “overtaking” is, in 
essence, what produces harmony.     
 Not surprisingly, we see an analogous thing happening with the universe itself though, in 
particular, with regard to its revolutions, and it seems that a parallel sort of overtaking is afoot.  
Consider the following passage. 
Indeed, because of the movement of the Same [the heavenly revolution of intelligence], 
the planets that go around most quickly appeared to be overtaken by those going more 
slowly, even though in fact they were overtaking them (tē dē tautou phorai ta tachista 
periionta hupo tōn braduteron iontōn ephaineto katalambanonta katalambanesthai). 
(39a4-5: tr. Zeyl) 
All the same factors are present.  There are fast and slow speeds, and the slower speeds are 
overtaking the faster ones just as we saw in the case above.  The further assumption, of course, is 
                                                 
150 Compare Cornford (1937): 66, who asserts to the contrary that “the World-Soul must contain the 
harmonious order which individual souls ought to learn and reproduce in themselves.” 
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that the various motions of the orbiting planets and even the universe itself are generating sounds 
and moreover that these sounds reflect the speeds which produce them.  This assumption, 
however, is contained, I suggest, in the very claim that the universe is itself harmonious.  In any 
event, in the end it appears that collecting data about the harmonies of the universe is essentially 
the same thing as collecting data about the speeds of the celestial revolutions.   
 The further thing to note about these speeds is their association with what Timaeus calls, 
“the numbers of time,” and each orbiting planet as well as the revolving universe itself represents 
one of these numbers (38c5-6).  In fact, observing these celestial motions is how we discover 
number in the first place, learning initially from the heavenly revolution of intelligence (39b2-c1) 
and, if we follow Johansen, discovering in it the number “one” which is linked to a full day and 
night.151  From here, we are meant to seek out the other numbers of time (which are multiples of 
one) represented in the seven orbiting planets, the month and the year being the most familiar 
and linked to the Moon and the Sun’s circling respectively.   
 The numbers of time are not, however, the only numbers attached to the eight heavenly 
revolutions (the orbits of the seven planets plus the revolution of the universe itself: 39b2-4).  
Consider what Timaeus tells us about the divisions of the celestial orbits. 
He [the demiurge] made the movement of the Same revolve toward the right by the way 
of the side, and that of the Different toward the left by way of the diagonal, and he made 
the revolution of the Same, that is, the uniform, the dominant one in that he left this one 
alone undivided, while he divided the inner one six times, to make seven unequal circles.  
His divisions corresponded to the several double and triple intervals, of which there were 
three each. (36c5-d4: tr. Zeyl)  
                                                 
151 See Johansen (2004): 113 and 170.  Also, see Vlastos (2005): 33. 
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The seven unequal circles correspond to the seven orbiting planets, and the intervals between 
them can be further connected with the following sequence of seven numbers: 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, and 
27.  These seven numbers, it seems, are meant to represent the relationship between the radii of 
each of the orbits in the revolution of the different.  Thus, if the Moon is the first orbiting planet 
from the earth, and the Sun the second, and Venus the third, and so on, the radius of the Moon’s 
orbit would be 1, the Sun’s would be twice as large as the Moon’s, Venus’ three times as large, 
etc.152 
 Now at the most general level, it appears that knowing the sizes of the orbits is important 
in the harmonic context because the sizes are correlated with speeds.  Simply put, the larger the 
orbit the slower the speed and conversely the smaller the orbit the faster the speed (39a1-2).  We 
should be cautious here, however.  Timaeus indicates not only that the outermost, and therefore 
largest revolution—the revolution of the Same—is the fastest of all (39a4).  In another vein, he 
also claims that Venus and Mercury move at a speed equal that of the Sun (38d1-3), the Sun, of 
course, inhabiting an orbit smaller than both of the former which should make us think that it 
would move at a speed faster rather than equal to them.153   
In order to resolve these complications, I suggest that we first recognize the context of 
Timaeus’ assertion about the connection between orbital size and speed.  In particular, he is 
speaking of the revolution of the Different, and we should perhaps think that the connection is 
only appropriate in that domain.  Further, within this domain, we should assume that speed not 
only applies to the raw velocity of a planet but also to the time it takes for a planet to complete 
one orbit around the earth.  So, when Timaeus says that the Sun, Venus, and Mercury move at 
                                                 
152 See Taylor (1928): 162, and Cornford (1937): 79. 
153 For an historical overview of dealing with these discrepancies, see Taylor (1928): 164-6. 
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the same velocity, we should think that he means they finish their orbits in the same amount of 
time.154  Moreover, it seems that the connection between the size of an orbit and its speed applies 
within this context in a loose way.  In short, when considering larger and smaller orbits and slow 
and fast speeds, we should think in terms of clusters—the Moon, being the smallest orbit, is 
faster than the larger cluster of circuits inhabited by the Sun, Venus, and Mercury, these three 
being, in turn, smaller and therefore faster than Jupiter and Saturn which occupy the largest 
orbits and are accordingly the slowest.  Thus, all in all, we should understand Timaeus’ claim 
about the connection between size and speed in a general way: i.e. the various sizes of the orbits 
found in the revolution of the Different correlate for the most part to various fast and slow 
speeds. 
 In addition to discovering these disparate numbers and speeds, it appears that we must 
also observe and record planetary positions.  Timaeus, in essence, even offers us a list of the 
kinds of positions that should interest us when observing the divine planets: 
To describe the dancing movements of these gods, their juxtapositions and the back-
circlings and advances of their circular courses on themselves; to tell which of the gods 
come into line with one another at their conjunctions and how many of them are in 
opposition, and in what order and at which times they pass in front of or behind one 
another, so that some are occluded from our view to reappear once again, thereby 
bringing terrors and portents of things to come to those who are unable to make the 
proper calculations [logizesthai]—to tell all this without the use of visible models would 
be labor spent in vain. (40c3-d3: tr. Zeyl with modifications) 
                                                 
154 See Vlastos (2005): 33. 
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Simply stated, we need to be able to identify for each planet both where it is at any point in its 
orbit and when it is there.  Talking about these positions, however, is so complicated that we will 
need to have a model on hand, a model Cornford takes to be an “armillary sphere”—a study aid 
made of connected and movable round bands that represent each of the disparate celestial 
orbits.155  Ultimately, however, the thing to notice is that this or that single orbit is not what 
should interest us.  Rather, we must be mindful of the whole, and we should proceed with our 
astronomical research accordingly. 
Thus, in sum, we have seen that two things are at issue in our initial investigation of the 
harmonies and revolutions of the universe and accordingly in the final pre-philosophical stage.  
First, in this stage, we must discover the numbers associated with each of the eight orbits.  And 
while these numbers might be conceived in temporal terms like months or years or even in 
spatial terms as with the radii discussed above, what seems to be emphasized is speeds, and 
accordingly when collecting such data, we are really collecting data on speeds.  Second, we must 
also gather data on the positions the planets occupy at each step throughout their orbits so that 
we can then compare or more specifically make calculations about their relative positions, 
calculations, however, that we will see in the next chapter eventually concern once again their 
speeds.   
3.5 Conclusion: The Transition to the Philosophical—The Spatial Characteristics of the 
Healthy Immortal Soul and the Literal Interpretation 
In this chapter, I have been mainly concerned with the presentation of a healing narrative 
told in terms of the spatial characteristics of immortal soul and one that emphasizes the healing 
of intellect.  As we have seen, at our incarnation the motions and shapes of both the revolutions 
                                                 
155 Cornford (1937): 74-5. 
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of intellect and sense are seriously damaged.  Once the initial tumult of embodiment subsides, 
however, the proper circular shapes of the sensory circuits are restored, and they also begin to 
move in the proper direction.  The revolution of intellect, on the other hand, merely regains its 
east to west rotation.  The speed and shape of its revolving remain damaged at this point though, 
as we will see, they are eventually corrected by the further mathematical work done on the data 
we have collected.  
Now, apart from framing the healing narrative, presenting Timaeus’ notion of the soul in 
this quasi-physical manner has also been a way of testing the literal interpretation, as I stated at 
the outset.  In part, in this chapter, I meant to uncover just how detailed Timaeus actually is 
about the soul’s spatial aspects, and showing his strong commitment to the notion of a soul with 
a size, shape, position, and speed should be enough to persuade us that we should take Timaeus 
at his word.156  He is not speaking metaphorically.   
This is not all that can be said for the literal interpretation, however.  In the educational 
context, what we have seen in particular with regard to intellect is that if we do not characterize 
it in terms of its disparate spatial aspects, we will not be able to explain Timaeus’ indication that 
intellect is healed twice.  In other words, Timaeus seems to be suggesting that intellect has 
recuperated naturally in our initial emphronic condition, yet he also indicates that our intellectual 
revolutions will be healed later upon calculation of the relative speeds of the heavenly orbits.  In 
the end what I am suggesting is that, in order to make sense of this double healing, we need to 
think of intellect as the kind of thing that can be healed twice, the kind of thing that is complex 
                                                 
156 Compare Sedley (1999): 317-8, whose strategy is similar.  In defense of the literal interpretation, he 
merely points to the amount of textual instances in which Timaeus emphasizes the quasi-physical nature 
of the soul. 
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enough to have multiple aspects in need of correction, and this need is fulfilled most faithfully by 
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 In the previous chapter, I was concerned primarily to present an account of the pre-
philosophical moments that anticipate the final healing of the spatial characteristics of intellect.  
In sum, I canvassed two phases in the course of this progress.  First, there is the initial and 
natural convalescence of intellect which amounts to the return of its east to west rotation.  As we 
saw, however, what remains to be healed are its shape and speed.  Thus, second, as preparation 
for such healing, we work to collect a body of data which, in essence, pertains to the speeds of 
the heavenly revolutions, and in the present chapter I begin by showing that the calculation or 
contemplation of these speeds results in the final healing of intellect.    
Before moving on to that task, however, it will be helpful to make a few preliminary 
points about Timaeus’ intimation of philosophy.  First, I speak of Timaeus’ intimation of 
philosophy, rather than his conception of philosophy, because he does not offer any 
straightforward account of the philosophical enterprise.  What we have in his speech instead are 
five instances of the word philosophia or its cognates (not counting the reference to the aspiring 
philosopher (ton nou kai epistēmēs erastēn) at 46d7).157  Consequently, I derive my account from 
an analysis of Timaeus’ usage of the terms though assuming all along Socrates’ claim that 
Timaeus has reached “the height of philosophy” (20a4-5) and is accordingly a philosopher in his 
own right.   
What is noteworthy about my approach is its contrast with the majority of commentary 
on the issue.  The traditional strategy involves first formulating a conception of Socratic or 
                                                 
157 I exclude from the current discussion the other four instances of the term and its cognates found in the 
prologue at 18a5; 19e5; 20a4; and 24d1.  For a discussion of these instances, I refer the reader to Chapters 
1 and 2: 20-2, 30-1, and 39-40. 
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Platonic philosophy and then using that conception as a foil for thinking about Timaean 
philosophy.158  This strategy is certainly illuminating in some respects but risks begging the 
question insofar as, more often than not, it explores the issue at the expense of any prolonged 
attention to the text of the Timaeus itself.   
Looking to the text then I suggest that philosophy is two things, and I suggest that it is 
because Timaeus appears to be using the term to describe two distinct types of intellectual 
exertion.  First, philosophy involves following or imitating the heavenly revolution of intellect, 
an endeavor that amounts to the mathematical arm of astronomy.  Here we calculate or 
contemplate the data we have collected on the disparate celestial speeds, comparing each to each, 
and through such contemplation effect the proper shape and speed in our intellects, establishing 
in ourselves a healthy emphronic state that resembles the spatial characteristics of the universal 
intellect.  I suggest further that philosophy comprehends both the act of contemplation and the 
psychic state that is its product, so to speak.  More precisely, given the connection I see between 
the contemplation and imitation of the universe, it appears that, as far as our intellects are 
concerned, contemplating heavenly velocity just is, in some sense, being this velocity as well as 
the shape this speed brings about.  Thus, philosophy is at once identical with a pursuit like 
mathematical astronomy and a psychic state of affairs.  Second, beyond such astronomical 
pursuits, philosophy means following the intellectual revolutions within ourselves.  In contrast to 
the first sense of philosophy, however, following our own intellects is not a contemplative affair.  
Rather, it is to be identified with intellectual rule over or regulation of body and mortal soul, so 
similar to the first sense it does indicate a specific psychic state and namely one in which 
intellect is in charge.  Thus, in sum, philosophy is the active and ongoing submission to both the 
                                                 
158 See Howland (2007); Zuckert (2011); and Broadie (2012), in particular Chapter 5. 
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intellect of the universe itself, which involves the contemplation and imitation of the heavenly 
revolutions, and submission to our own intellects, which involves the presence of noetic 
dominion over our mortal components.           
What should be most glaring about my account is the absence of any talk about the forms 
or dialectic.  While I do see reasons to think that philosophy should be distinguished from 
activities connected entirely to sense-perception (e.g. the observation of the heavens and the 
collection of the relevant data), it does not seem to me that Timaeus uses philosophia to indicate 
the contemplation of the intelligible realm.159  Instead, it appears that philosophy indicates two 
phases in the work done to establish the proper characteristics of our own intellects.  And though 
this work most certainly puts us in a position to interact successfully with the forms, such 
interaction on our part is not at all emphasized by Timaeus nor labeled or in any way described 
as philosophy.  In saying this, however, I do not mean to suggest that I am uninterested in the 
results of our philosophical work.  To the contrary, in the present chapter I am certainly 
interested in at least one such consequence: the production of the philosopher-warrior who, by 
his mastery of philosophy, is capable of being appropriately fierce with his enemies (see p. 22 
above).         
Accordingly, I suggest thinking of the philosophical stages addressed in this chapter as a 
progress through phases of submission to intellect and the consequences of this submission.  
First, we follow the intellect of the universe, the result of such fidelity being our spatially sound 
intellects.  Having corrected our revolutions of intelligence, we then proceed to pledge allegiance 
to our own intellectual revolutions by effecting noetic regulation of body and mortal soul.  
                                                 
159 Compare Kalkavage (2001), 24: “philosophic education…aims not at transcendence of, but at 
assimilation to, the intelligent order of the visible heaven.” 
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Subsequently, this complete intellectual authority gives rise to facility in battle and brings the 
narrative that began with Socrates’ request full circle.  
4.2 Philosophy as Following the Heavenly Intellect 
 As indicated, I take philosophy in its first sense to include both the activity of calculating 
celestial speeds and the psychic state of affairs (the proper shape and speed of our intellects) that 
accompanies this activity.  Accordingly, I begin by highlighting the attention Timaeus gives to 
such calculation though I do so ultimately for the sake of connecting it to both the relevant 
psychic state of affairs and philosophy. 
4.2.1 “Harmonies and Revolutions” Part 2: Learning, Calculating, and Imitating—The 
Correction of the Shape and Speed of Intellect  
 Let’s consider first what Timaeus tells us about the demiurge’s reasons for creating the 
shining sun. 
And so that there might be a conspicuous measure of the relative slowness and quickness 
[pros allēla bradutēti kai tachei] with which they move along their eight revolutions, the 
god [the demiurge] kindled a light in the orbit second from the earth, the light we now 
call the Sun.  It would shine upon the whole heaven so that as far as possible all capable 
living things might share in number, learning [mathonta] it from the revolution of the 
Same and uniform.  In this way and for these reasons night and day, the period of a single 
circling, the wisest one, came to be.  A month has passed when the Moon has completed 
its own cycle and overtaken the Sun; a year when the Sun has completed its own cycle.  
As for the periods of the other bodies, all but a scattered few have failed to take note of 
them.  Nobody has given them names or considered measuring their relation to each other 
with numbers [oute pros allēla summetrountai skopountes arithmois].  And so people are 
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all but ignorant of the fact that time really is the wandering of these bodies [.] (39b2-7: tr. 
Zeyl with modifications) 
It seems that the sun is “kindled” for two reasons.  First and foremost, the sun is meant to 
illuminate the heavenly “wanderings” of time so that we might learn number from them.  
Second, and most importantly for our purposes, these numbers are meant to serve as the means 
for making measurements of the relative speeds of the eight heavenly revolutions.  Thus, it 
would seem that the demiurge intends for us to be engaging in such measurement though the 
question, of course, should be, why? 
 Putting the answer aside for now, let’s consider two further passages that exhibit 
Timaeus’ emphasis on measurement and calculation.  The first, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, enumerates the disparate relations between the orbiting planets that we should keep in 
mind, and I recall it here to refresh our memories. 
To describe the dancing movements of these gods, their juxtapositions and the back-
circlings and advances of their circular courses on themselves; to tell which of the gods 
come into line with one another at their conjunctions and how many of them are in 
opposition, and at which times [kata chronous] they pass in front of or behind one 
another, so that some are occluded from our view to reappear once again, thereby 
bringing terrors and portents of things to come to those who are unable to make 
calculations [logizesthai]—to tell all this without the use of visible models would be 
labor spent in vain. (40c3-d3: tr. Zeyl with modifications) 
The first thing to note is a concern with temporal matters.  As Timaeus indicates, we should be 
cognizant of the “times” at which each of the planets passes in front or behind one another, and 
this, I take it, is another way of considering their relative speeds.  In other words, knowing about 
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their speeds should give us some indication about when the various planets will meet or 
disappear and reappear.  Further, we see a connection between knowing about these times or 
speeds and making calculations (logizesthai), and we do to the extent that those who lack such 
computational skills are likely to be riddled with fear when planets “disappear.”  The skilled 
astronomer, by contrast, can not only point out all the past moments at which such things have 
transpired, I assume, but also all the future moments, and again I suggest that he can because of 
his ability to make calculations about the speeds at which the planets move through the heavens. 
Now I am stressing the ability to make calculations about celestial speeds because 
calculation, most specifically, is how we correct our intellectual revolutions, and what I have 
been trying to do thus far is set the stage for the claim that Timaeus connects calculations of the 
celestial speeds, in particular, not only to the healing of our intellects but also to philosophy.  
Consider the following passage. 
Let us conclude then our discussion of the accompanying auxiliary causes that gave our 
eyes the power which they now possess.  We must next speak of that supremely 
beneficial function for which the god gave them to us.  As my account has it, our sight 
has indeed proved to be a source of supreme benefit to us, in that none of our present 
statements about the universe could ever have been made if we had never seen any stars, 
sun, or heaven.  As it is, however, our ability to see the periods of day and night, of 
months and years, of equinoxes and solstices, has led to the invention of number and has 
given us the idea of time and opened the path to inquiry into the nature of the universe.  
These pursuits, in turn, have given us philosophy [philosophias], a gift from the gods to 
the mortal race whose value neither has been nor ever will be surpassed.  I’m quite 
prepared to declare this to be the supreme good our eyesight offers us.  Why then should 
136 
 
we exalt all the lesser good things, which a non-philosopher struck blind would lament 
and bewail in vain?  Let us rather declare that the cause and purpose of this supreme good 
is this: the god invented sight and gave it to us so that we might observe the revolutions 
of intelligence [tas…tou nou periodous] in the heavens and apply [chrēsaimetha] them to 
the revolutions of our own thought [dianoēseōs].  For there is kinship between them, even 
though our revolutions are disturbed, whereas the universal revolutions are undisturbed.  
So once we have come to learn from them and to share in the ability to make correct 
calculations [logismōn] according to nature, by imitating the completely unstraying 
revolutions of the god, we might stabilize [katastēsaimetha] the straying revolutions 
within ourselves. (46e6-47c4: tr. Zeyl with modifications) 
As we can see, just as the demiurge intended, sight puts us in touch with the celestial circlings 
and leads consequently to the discovery of number and time.  These findings are further paired 
with the discovery of the investigation of the nature of the universe though, as indicated in 
Chapter 2 (pp. 58-9), I think we should refrain from trying to figure out what this investigation 
entails.  The passage is just too vague here.  In any event, what is apparent is that the upshot of 
these findings is philosophy.  
Continuing with the passage, then, I agree with Cornford in thinking that philosophy is 
the referent of “this supreme good.”160  When Timaues goes on to describe the purpose of this 
supreme good in terms of the purpose of eyesight, however, I am moved to include in 
philosophy, not the observation of the heavenly revolutions of intelligence, but rather the 
application of these revolutions to our own.  After all, observation of the celestial circuits is at 
least twice removed from philosophy to the extent that we start by observing the heavens; this, in 
                                                 
160 Cornford (1937): 158 n. 2. 
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turn, yields number, the concept of time, etc.; and these in turn yield philosophy.  Thus, I suggest 
that the application of the heavenly revolutions of intelligence to our own intellectual revolutions 
is philosophy.  The question is, of course: what does such application entail? 
 If we follow the passage through, we see that after reminding us of the kinship between 
our own intellects and that of the universe, Timaeus answers our question.  First, he suggests that 
we learn from (ekmathontes) the heavenly revolution of intelligence, and here it seems that we 
are meant to recall the demiurge’s reasons for creating the Sun.  The eternal god creates the Sun 
to shine on the universe so that we might, on the one hand, learn (mathonta) number and, in 
particular, learn it from “the revolution of the Same and uniform,” the universal intellect, and on 
the other use number to measure the relative speeds of the celestial motions.   
Second, in conjunction with this learning, we are meant to participate in calculations 
(logismōn) that are correct according to nature (orthotētos kata phusin).  Leaving aside the 
intractable phrase, “correct according to nature,” I suggest that this reference to calculation is an 
echo of what we saw above concerning the fear stricken individuals who are incapable of 
calculating (logizesthai).  Thus, at the very least, it seems that we should have them in mind and 
in particular the computations they are unable to make, computations which again appear to 
concern celestial speeds.   
 Continuing further through the passage, I claim a connection between this learning and 
calculating and the imitation of the heavenly revolution of intelligence, and I do for two reasons.  
First, I am, at least in part, following Lee and Carone who suggest that learning about the 
universe’s intellectual revolution amounts to taking it on in our own intellects.161  In other words, 
learning about it just is successfully imitating it.  Second, I posit a connection based on what we 
                                                 
161 See Lee (1976): 82-3, and Carone (2005): 71. 
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find in a later passage which it should be uncontroversial to claim is itself parallel to the current 
passage we are addressing.  It is as follows. 
Now there is but one way to care for anything, and that is to provide for it the 
nourishment and the motions that are proper to it.  And the motions that have an affinity 
to the divine part within us are the intellections and revolutions of the universe.  These, 
surely, are the ones that each of us should follow.  We should correct the revolutions in 
our heads that were thrown off course around the time of our birth, by coming to learn 
[katamanthanein] the harmonies and revolutions of the universe, and so make thought 
like the object of thought [tōi katanooumenōi to katanooun exomoiōsai], as it was in its 
original condition. (90c6-d5: tr. Zeyl with modifications) 
As specified in the previous chapter, learning the harmonies and revolutions of the universe 
means, in the main, learning about celestial speeds, and as we see such learning makes “thought 
like the object of thought,” a likeness that should remind us of the imitation mentioned in the 
previous passage above.  Accordingly, in order to fill out our understanding of what imitation of 
the heavenly revolution of intelligence involves, we might briefly address what the likeness 
between thought and the object of thought indicates.   
To begin with, the object of thought is “that which is” (28a1-2) or “the unchanging form” 
(51e6-52a4) or, just generally speaking, Being, and we should keep in mind that the universe 
itself is, in short, an imitation of Being and specifically the eternal Living Thing.  Now most 
pertinent to our current discussion is Timaeus’ suggestion that the universe resembles the 
eternality of the Living Thing (37c6-d2), and the universe does to the extent that its own psychic 
revolutions move according to number (37d5-7), motions, which we have already seen, amount 
to time.  So, taking the universe as our model, making thought like the object of thought should 
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involve enacting in our souls the same numbers we find in the heavenly revolutions, and this, I 
assert, is what we are doing when we make correct calculations about celestial speeds.  We are 
engendering in ourselves immortal souls that move according to the numbers of time, and this is 
what it means to apply the heavenly revolutions to ourselves. 
As Timaeus describes it further, souls to which the heavenly revolutions have been 
successfully applied are stable souls, souls that we have literally “brought down to a place” 
(katastēsaimetha: 47c4, see above).  In the quasi-physical terms of the previous chapter, this 
means two things.  First, just like the intellect of the universe, this stability indicates that our 
immortal souls are stationary or at rest.  They do not move with respect to latitude or longitude 
though, as we should recall, this is something brought about in our initial emphronic condition.  
This is something everyone has.  Thus, second, and something not everyone possesses, this 
stability also indicates an intellect with a circular shape, a shape exclusively present in the 
philosopher’s intellect and achieved, I suggest, by correct calculation of celestial speeds.  How 
calculating and thusly enacting these speeds produces this shape in our noetic revolutions is a bit 
obscure, however, and accordingly my account here will be somewhat speculative. 
As Timaeus tells us later in the second part of the speech, the circular motion of the 
universe as a whole (hē tou pantos periodos: 58a4-5) encloses all things within its boundary and 
compresses them (sphiggei panta: 58a7).  I emphasize that what is at work here is motion and 
more specifically the motion of the universe’s intellect which is wrapped around the body of the 
universe (he d’ ek mesou pros ton esxaton ouranon pantē diaplakeisa kukloi te auton exōthen 
perikalupsasa: 36e2-3).  Further, I follow Bury in thinking that Timaeus is speaking here of the 
centripetal force exerted by the motion of the revolution of intellect.162  By invoking this force, 
                                                 
162 Bury (1929): 142 n. 2. 
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however, I mean only to suggest that, once a certain speed of rotation is reached, some degree of 
compression happens.  The additional stipulation and my main point is that when our own 
intellects achieve their proper speed, whatever imperfections might have been jutting out of them 
like teeth jutting out from a malleable, circular gear are ironed out or absorbed into the shape of a 
circle.  The compressing speed of the revolution, so to speak, compresses itself, and the proper 
shape of intellect’s revolving is achieved.  Accordingly, it becomes perfectly circular just like the 
heavenly intellect. 
 Thus, in the end, I suggest that we think of philosophy in this initial sense in two ways.  
First, philosophy is the application of the heavenly revolutions of intellect to our own.  In a 
significant sense, this simply means that the philosophical enterprise is identical with the 
imitation of the heavenly intellect though this imitation, as we have seen, ultimately amounts to 
measuring or calculating the celestial speeds with respect to one another.  Second, such 
calculating and thus philosophy is synonymous with a psychic state of affairs in which intellect 
moves at the proper speed, in the proper direction, maintains a single position, and consequently 
has a circular shape. 
4.2.2 Philosophy and Music: The Intellectual Observer and the Intellectual Listener 
In order to reinforce the connection I have argued for in philosophy between the 
calculation of celestial speeds and the imitation of the heavenly intellect, I draw on the similarity 
Timaeus appears to see between philosophy and music.163  I suggest that he sees a kinship 
between the two because three of his five references to philosophy occur alongside mention of 
                                                 




music (46e6-47e2; 73a6-7; and 88c5).  In this section, however, I only discus two of these 
references, saving the third for the discussion below.   
The first explicit mention of music in the speech shadows Timaeus’ account of 
philosophy as the greatest benefit of eyesight. 
These pursuits, in turn, have given us philosophy, a gift from the gods to the mortal race 
whose value neither has been nor ever will be surpassed.  I’m quite prepared to declare 
this to be the supreme good our eyesight offers us.  Why then should we exalt all the 
lesser good things, which a non-philosopher struck blind would lament and bewail in 
vain?  Let us rather declare that the cause and purpose of this supreme good is this: the 
god invented sight and gave it to us so that we might observe the revolutions of 
intelligence in the heavens and apply them to the revolutions of our own intellect.  For 
there is kinship between them, even though our revolutions are disturbed, whereas the 
universal revolutions are undisturbed.  So once we have come to learn them and to share 
in the ability to make correct calculations according to nature, we should stabilize the 
straying revolutions within ourselves by imitating the completely unstraying revolutions 
of the god.  
Likewise the same account goes for sound and hearing—these too are the god’s 
gifts, given for the same purpose and intended to achieve the same result.  Speech was 
designed for this very purpose—it plays the greatest part in its achievement.  And music 
too, insofar as it uses sound, is given for the sake of harmony, and so serves this purpose 
as well.  And harmony, whose movements are akin to the revolution within our souls, is a 
gift of the Muses for those who make intelligent use it.  Music is not for irrational 
pleasure, which is how people nowadays seem to make use of it, but rather is an ally in 
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the fight to bring order to the revolution of the soul within us that has become 
unharmonized [anarmoston] and make it concordant [sumphōnian] with itself. (46e6-
47e2: tr. Zeyl with modifications) 
The first thing to note is that philosophy and music are intended by the gods to be used for the 
same purpose—the stabilization or correction of our corrupted intellectual revolutions.  What 
distinguishes the two, however, appears to be not only the way in which each brings about this 
correction but also the way in which this correction is conceived.  On the one hand, philosophy 
construes the problem in terms of wandering revolutions and the solution to the problem in terms 
of the imitation of the unwandering heavenly revolutions of intelligence.  Music, on the other 
hand, construes the problem in terms of a lack of harmony in our revolutions and invokes the 
intellectual use of musical harmony accordingly.  So having already seen how it is that imitation 
of the heavenly revolutions brings about the correction of our own revolutions, we should 
wonder in turn what studying musical harmony involves and how it also yields corrected 
intellects. 
 On the most general level, it appears that the study of music achieves the desired results, 
generally speaking, through the engagement of an intellectual exertion which amounts to the 
provision of motions for the soul.  Take the following passage. 
The student of mathematics, or any other subject, who works very hard with thought 
[dianoiai] should also provide exercise for his body by taking part in gymnastics, while 
one who takes care to develop his body should in turn provide motions for his soul by 
applying himself to music and philosophy [philosophia]. (88c1-5: my translation)  
Notice first that the student of mathematics is working hard specifically with his dianoia or 
thought.  I point this out because Timaeus uses a similar word, dianoēsis, in the context of 
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philosophy to describe specifically what it is about intellect that we are correcting when we 
successfully imitate the heavenly revolution of intelligence (tas en ouranōi katidontes tou nou 
periodous chrēsaimetha epi tas periphoras tas tēs par’ hēmin dianoēseōs: 47b7-8).  Thus, when 
Timaeus suggests that the fitness enthusiast emulate the mathematician and apply himself to 
music and philosophy, we should recognize that this means providing his soul with the proper 
motions, and in particular providing these motions for his dianoia. 
If we want to know further how music provides such motions, I suggest that we consider 
Timaeus’ distinction in the first passage above between listening to music for pleasure and 
listening intellectually, a distinction that we later find out invokes calculation as a distinguishing 
factor of intellectual listening.  Consider the following excerpt. 
We should also investigate all sounds, whether fast or slow—sounds that appear to us as 
high-pitched or low.  Sometimes, when the motion they produce in us as they move 
toward us lacks conformity, these sounds are inharmonious; at other times, when the 
motion does have conformity, the sounds are harmonious.  [What happens in the latter 
case is this.]  The slower sounds catch up with the motions of the earlier and quicker 
sounds as these are already dying away and have come to a point of conformity with the 
motion produced by the slower sounds that travel later.  In catching up with them, the 
slower sounds do not upset them, even though they introduce another motion.  On the 
contrary, they graft onto the quicker movement, now dying away, the beginning of a 
slower one that conforms to it, and so they produce a single effect, a mixture of high and 
low.  Hence the pleasure they bring to fools and the intellectual delight they afford—in 




The important thing to recognize is the mathematical flavor of the above.  As opposed to the 
fool, I assume that the intellectual listener is involved in the enterprise of calculating the relative 
speeds of multiple tones, and more specifically in identifying which rapid motions and slower 
motions come together to make this or that harmony.  This kind of approach, it seems, amounts 
not only to the intelligent use of music but also to the finer details of intellectual exertion in the 
musical context. 
Moreover, we should recognize a similar scenario in astronomy in the distinction 
between the meteōrologikos, who we met in the previous chapter, and what we might call, “the 
intellectual observer.”  The meteōrologikos’ folly consists in his attachment to vision which he 
thinks provides “the most solid proofs” (apodeixeis bebaiotatas: 91e1) concerning heavenly 
matters.  And much like the musical fool who uses sounds improperly for enjoyment alone, the 
meteōrologikos uses the sights he sees improperly as evidence.  By contrast and similar to those 
who make intelligent use of music and in particular harmony, the intellectual observer makes 
proper use of astronomy and, in particular, as we have seen, philosophy.  In other words, we 
should recognize in philosophy the same thing we see in the investigation of harmony though, in 
place of calculations about the things we hear, we have calculations about the things we see, and 
this is, as I have claimed, what Timaeus is indicating when he suggests that the greatest good, 
philosophy, involves making “correct calculations.”  While all the other products of vision—the 
discovery of number, time, and the investigation of nature—certainly lay the ground work for the 
philosophical enterprise, they are nonetheless things the meteōrologikos is most likely also 
abreast of.  What he lacks, it seems, is the further coordinated and mathematical use of these 
products.  This is his supreme failure.  He neglects mathematics and by doing so neglects his 
intellect just like the musical fool. 
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4.3 Philosophy as Following Our Own Intellects 
 As stated at the outset, philosophy is not only an astronomical endeavor in which we 
yield to the heavenly revolution of intelligence.  It is also, it appears, a more localized pursuit 
involving submission to the intellect in us.  Timaeus presents this notion initially as follows.   
So, to prevent the swift destruction of our race by disease and to forestall its immediate, 
premature demise, they had the foresight to create the lower abdomen, as it’s called, as a 
receptacle for storing excess food and drink.  They wound the intestines round in coils to 
prevent nourishment from passing through so quickly that the body would of necessity 
require fresh nourishment just as quickly, thereby rendering it insatiable.  Such gluttony 
would make our whole race incapable of philosophy and music [aphilosophon kai 
amouson], and disobedient to the most divine part within us.  (72e6-73a8: tr. Zeyl with 
modifications) 
Intestines long enough to store our food for a while, it seems, are a necessary condition of 
becoming philosophical and musical.164  The further specification is that such length is required 
for the possibility of obedience to our most divine part, intellect.  Accordingly, it seems that two 
things are at issue.  First, having an insatiable appetite would undoubtedly take away from the 
time we might dedicate instead to astronomy and music and more specifically to the correction 
of our intellects, and here, I take it, that at least in part unphilosophical and unmusical refers to a 
mangled intellect that lacks the proper shape and motion and just like the one found in young 
humans, as we saw in the previous chapter (see pp. 104-5 above).  At the same time, I suggest, 
that obedience to intellect should be aligned with being philosophical or philosophy and not 
                                                 
164 See also Aristotle, Generation of Animals: 1.4 717a25ff, who indicates that animals with straight 
intestines have a more insatiable appetite than those who, as Timaeus suggests, have coiled intestines.  
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necessarily with music, and I do in the main because of what Timaeus tells us elsewhere about 
the coming to be of birds and land animals. 
As for birds, as a kind they are the products of a transformation.  They grow feathers 
instead of hair.  They descended from innocent but simpleminded men, men who studied 
the heavenly bodies [meteologikōn] but in their naiveté believed that the most solid 
proofs concerning them could be based upon visual observation.  Land animals in the 
wild, moreover, came from men who had no tincture of philosophy [philosophia] and 
who made no study of the heavens whatsoever, because they no longer made use of the 
revolutions in their heads but instead followed the lead of the parts of the soul that reside 
in the torso [stēthē].  (91d6-e6: tr. Zeyl with modifications) 
Here once again I call our attention to the meteōrologikos.  The meteōrologikos fails to take his 
astronomical pursuits further than what his eyes can tell him and is reincarnated as a bird 
accordingly.  The man destined to be the wild land animal, however, not only fails to investigate 
the heavens, as Timaeus claims, but also neglects philosophical matters.  Neglecting the latter in 
this instance appears to mean that instead of following the “revolutions in his head,” he instead 
follows “those parts of the soul in his torso,” i.e. spirited and appetitive soul (en dē tois stēthesi 
kai tōi kaloumenōi thōraki to tēs psuchēs thnēton genos enedoun: 69e3-4).  So just like the 
unphilosophical humans with short intestines who were never created though who would have 
undoubtedly followed their appetitive soul, the man destined to be the wild land animal is 
equally unphilosophical and also becuause, in part at least, his obeys his appetites.  Accordingly, 
it would seem that obedience to the revolutions in our heads is, to the contrary, a philosophical 
activity.     
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 The regrettable thing about these passages is that they offer less detail than we might like 
about how intellectual sovereignty works.  They are not, however, our only resource.  Elsewhere 
in the speech, Timaeus offers two pictures of what rational dominion in mortals entails.  First, we 
have Timaeus’ rendering of the demiurge’s advice to us before our embodiment where he 
outlines the intellectual regulation of our incarnated selves.  Second, we have the vignette of the 
installment of mortal soul in human beings in which Timaeus presents a similar though more 
detailed picture of intellectual rule.  Thus, the majority of my analysis of philosophy here will 
involve discussing these two pictures. 
 It is worth noting that while we might treat the latter picture as if it were an echo of the 
former as Taylor and Cornford seem to do,165 it seems that we might also see differences 
significant enough to analyze as in the work of Johansen and Gordon.166  I align myself with the 
first pair though without thinking that my claims are necessarily incompatible with the second.  
Accordingly, I concentrate on the similarities between the two passages and in particular the 
theme of subjugating the body.          
4.3.1 The Demiurge’s Advice: What We Must Master and How 
 Ultimately, I am interested to show that philosophy in the second sense is identical with a 
sophisticated sort of control over body, and the following passage gives us some indication of 
this. 
He [the demiurge] described to them the laws that had been foreordained…once the souls 
were of necessity implanted in bodies, and these bodies had things coming to them and 
leaving them, the first innate capacity they would of necessity come to have would be 
                                                 
165 Taylor (1928): 493, and Cornford (1937): 281 n.3. 
166 Johansen (2004): 146-9, and Gordon (2005): 257. 
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sense-perception, which arises out of forceful disturbances.  This they would all have.  
The second would be love, mingled with pleasure and pain; and they would come to have 
fear and anger as well, plus whatever goes with having these, as well as their natural 
opposites.  And if they could master these, their lives would be just, whereas if they were 
mastered by them, they would be unjust.  And if a person lived a good life throughout the 
due course of his time, he would at the end return to his dwelling place in his companion 
star, to live a life of happiness that agreed with his character.  But if he failed in this, he 
would be born a second time, now as a woman.   And if even then he still could not 
refrain from wickedness, he would be changed once again, this time into some wild 
animal that resembled the wicked character he had acquired.  And he would have no rest 
from these toilsome transformations until, by means of the revolution of the same and 
uniform within him, he had tamed [sunepispōmenos] that accretion of fire, water, air, and 
earth, ruling [kratēsas] over its turbulent and irrational being with reason [logōi].  This 
would return him to his original condition of excellence. (41e2-42d2: tr. Zeyl with 
modifications) 
I think that I should first point out that the context here is not entirely bodily as it might appear.  
There is some indication that mortal soul is also being referenced here.  In fact, the first mention 
of mortal soul in the dialogue follows directly on the heels of the above.  After explaining to us 
our task, the demiurge hands over our immortal souls to his progeny and reminds them of their 
responsibility to make not only our bodies but also “the human soul which remained to be built” 
(42d7-e1), namely mortal soul.  Ultimately, I say this so we will not be tempted to think that 
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sensations or the emotions are the products merely of the comings and goings of the body.167  
Nonetheless, I suggest that the emphasis in the passage is certainly on the corporeal. 
At any rate, it seems that there are as many as three things that the demiurge calls upon us 
to master in the passage above: 1) sensations (“forceful disturbances”), 2) emotions (“love, 
mingled with pleasure and pain…fear and anger…”), and 3) the body (“that accretion of fire, 
water, air, and earth”).  The first two I include given the ambiguity of the clause, “if they could 
master these,” which seems to require that we take into consideration control over both 1) and 2).  
Certainly, our sensations are things that need to be “ruled” or regulated.  Recall from the 
previous chapter that the disfigurement of our intellects is in large part due to the harmful effects 
of unruly sensations.  On the other hand, barring mental illness, these sensations are eventually 
regulated once and for all naturally in our initial condition of being emphrōn (see pp. 116-7 
above).  Thus, I suggest that, of the two, the emotions are the only items that truly require 
intellectual effort on our part to control.168 
 Concerning the third item, the body, we see not only that it is indeed something to be 
controlled but we also see what entity in particular is meant to control it and how.  First, “the 
revolution of the same and similar in us,” as should be expected, is the agent assigned to the task.  
Further, regarding the means to regulating it, the “accretion of fire, water, air, and earth” is to be 
“drawn along with” (sunepispaō, what I have translated above as “tamed”) our intellectual 
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revolution, and an important thing to note is that Timaeus uses the same language to describe the 
authority that sensations have over us in our early years.  The internal products of our juvenile 
sense-perception “draw along the whole vessel of the soul” and they do so by colliding with it 
(hais d’ an exōthen aisthēseis tines pheromenai kai prospesousai sunepispasōntai kai to tēs 
psuchēs hapan kutos: 44a6).  It is not clear here, however, that intellectual “drawing along” 
involves any kind of collision (though we will see that something like this is the case below) nor 
is it clear what else it may entail.    
Further, assuming that intellect has exclusive rights to ruling, we might wonder what we 
are to do when it comes to regulating our emotions.  Must we enact a separate mission and 
means to drawing feelings like fear and anger along with intellect?  Or should we think instead 
that, given the emphasis on the corporeal, controlling the body is the mediating route to 
dominion over our emotions, that in achieving victory over the former we simultaneously win 
over the latter?     
 We should be equally curious about the role education plays in establishing intellectual 
authority, whether it be over body or the emotions.  In the present instance, Timaeus appears to 
be at least somewhat cognizant of the issue insofar as the demiurge assigns his divine progeny 
the task of “steering” (diakubernaō) us to the best of their ability (42e2-3).  It is unclear, 
however, what this divine guidance includes.  Is there some god-given subject matter the study 
of which would result in allegiance to our own intellects?  Or has our education in this regard 
been exhausted upon the demiurge’s last word of advice in which case establishing intellectual 
authority is just a matter of successfully remembering and following instructions?169        
                                                 
169 For the indication that Plato’s theory of recollection is at work here, see Hadot (1983): 120, and 
Zuckert (2011): 357 n. 20, who reiterates Hadot’s point. 
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As far as subject matter is concerned, it should be tempting to think that just as studying 
astronomy results in the healing of our intellects, some other investigation could result in the 
initiation of intellectual rule.  In fact, at least when it comes to control over the body, the 
majority of the second part of Timaeus’ speech promises to be the perfect investigation for the 
task.  It is indeed a study of the subjugation of Necessity by Intellect, a study we might 
reasonably think of as one concerned with the nature of the elements and their contribution to the 
overall order present in the universe.  The major drawback of this suggestion, however, lies in 
the difficulty of deciding how investigating or, I dare say, knowing the nature of “fire, water, air, 
and earth” would effect the installment of rational command over body.  The alternative proposal 
that Timaeus intends us to imitate the demiurge’s wise persuasion of necessity is no better.  After 
all, what would such imitation involve?  Certainly, it cannot require ordering the elements within 
us by means of numbers and shapes (53b4-5).  The fire, etc. in our bodies are borrowed from the 
already ordered elements of the universe’s body (42e8-10), and in the final analysis, it is unclear 
what else the demiurge is doing that we might imitate.  
Gymnastics might also be a tempting option when it comes to subject matters that could 
bring about the appropriate intellectual rule.  When we exercise, we are exerting intellectual 
control over body to the extent that physical exertion is a case of self-motion and self-motion, in 
turn, is driven by intellect (89a1-3).  The problem in this case, however, involves the 
awkwardness of thinking that proper attention to gymnastics alone could return us to “our 
original condition of excellence.”  As we saw above, the individual who focuses on his body is 
only doing half of what is required and therefore cannot be expected to have achieved to the 
greatest goal of all mortal existence (90d5-7).   
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Accordingly, I think we see that drawing the body along with intellect in the 
philosophical sense must be something distinct from the type of control we see in the demiurge’s 
own suppression of necessity or even from the type of rational command we see in gymnastics.  
Accordingly, there appears to be no obvious study that will effect such intellectual control over 
ourselves and also no other apparent pursuits that the demiurge’s divine progeny have put in 
place to help us.  At this point, then, what I think we are left with is the suggestion that following 
our own intellects and thus practicing philosophy is something to be identified with a sheer act of 
will carried out in accordance with the demiurge’s instructions.  In order to see how this works 
out, however, I suggest that we draw from Timaeus’ more detailed account of the installment of 
mortal soul in the human body.   
4.3.2 Mastering Appetitive Soul via Advanced Control of the Body 
 Timaeus’ account of mortal soul is, I suggest, not so much an account of its creation as it 
is an account of its installment in the body, the consequences of this installment, and indications 
for how to deal with these consequences.  In other words, the emphasis does not fall on what 
mortal soul is: for instance, what it is made of or how it is structured or just generally speaking 
what its spatial characteristics are.  At most, Timaeus might be taken to imply that mortal soul is 
“round and elongated” like an oval when he describes the shape of the marrow as such that holds 
it, but this is hardly conclusive.  It seems that the only thing we can be certain of is that mortal 
soul is motive (89e3-5),170 and I take it that we can be certain of so little because its spatial 
characteristics are ultimately unimportant.  Knowing about them is not at all necessary for 
                                                 




asserting our intellectual dominion.  What it appears is important is knowing the possible outputs 
of each part of the soul, where each part of the soul is, and why each part is where it is.   
Timaeus begins his account from the outputs, and in particular he speaks of the unsavory 
ones. 
[H]aving taken the immortal origin of the soul, they proceeded next to encase it within a 
round mortal body [i.e., the head], and to give it the entire body as its vehicle.  And 
within the body they built another kind of soul as well, the mortal kind, which contains 
within it those dreadful but necessary disturbances: pleasure, first of all, evil’s most 
powerful lure; then pains, that make us run away from what is good; besides these, 
boldness also and fear, foolish counselors both; then also the spirit of anger hard to 
assuage, and hope easily led astray.  These they fused with unreasoning sense-perception 
and all-venturing lust (erōti), and so as was necessary, they constructed the mortal type of 
soul. (69c5-d6: tr. Zeyl with modifications)       
First, I think we should see in this list of outputs an echo of the demiurge’s advice discussed 
above.  Certainly, all the players are present—sensation, love (eros), pleasure and pain, fear and 
anger.  In contrast to the above, however, each item here is explicitly connected to mortal soul.   
 Now, recall from Chapter 2 that there are two types of mortal soul: the spirited and the 
appetitive.  Thus, there are two entities to take on the responsibility of processing the collage of 
pleasure, pain, fear, anger, etc.  As Timaeus makes clear, the spirited soul is responsible for our 
emotional life and the pleasures and pains associated with it while the appetitive is responsible in 
a parallel sense for our bodily desires, most emphatically desires for food and drink.  
Accordingly, regulating the two should involve controlling our feelings and our appetites.   
154 
 
With regard to our emotional life, one such affection is stressed above all others—
contentiousness (philonikos).  It is highlighted not only for the potential problems it causes in the 
body—inflaming it and causing illness (88a3-6).  But also, those who cultivate and give 
themselves over to contentiousness, as well as the desires of appetitive soul, are sealing their fate 
as four-footed beasts and worse (90b1-3).  In fact, this act of submission seems to be precisely 
what it means to follow “the parts of soul in the torso.”  At our most mortal, then, we are 
contentious sensualists.              
 While I think that Timaeus certainly intends for us to refrain from being sensualists, I do 
not think, however, that he means for us to dispense with all antagonism.  Remember that we are 
still in the midst of unpacking Socrates’ indication that philosophy is ultimately what makes 
warriors appropriately fierce with their enemies.  So the goal, I take it, is not to become pacifists.  
Rather, it is to use our contentiousness properly.171  Thus, I suggest that intellectual command of 
spirited soul is, in the main, the successful direction of our hostility toward suitable objects. 
 Timaeus says as much himself.  He indicates, however, that this hostility can be directed 
to two sources.  On the one hand, we can be appropriately contentious with unjust human beings 
or nations, and in the context of the Timaeus-Critias, such a scenario is exemplified by Critias’ 
tale of the Athenian fight with the aggressive military force of Atlantis, a fight I address later 
below.  On the other hand, we are also right to combat injustice that might arise, surprisingly 
enough, inside ourselves.  In this case, the culprit we are fighting is bodily desire and thusly 
appetitive soul. 
                                                 
171 For the idea that mortal soul, generally speaking, is to be utilized for the good it can do rather than 
being something to suppress, see Johansen (2004), in particular Chapter 7, and Carone (2007). 
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 When it comes to vanquishing appetitive soul, there is really only one course we can 
take.  First, I should make clear that intellect is capable of interacting directly with spirited soul.  
This is a consequence of the fact that, apart from having the proper nature, spirited soul is 
installed within earshot of rational command in the chest and accordingly can easily hear its 
orders (70a2-4).  Moreover, spirited soul is situated where it is because part of its task is to 
operate the heart and circulatory system when called to just action by intellect (70a7-c1).  In such 
a scenario, it readies all the blood vessels so that through them “the sensitive parts in the body” 
(pan hoson aisthētikon en tōi sōmati: 70b6) can receive intellect’s encouragements or threats, 
and in the present case, it is the appetitive soul that is to receive them.   
How it receives them is a somewhat fantastic affair.  The appetitive soul is situated in our 
gut close to the intestines frequented by the food we consume (70d7-e1).  In principle, placing it 
this far from intellect is meant to create the peace and quiet necessary for contemplation of “what 
is beneficial for all” (70e5-71a3).  The appetitive soul, however, cannot receive communications 
directly from intellect as the spirited soul can though it does not appear that the distance is at all 
the issue.  Rather, appetitive soul simply does not have a nature that is capable of understanding 
or even caring about rational matters (71a3-5).   
Given this irrational character, the gods contrive the liver, designing it to be a tool of 
intellectual control over appetitive soul (71a7-b1).  To facilitate this control, they furnish the 
liver with certain characteristics that can be manipulated to threaten appetitive soul or encourage 
it as the case may be.  The threats (apeilēi: 71b7), I take it, come into play as a response to unjust 
desires, as we saw above, and there appear to be two different ways of thinking about this 
response.  As Timaeus describes it, we can, on the one hand, use the liver’s mirror-like character 
to show images of frightening thoughts to appetitive soul (71b4-5).  On the other hand, and what 
156 
 
appears to be the more threatening gesture, we can use the liver’s bitterness to contract and 
contort the organ’s parts—its “lobes, passages, and gates”—and consequently cause pains and 
nausea in the appetitive soul (71b8-c3).   
One thing to note about this retributive process is that the appetitive soul remains our 
own.  It is not as if we are causing pain in something outside ourselves, pain that we will not feel.  
Even more noteworthy is the amount of control over body such retribution entails.  Timaeus is 
suggesting that the gods have set things up so that we have the power to contort organs inside our 
bodies, and this is, of course, truly amazing.   
Thus, I think we can say in sum that following our own intellects and thus philosophy is 
identical with an uncanny degree of self-control, and here, I suggest, it is a specific kind of 
physiological control.  So when the demiurge chooses to describe our intellectual mastery as a 
“drawing along” of the body, I think we should take this literally as Timaeus appears to do.  
Accordingly, philosophical authority over body, as opposed to the intellectual authority exhibited 
in gymnastics, for instance, involves, first, control over spirited or emotional soul which, as we 
have seen, involves the emphatic mastery of one emotion—contentiousness.  Further, such 
control involves directing our contentiousness, and this direction amounts to power over the 
circulatory system.  Having this power, in turn, allows intellect to exert its influence over 
appetitive soul not only by impressing alarming images on the liver, a physical feat of the highest 
order in its own right.  But it also makes possible the contortion of the liver’s parts which results 
in a kind of persuasive nausea, but one that we can assume acts as a remedy for the internal 
injustice that, in some sense, began the whole chain of events representative of the amazing 
physiological control of the philosopher. 
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Additionally, we can now see what the demiurge means when he suggests that mastery of 
the relevant items makes us just and failure to do so unjust.  When we do not open up our 
physiology and descend upon the transgressions of appetitive soul, we are in effect allowing the 
injustices within us to go unchecked, and we should be considered unjust accordingly.  As an act 
of omission, this amounts to a similar sense of the intellectual inactivity (argias) Timaeus 
explicitly intends us to avoid (92a1 and 89e6-7).  Thus, the man destined to be the wild four-
footed beast not only distorts his intellectual revolution when, in his inactivity, he neglects the 
study of the heavens.  He also contributes to this distortion, it seems, when he fails to use “the 
revolution of the Same and similar” against his mortal soul and perhaps even by default is 
considered to be following the spirited and appetitive instead.        
4.4 Conclusion: Philosophy and the Warrior 
 As seen in seen in the story told thus far about the installment of mortal soul, the context 
of philosophical control is very much the context of injustice.  When intellect registers an unjust 
action, either from within or without, it moves through a sophisticated physiological means to 
combat it, a means that I have argued is, in some sense, identical with philosophy.  Thus far, 
however, we have considered only actions against the culprit within—appetitive soul.  We must 
now discuss the philosophical reaction to injustice from without.  
 Let me first briefly reiterate the impetus to this discussion.  As we saw in Chapter 1, the 
day before the events of the Timaeus and Critias Socrates offers Timaeus and company an 
account of his ideal city.  This account is not given without some expectation of repayment, 
however.  Socrates asks that he be given, in return, a story about his ideal city at war though one 
that highlights the warriors’ education and in particular that part of their education responsible 
for success in battle.  This education, I argued, is that of the philosopher insofar as Socrates 
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thinks that it is the philosophical soul that allows the warrior to be appropriately harsh with his 
enemies.  After some discussion and exhibition, Timaeus accepts the task of presenting the 
educational component, and ultimately, as we have seen, this amounts to presenting a description 
of the philosopher’s soul and how it comes to be as it is.   Accordingly, we must now consider 
what it is about his soul, in particular, that makes the Timaean philosopher a candidate for 
Socrates’ ideal warrior.        
 First, I reiterate that what is operative in the philosophical context is a combination of 
physiological and psychic factors.  When he is the victim of an unjust action or, I suppose, even 
the prospect of one hailing from an external enemy, the philosopher via intellect reports the 
occurrence to spirited soul.  In expectation of dangers (deinōn) to come, spirited soul, in turn, 
“boils” (zeō) over, causing the heart to beat vigorously (pēdēsis) in its preparation of the bodily 
channels for the transmission of intellectual commands and threats (70c1 ff.).  Moreover, this 
beating is tempered by the coolness and softness of the lungs surrounding the heart, organs 
placed there by the gods for the very purpose of maintaining the heart’s and thus the spirited 
soul’s service to intellect in times of the greatest passion (70c4-d6), in times, it appears, of battle. 
   In contrast to the case of internal injustice, it is not apparent here that the threats 
intellect deploys into the circulatory system are relevant in the event of war.  There is no 
indication that such ultimatums are meant to check a potentially cowardly spirited or appetitive 
soul or that they somehow translate into violence against an external adversary.  In the main, 
then, when intellect is in command, what we should say is that our contentiousness is properly 
directed and our bodies are ready to act in whatever way intellect dictates.  Most importantly, 
however, we see a need for intellect to stay at the reins, and the gods have created us so that this 
is a possibility.  Accordingly, for Timaeus, war is not an inspired affair to be pursued when we 
159 
 
are out of our minds (aphrosunē), as Timaeus suggests we are when divining in dreams (71e2-3).  
Rather, as we should expect, war is yet another instance in which we follow intellect and perhaps 
even the greatest test of our obedience thereto.  Thus, the philosopher, in this case, the champion 
of allegiance to intellect is the prime candidate for war.   
  This is not the only thing that makes philosophers superior.  It seems that philosopher-
warriors are also supreme in the sense that they would never battle for the sake of increasing 
their property or wealth.  In order to bring out this point, however, I think we should look at the 
best example of the opposite kind of combatants, the Atlantians, and here I turn again to the 
Critias. 
For many generations, so long as the inherited nature of the god remained strong in them, 
they were submissive to the laws and kindly disposed to their divine kindred.  For their 
thoughts were true and in all ways great, and they showed gentleness joined with wisdom 
in dealing with the changes and chances of life and in their dealings with one another.  
Consequently, they thought scorn of everything save virtue and lightly esteemed their 
rich possessions, bearing with ease the burden, as it were, of the vast volume of their gold 
and other goods; and thus their wealth did not make them drunk with pride so that they 
lost control of themselves and went to ruin; rather, in their soberness of mind they clearly 
saw that all these good things are increased by general amity combined with virtue, 
whereas the eager pursuit and worship of these goods not only causes the goods 
themselves to diminish but makes virtue also to perish with them.  As a result, then, of 
such reasoning and of the continuance of their divine nature all their wealth had grown to 
such a greatness as we previously described.  But when the portion of divinity within 
them was now becoming faint and weak through being often blended with a large 
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measure of mortality, whereas the human temper was becoming dominant, and being 
unable to bear the burden of their possessions, they began to behave in a disgraceful 
manner and became ugly to look upon, in the eyes of him who has the gift of sight; for 
they had lost the fairest of their goods from the most precious of their parts; but in the 
eyes of those who have no gift of perceiving what is the truly happy life, it was then 
above all that they appeared to be superlatively fair and blessed, filled as they were with 
lawless ambition and power. (Crit. 120e1-121b7; tr. Bury with modifications) 
In essence, what we see here is the Atlantians’ fall from philosophy, and I say this because of the 
parallels I see between the above and Timaeus’ account.  First, the Atlantians have true thoughts 
(phronēmata althina).  For Timaeus, such thoughts (alētheis phronēseis) are, in part, the gateway 
to immortality and happiness and are equated by him with correct calculations concerning the 
heavenly revolutions, which, as we have seen, go hand in hand with philosophy (90b6 ff.).  
Further, the Atlantians are gentle with one another.  They are not, at least initially, at all 
contentious or combative and accordingly are not following the mortal parts of the soul, in 
particular, the spirited part.  Moreover, they are very much in control philosophically speaking, 
or as Critias describes it, they are not powerless (akratores) over themselves, over their desires.  
We, of course, see similar language in the demiurge’s advice—we must master (krateō) our 
sensations, emotions, and body.  The Atlantians behavior in this regard, it seems, is even the 
product of some reasoning (logismos).  They think that the pursuit of material wealth not only 
destroys that wealth but also its pursuers.  In fact, this line of thought in conjunction with the 
presence of their “divine nature,” appears to be the very source of their riches.     
 This “best of both worlds” story, however, takes a turn for the worse as we should expect.  
The divine rule within the Atlantians starts to fade and their mortality and humanity takes over 
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(epekrateō).  They then become ugly (to those capable of noticing, at least), having lost or even 
destroyed (apollumi) their own divinity.  Moreover, they become greedy, thirsting for injustice 
and power (121b6-7) which, as we know from Critias’ summary version of the story, eventually 
amounts to a thirst, in essence, for world domination.  Thus, in sum, their fall from philosophy is 
a fall from divinity to humanity and ultimately to war.   
 In the end, the point seems to be about sustainability.  Both the ancient Athenians and the 
Atlantians, in a significant sense, are philosophical initially due to a kind of divine afterglow.  
This is particularly apparent in the case of the Atlantians, and it seems that we can think that the 
first humans in Timaeus’ account are philosophical in much the same sense.  The question is, 
then, what changes them?  If we take the Atlantians as our example, it would seem that the 
simple answer is—gold and silver or just generally speaking great wealth.  By contrast, the 
ancient Athenians, just like Socrates’ guardians, have nothing to do with gold or silver and live 
in modest homes and under humble circumstances (111e5 ff.), and it should be reasonable to 
think that if there had been no aggressors like the Atlantians to strike down nor unavoidable 
cataclysms to endure (recall from Chapter 1, pp. 24-5, the floods and conflagrations spoken of by 
the Egyptian priests), the ancient Athenians would have continued living philosophically in 
perpetuity.  On the other hand, I doubt that anyone could maintain devotion to philosophy in an 
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